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ABSTRACT
Something fundamental is changing – or is it? The firms are preoccupied by trans-
formations and disruptions, the scholars are reassessing the validity of old theories, 
the politicians are wondering where the power is, and the individuals are struggling 
to understand how to go about making a living tomorrow. Has this always been the 
normal, or are we evidencing an era that can rightfully be called a New Normal?
This research is an attempt to synthetize knowledge from several rich sources 
in order to understand the drivers of the changes emerging from the phenomenon 
labelled digitalization. The research quandary of this conceptual monograph is the 
impact of digitalization – as a sociotechnical trinity of digital technological systems, 
humans and perceptions – on strategizing, the individual level actions and decisions 
tackling the fundamental uncertainty of anything future-oriented, subsequently co-
alescing into collective level outcomes. 
This research explores the constitutions of strategizing, uncertainty and digitaliza-
tion in order to understand the impact of the drivers of digitalization on the consti-
tution of uncertainty dealt with in strategizing, and the subsequent changes therefore 
reflected on strategizing. Tracing these ripples requires reconceptualizing uncertainty 
as consisting of three dimensions: lack of knowledge, difficulty of choosing between 
diverse standards of desirability, and the infathomability of the meaning making mech-
anisms that underpin the creation of those standards of desirability.
As findings, this dissertation presents three theses: first, digitalization obliterates 
one type of uncertainty, while changing and enforcing other types; secondly, digita-
lization erodes the boundaries of extant entities and creates new boundary forming 
mechanisms; and thirdly, digitalization changes the shape and impact of what we 
take for granted, consider normal – the doxa. These findings have implications for 
both the theorists and the practitioners.
As scholars, we need to redefine such units of analysis, as heretofore captured by 
concepts like the firm, market or nation. As practitioners, we need to cherish such 
rationalities that do not compete with the algorithmic intelligence, to emphasize such 
creative thinking a machine cannot do. As individuals, we need to understand how 
many of our actions are grounded on the unreflective acceptance of what we take for 
granted, and how susceptible our notion of normal is to manipulation. Together, we 
need to understand that the digital representation of reality, being constructed today 
to give the shape for our tomorrow, reflects not only the physical entities datafied and 
digitized, but also our values and preferences – whether we reflectively acknowledge 
them or not. 
Keywords: Digitalization, uncertainty, strategizing, doxa

TIIVISTELMÄ
Elämme perustavanlaatuisen muutoksen aikaa – vai elämmekö? Yritykset keskit-
tyvät disruptioihin ja muutoksiin, tutkijat arvioivat vanhojen teorioiden kykyä se-
littää uusia ilmiöitä, poliitikot pohtivat vallan uusia muotoja ja yksilöt taistelevat 
huomisen toimeentulon kanssa. Onko tämä ollut aina yhtä normaalia, vai elämme-
kö aikaa, jota voimme rehellisesti kutsua uudeksi normaaliksi?
Tämä tutkimus pyrkii yhdistämään rikasta, olemassaolevaa tietoa monista 
lähteistä luodakseen ymmärrystä digitalisaatioksi kutsutun ilmiön synnyttämien 
muutosten ajureista. Tämän teoreettisen monografian tutkimusalue on digitali-
saation – digitaalisten teknologisten systeemien, ihmisten ja oletusten muodos-
taman sosioteknisen kolmiyhteyden – vaikutus strategiointiin, eli tulevaisuuteen 
elimellisesti liittyvän epävarmuuden käsittelyyn sellaisella yksilötason toiminnal-
la ja päätöksenteolla, joka yhdistyy kollektiivisen tason lopputuloksiksi.
Tämä tutkimus perehtyy strategioinnin, epävarmuuden ja digitalisaation luon-
teeseen selvittääkseen digitalisaation ajurien vaikutusta strategioinnissa käsiteltä-
vään epävarmuuteen, ja siitä syntyviin muutoksiin strategioinnissa. Tämän vaiku-
tusketjun ymmärtäminen vaatii epävarmuuden uutta konseptualisointia: epävar-
muus muodostuu kolmesta ulottuvuudesta, jotka ovat tiedon puute, eri arvoskaa-
lojen välillä valitsemisen vaikeus, sekä niiden merkityksen muodostamismekanis-
mien hahmottomuus, joista arvoskaalamme kumpuavat. 
Tämän kirjan tulokset muodostavat kolme väitöstä: ensinnäkin, digitalisaatio 
tuhoaa yhden epävarmuuden tyypin ja muuttaa sekä vahvistaa muita; toiseksi, di-
gitalisaatio haurastuttaa olemassa olevien entiteettien rajoja ja synnyttää uusia ra-
janmuodostusmekanismeja; ja kolmanneksi, digitalisaatio muuttaa itsestäänselvänä 
ja normaalina pitämiemme asioiden muotoa ja vaikutusta. Näillä tuloksilla on niin 
teoreettisia kuin käytännönkin vaikutuksia.
Tutkijoina meidän on uudelleen määriteltävä sellaisia analyysin yksiköitä kuten 
yritys, markkina tai valtio. Yritystoiminnan harjoittajina meidän on vaalittava sel-
laista rationaalisuutta, mihin algoritminen äly ei kykene, painotettava luovaa ajat-
telua. Yksilöinä meidän on ymmärrettävä miten iso osa toiminnastamme perustuu 
itsestäänselvyyksinä pitämiimme asioihin ja miten helposti käsitystämme normaa-
lista voidaan manipuloida. Yhdessä, meidän on ymmärrettävä, että tänään muodos-
tumassa oleva, huomistamme muovaava digitaalinen todellisuuden representaatio 
heijastelee, paitsi fyysisen maailman digitaaliseksi dataksi muunnettuja entiteettejä, 
myös arvojamme ja preferenssejämme – riippumatta siitä, tiedostammeko ja tunnis-
tammeko ne vai emme. 
Avainsanat: Digitalisaatio, epävarmuus, strategiointi, doxa, normaali
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“In short, if something can happen, it will happen – regardless of what 
governments, or societies as a whole, might think about it. That’s the 
natural way of human curiosity and inventiveness. And no amount of 
political bombast or hand-wringing morality is going to change that state 
of affairs.”
(John Casti: X-events – The Collapse of Everything)
Since pre-historical times, humanity has strived to create technology as means to 
reach whatever goals were at any given time in any given context deemed worth pur-
suing. The first steps were few and far apart, however the past centuries and especially 
decades have witnessed how the stumbling toddler of humanity has grown up to 
become a sprinter, leaping over the hurdles in accelerating to a nigh super-human 
speed.
The most recent technological transformation is driven by digitalization, expected 
to transform our society on par with such game changers as the shift to agriculture, 
introduction of the spinning jenny, and the diffusion of electricity. It is the aim of this 
research to explore what digitalization ultimately means, what does it change, how 
those changes unfold and what does that mean for the agents in global economy, be 
they firms, nations or individuals. 
This introductory chapter opens with a view at the New Normal, the somehow 
perceivable era of transformations we quite cannot grasp, outlining the backdrop of 
this research. The second subchapter is a guide to this book, introducing the research 
quandary, key themes and premises, and the structure of this theoretical monograph. 
However, even before these onsets, some expectation management might be in order: 
while the contents of this book constitute a dissertation, the template of the book is 
not typical for a dissertation – for reasons that will hopefully become clear in the 
unfolding of the book. 
1.1 Digitalization and the New Normal: the background
We know a lot. Never before has humanity possessed the sheer quantity of quality 
data we now have at our fingertips. So why then does it feel that uncertainty reigns 
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supreme? Globalization seemed like an irreversible deal, but somehow we ended up 
with Brexit and Trump. MNCs were by all our theoretical knowledge destined to 
become transnationals (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1999), but the tide is changing (Econ-
omist, 2017). For the first time in generations, the income of the children will not 
outgrow that of their parents (Siltala, 2016). What happened?
Since the horrors of the World Wars I and II, the intertwined drivers of scientific 
advances in both technology and business, peace-seeking coalition-creating efforts 
among the so called developed nations, financial innovations enabling investments 
in the always better future, and freeing trade diffusing the fruits of human ingenui-
ty, seemed to succeed in forging an unforeseen era of ever-increasing wealth spread 
more evenly than ever in the history of humanity – in addition to the longest peace-
ful era in the history of the Western civilizations (Pinker and Mack, 2014). It briefly 
seemed as if the humanity had finally hit the philosopher’s stone of everlasting prog-
ress and prosperity for all1.
Then the pieces started to crumble. Technological and business advances raped 
the environment. Introverted tribal sentiments began to overrule the social integra-
tion efforts. Sophisticated financial inventions turned out to be built on legs of clay. 
Free trade revealed its victims in the less than well-to-do pockets of our global village, 
which seem to exist not only "out there" in the so called developing nations, but also 
in our neighborhood, wearing the desperate face of our unemployed friend. 
With everything we now know about everything, why does everything seem more 
uncertain than ever? Is it only the other side of the coin of accumulating knowledge 
revealing always more about what we don't know? Is it maybe the fault of contempo-
rary communications channels, broadcasting the negative news as flash fires, distort-
ing our view of the good and beautiful? Or is there a dimension to uncertainty we are 
yet to identify, and as such, yet to understand and address? Where does digitalization 
come in to play – is the imminent technological paradigm change prophesying the 
salvation or the doom of the humanity? 
Future, by most definitions, is something that has not happened yet. Therefore, 
while we can debate about the accuracy and validity of our knowledge about events 
past, we can with certainty say that of the future events, we have none. While we can 
be relatively certain that some of the things that happened yesterday will also happen 
tomorrow (most likely the sun will rise, because if it didn't there would be no tomor-
row to worry about), most of the actions we take today are essentially grounded in 
1 With the turbulence of 1970’s yet to cast shadows of doubt, the remark by Steiner writing in 
1969 captures the sentiments quite aptly: ”Much remains to be done, but one thing is clear: the 
area of unpredictable events is rapidly narrowing.”(Steiner, 1969, p. 207), quoted in Mascarenhas 
(1982, p. 87).
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fundamental uncertainty about how they will play out tomorrow. Therefore, with lit-
tle exaggeration, it can be said that most of our decisions, conscious or subconscious, 
prospective or retrospective, guised as mundane or framed as strategic, are based on 
dealing with uncertainty. I would even go as far as to suggest that most of our actions 
are grounded on the attempt to diminish that inherent uncertainty we are immersed 
in. 
Interestingly, the key point of the discussion of the ethics and morality of artificial 
intelligence is the revelation it makes about how we humans now go about making 
decisions under that uncertainty. The difficulty in defining ethical action in terms a 
machine could understand shows how much our actions and decisions are guided 
by something that cannot be bent to rules or models, processed by algorithms. In 
essence, with all the accumulated knowledge of humanity, we are still unable to create 
a formula for making good decisions when faced with the inherent uncertainty of 
even the most imminent future. Ultimately this boils down to the problem of actually 
being able to define a “good” decision (Hastie, 2001). 
It is this nebulous nature of a “good” decision that makes the ethical programming 
of artificial intelligence nigh impossible (Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2014, Yampolskiy, 
2013). Decisions are seldom universally “good”, as each decision triggers chains of 
actions and events that can at some future point in time be deemed as beneficial by 
some standards and harmful by others. These standards of good or bad in turn are 
dependent on the underlying structures of meaning we use when allocating the va-
lence to the outcomes: from whose perspective, in what context and based on what is 
something good or not? Let’s take child labor as an example: not too long ago it was 
perceived as a good thing that children could be employed in a factory because it in-
creased the number of bread-winners of a household in times of sustenance scarcity. 
Now a CEO making a decision that leads to increasing the child labor in Asia makes, 
according to most western people, a bad decision. But if on the level of the individual 
child the alternatives are either child prostitution, starvation or working at a sewing 
factory, the decision that creates the third option of child labor, can be also defined 
as beneficial2. 
2 This example highlight also the issue of the scope of the decision: it can be argued that the 
CEO of the example would be instead making a good decision if instead of opening a factory 
utilizing child labor, he were to open a school for the children in the region, thus contributing 
both to the society and to the future work force development he can later utilize in the region. 
However the activity of opening up the school is, both in terms of time and scope, an answer 
to a different problem (long-term resource building and social contribution) than the one he is 
solving (short-term need for production capabilities) by contemplating the opening of a new 
factory in the current reality.
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So, where do the meaning structures come from? Are there some fundamental 
principles we could unearth that would enable defining good and bad, well, for good? 
In my view, ultimately the meaning structures cannot be subjected to reduction that 
would somehow unveil the core principles by removing the contexts and human 
beliefs, emotions, values, cognitive idiosyncrasies, because the meaning structures 
emerge and are constituted by exactly these contexts, beliefs, emotions, values and 
cognitive structures. However, these meaning structures are the glue that binds the 
ultimately random singular actions resulting from our decisions into a coherent and 
sometimes even purposeful whole. They contribute to our notion of normal, what we 
can take for granted and build our actions on before engaging in reflective thinking.
But what is the meaning of this discussion of meaning in the context of this dis-
sertation? It is the claim of this book that the most pivotal impact of digitalization is 
the change in the nature of uncertainty we need to deal with, both within the sphere 
of strategizing, and on the wider level of the whole society. Therefore this disserta-
tion highlights how uncertainty is not only about what we don’t know, but also con-
stituted by the impossibility of creating universal meaning structures, and how this 
dimension of uncertainty impacts strategizing. Furthermore, this dissertation also 
shows that as the primary way with which we deal with uncertainty is by relying on 
the foundations of what we consider to be normal, the changes in the nature of what 
we take for granted impact our dealing with uncertainty and strategizing in ways we 
don’t reflect. 
At the core of this inquiry is the same quest that defines the attempts to find the 
approaches to instill the artificial intelligence with guidelines for ethical action. Since 
the Enlightenment, a big portion (at least if estimated based on impact, not sheer 
number of populace) of humanity has been driven by the meaning structure of faith 
in the everlasting progress through the scientific method geared towards increasing 
knowledge – relying on the faith that addressing the lack of knowledge is enough in 
guiding our actions towards creating a better world. But now, with both the positive 
and negative outcomes of this drive evident, we are beginning to see the limits of data. 
The concept of New Normal in the title of this dissertation refers to both the ex-
ogenous and endogenous changes we are currently living through. The exogenous 
changes are evident in the human-wrought upheavals consisting of the convergence 
of radical technological advances (Linturi, Kuusi and Ahlqvist, 2014), geopolitical 
and socio-economic turbulence (Kobrin, 2015, 2017a) and global environmental ca-
lamities (Wilenius and Casti, 2015). In turn, the endogenous changes emerge from 
the way these exogenous drivers shape our perceptions of normal, of what we take for 
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granted and ground our actions on. The loop closes with the impact of these endoge-
nous changes on the subsequent trajectories of the exogenous changes.
To finish in order to start, we are seeing technological developments that make 
it feasible to think that it might actually be possible to have wielders of full com-
putational rationality accessing and processing all knowledge acquired by humanity 
amongst us3. But when we have all the data in the world, and possess the computa-
tional power to process it any way we choose, is it enough to guide us in making wise 
decisions?
I don’t think so, and this book argues why. 
1.2 The purpose, key themes and the structure of this thesis
1.2.1 Research quandary and the structure of this book
The backdrop of intangible uncertainty and a vague sense of an era of transforma-
tion conveyed through traditional media, discussed at coffee tables, and analyzed in 
diverse online channels of various dispositions outlined before, is vague and amor-
phous. However, many of the threads of these sentiments pivot around technological 
advances, captured by the buzzword of digitalization. While the scholarly definitions 
of the concept of digitalization are all but unanimous, as a concept it still captures an 
integral part of what seems to be partially driving the turbulence we are experiencing. 
Therefore, digitalization (explained shortly in some detail, and even later in nu-
anced detail) is in this dissertation perceived as the independent variable that induces 
change. This leads to the question of what is it then that it changes, what is the de-
pendent variable? In this dissertation that entity is captured by the concept of strat-
egizing, also explained in more detail subsequently. However, as one of the premises 
(explained also in more detail shortly) in this dissertation is that strategizing is pri-
marily dealing with uncertainty, it is here perceived that the changes in strategizing 
3  Artificial intelligence will be discussed more later in this book, however for the hasty reader, 
a few hints: while typing the words artificial intelligence to any search engine yields the inter-
ested a cornucopia of insights, debates, facts and questions, World Economic Forum (www.
weforum.org) or the EFF portal (https://www.eff.org/issues/ai) are good sources for follow-
ing the most relevant recent outbreaks and their implications. A nice overview of AI from 2015 
can be found in the blog Wait But Why? (Urban, 2015), but in short, artificial intelligence refers 
to an advanced algorithm, a program code, that instead of needing to be pre-programmed 
by humans to carry out a specific task, utilizes so called machine learning, ie. “teaches” itself 
(develops its own code) based on an initial algorithm programmed to learn (by identifying 
patterns) through massive data sets.
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emerging from the influences of digitalization are mediated through uncertainty. The 
following figure explicates the connections of the three key concepts of this research.
DIGITALIZATION UNCERTAINTY STRATEGIZING
IMPLICATIONS?
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE MEDIATOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE
p.21
Figure 1: Key concepts and their relationships
The main research question of this dissertation is How does digitalization im-
pact strategizing? This is answered through three types of outcomes: the changes 
emerging from the direct interaction of digitalization and strategizing, the chang-
es mediated through the changes in the uncertainty, and the implications thereof 
emerging. 
In order to answer the main research question, some additional questions are 
needed. The first subquestion is “how does digitalization change the constitution 
of uncertainty?” and in order to answer that, it is necessary to first zoom in to the 
constitutions of uncertainty (chapter 4) and digitalization (chapter 5), before being 
able to present some tentative answers (chapter 6). 
The second necessary subquestion is “how are those changes in the uncertainty 
reflected in strategizing?” and again, this needs to be preceded by an understanding 
of strategizing (explicated in chapter 3), before discussing in chapter 7. The third 
subquestion pertains to the implications: “what are the theoretical and practical 
implications emerging from the changes in uncertainty and subsequently strate-
gizing?” and these are also discussed in the chapter 7, and even further in chapter 8.
The conceptual goals of this dissertation seek to form integrative knowledge, de-
fined by MacInnis (2011) as seeing “previously distinct pieces… in terms of a unified 
whole whose meaning is different from its constituent parts.” (MacInnis, 2011, p. 138). 
In order to do that, it is necessary to draw insights from diverse sources, even across 
paradigmatic or science philosophical divides. The argumentation for utilizing logi-
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cally such knowledge, stemming from diverse philosophical roots, and the support-
ing philosophical choices of this dissertation are explained in the second chapter. 
To recapitulate, this dissertation unfolds as follows. After this introductory chap-
ter, the chapter two explicates the foundations of knowledge seeking in this disserta-
tion by identifying diverse ontological choices in social sciences, and explaining and 
arguing for the use of knowledge from different philosophical underpinnings in this 
dissertation. The following two chapters synthesize an integrative framework of strat-
egizing (in chapter 3) and an integrative conceptualization of uncertainty (in chapter 
4). The chapter on digitalization (chapter 5) is grounded on some of the extant con-
ceptualizations of digitalization, however the focus is on defining and understanding 
the concept as necessary for the research purpose of this dissertation. 
Chapter 6 is the first element of the discursive part of this dissertation and an-
swers the first subquestion (how does digitalization change the constitution of un-
certainty). The continuing discussions in the chapter 7 in turn propose answers to 
the other subquestions in addition to outlining the answers to the main research 
question. These discussions are then summarized and scrutinized in terms of their 
potential contributions and limitations in chapter 8, before finalizing the book with 
the introduction of potential future research avenues. 
1.2.2 Key concepts and premises: on digitalization, uncertainty and 
strategizing
The key concepts in this dissertation are strategizing, uncertainty and digitalization, 
in that order addressed in the following chapters. While the chapters will delve the 
concepts in detail, some preunderstandings are however beneficial already at this 
stage in order for the reader to follow the overarching narrative of this book. This 
applies equally to the three key premises, argued more thoroughly throughout the 
book, but also taken as the starting points for weaving the fabric of this thesis.
The first premise is simultaneously the definition of strategizing as understood 
in this book. Strategizing means the individual level actions and decisions, fused to-
gether in social action that aggregate into collective level outcomes within the realm 
of economic action. As such, the perspective fuses together the philosophically di-
vergent streams of research on microfoundations (Barney and Felin, 2013, Felin and 
Foss, 2005, Felin, Foss and Ployhart, 2015) and research on strategy-as-practice (Pau-
la Jarzabkowski, Balogun and Seidl, 2007, Paula Jarzabkowski, 2008, Vaara and Whit-
tington, 2012, Whittington, 1996). The differences of the approaches will be later 
discussed, however the mutual element they share is at the core of the definition of 
strategizing in this dissertation: there are no macro level causalities, but all collective 
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level outcomes emerge from the actions and interactions on the micro level of an 
individual, shaped by and further shaping the collective level influences.
The second premise of this book is that strategizing is mainly about dealing with 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is used in this thesis as an umbrella term covering the cor-
nucopia of concepts like risk, normal and Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921), am-
biguity and Marchian ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961, March, 1978, 1982), isotropy (Sar-
asvathy, 2001), equivocality (Weick, 1979, 1995) in addition to typologies such as 
weak and strong uncertainty (Dequech, 2004, 2011), substantive and procedural un-
certainty (Dosi and Egidi, 1991), and state, effect and response uncertainty (Milliken, 
1987). Based on existing literature, uncertainty is in this thesis reconceptualized as 
consisting of three dimensions: lack of knowledge (consisting of open and closed sets 
of options and outcomes as discussed by Packard, Clark and Klein (2017)), difficul-
ty of choosing between diverse standards of desirability (March, 1982, Thompson, 
1967), and the impossibility of objectively deducting the non-objective, constructed 
nature of the meaning making mechanisms that underpin the creation of those stan-
dards of desirability in the first place. 
The third premise of this book underlies also the definition of the buzzword-like 
concept of digitalization. Digitalization is in this book understood as a sociotechni-
cal entity (Geels, 2004, 2010, Geels and Schot, 2007, Leonardi, 2012) that consists 
of three dimensions as discussed by Tilson, Lyytinen and Sörensen (2010a, 2010b). 
The first component is technological, and includes datafying entities from the objec-
tive (physical), subjective and intersubjective (explained in more detail later) realms, 
giving that data a digital form (digitizing) and subsequently storing, processing and 
transferring that digital data. The second component are the humans as users and 
shapers of technology, sources of data, and as subjects and objects of collective level 
change, and the third component are the perceptions of the humans as guiding the 
use and developmental trajectories of technology, and as subjects and objects of in-
dividual level change.
As such, the use of the concept of digitalization requires a caveat. Like mentioned, 
there is no scholarly agreement on the definition of the concept, and the discussions 
of digitalization often pertain to some sets of technological developments or to an 
organizational transformation ensuing from adopting new technologies. The techno-
logical components may entail such enablers as the increase in computational capac-
ity (with increasing ease of access through eg. cloud computing and decreasing pric-
es), the advances in telecommunication technologies, diffusion of mobile digital de-
vices, sensor technology, or applications such as digital platforms, internet-of-things 
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(or of-everything), or even the school of quantified self, transhumanism4. However, 
the focus in this dissertation is not on scrutinizing any of the individual technological 
advances, but on trying to pin down the drivers of the changes ensuing from the con-
vergence of these different technological developments, and the enmeshed interplay 
of technology and humans. As such, the adopted viewpoint adheres to the sociotech-
nical school of research on technology,
In this dissertation digitalization is perceived as an ongoing phenomenon not de-
pendent on any of the individual technological enablers or applications – somewhat 
similar to how the adoption of electrical technology was not dependent on any single 
technological innovation: once the ability to harness electricity was created, the indi-
vidual advances in both the technology and its use by humans converged in creating 
the contemporary society where electricity is taken for granted to the extent of nigh 
invisibility. 
As mentioned, all of these key themes will be discussed in more detail in their 
own chapters, but hopefully these early revelations will aid the reader in holding 
on to the red thread of the overarching quandary of this research. Next it is time to 
tip one’s toes into the ocean of philosophy, and to explicate the knowledge building 
mechanisms of this thesis. 
4 This refers to individuals who use developing sensor technology and science to monitor their 
bodily functions in order to enhance their physical form, a sort of preliminary phase on the 
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“Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away.”
(Philip K. Dick: How to Build a Universe that 
Doesn’t Fall Apart Two Days Later)
Conducting social science requires addressing a set of ontological questions that un-
derpin the epistemological and methodological choices – while having constituted 
the core of philosophical ponderings throughout human history, the nature of reality 
is still far from undebated. This is evident in the constellation of our scholarly knowl-
edge: our knowledge of a given object on inquiry constitutes of several, sometimes 
complementary, at other times contradicting insights grounded on the specific per-
spective from which the given object has been observed.
 Two of the three focal concepts of this dissertation, strategizing and uncertainty, 
are widely and deeply researched objects of inquiry. However, the fact that most of 
the past endeavors are grounded on specific philosophical underpinnings has result-
ed in somewhat disjointed knowledge. Most acutely this pertains to the threefold 
conceptualization of uncertainty in this thesis: the two first types of uncertainty have 
been researched from different philosophical vantages than the third type. 
This means that in order to understand and conceptualize the objects of enqui-
ry in this dissertation, I need to be able to utilize insights emerging from different 
philosophical perspectives. This chapter explicates the logic and argumentation with 
which I attempt to do that. The first subchapter is a brief detour to my personal his-
tory, necessary in explaining the constitution of the research tool of this disserta-
tion, me. The second subchapter outlines the plural choices of the social scientist 
as grounded on the diverse ontological choices, and the third chapter outlines the 
choices on which this dissertation is grounded. 
2.1 Developments of the research instrument
It is inescapable that we see things through our own eyes and make sense of them 
through our very own experiences. In communicating an idea, the key desire there-
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fore becomes to make what is seen through my eyes visible also to another set of eyes. 
While I cannot influence the experiences of the reader, I can try to make myself more 
understandable by sharing some of the experiences that have played an integral role 
in making me see what I see the way I see it.
It has never been easy for me to quite capture what is normal. As a child, I spent 
a lot of time with my maternal grandmother and her thirteen siblings. In going to 
school I found out that what was considered normal in my family, was not normal in 
the new setting. With the malleability of the young, I soon learned to mimic normal 
in both settings.
I started playing French horn quite young, first as a hobby, but quite soon as a se-
rious hobby in a national youth symphony orchestra, with devout teenagers of which 
most subsequently became professional musicians. Again, what had been normal in 
the school setting in a small town, was not normal in the setting of ardent youths 
from across the country, brought together by their passion of pursuing a life of a 
musician. This normal became the most natural normal to me as I also ended up 
studying music professionally in the Sibelius Academy (the only music university 
of my country), then working as a symphony orchestra musician, spending the ma-
jority of my formative years being socialized into the world of professional classical 
musicians.
However, life twists and turns, and after ten years of being a professional musi-
cian, I became a radio journalist, and ended up hosting a morning show at a Chris-
tian radio channel. Again, what had before been normal, no longer applied. Being a 
journalist led me to doing communications, becoming an entrepreneur and ending 
up producing events such as the sponsorship village of the Eurovision Song Contest 
held (once) in Finland – in short being entangled in the entertainment industry, fa-
miliarizing myself with both the glitter and the gutter of the industry. Needless to say, 
little of what had been normal, applied. A brief return to the world of art, this time 
as the communications manager of the contemporary art museum Kiasma, brought 
me into the middle of an ongoing power shift within the museum, introducing me 
two types of normal, neither of which resonated with my previous encounters of what 
should be taken for granted. 
Then I got married and moved from the capitol to a small village of 3000 inhab-
itants, to a house in between the sea and the forest, with 10km to the only grocery 
store of the village, and had two children. Becoming a mother changes the normal 
quite dramatically, but so did the encounters with the local people, who perceived all 
my past lives as quite abnormal. I took up the hobby of bowhunting, and yet again 
encountered a group of people with their own distinct understanding of what can be 
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taken for granted. In addition, I got involved in the municipal politics, yet again a 
learning experience. 
With kids growing, I needed to figure out a livelihood and launched a communi-
cations agency, specializing in the needs of the small and medium sized firms in the 
region, and learned to know the hard life of an SME entrepreneur through both my 
own experiences and through the problems of my clients. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the business and the economy, I started to pursue the degree of 
executive Master of Business Administration, eMBA. Through the studies I met yet 
another group of people I had not previously closely known, the middle managers of 
large companies, with their sense of normal born out of having been involved in the 
corporate life throughout their whole career, mostly spanning over two decades by 
the time of eMBA studies. Becoming a board member, and subsequently the chair of 
the board of a board members association showed me yet another facet of the sphere 
of business. 
It came with little surprise that when I became a full time doctoral candidate, an 
employee of the university, I was yet again revealed a new notion of normal. One of 
the many moments of revelation accompanying this choice of career was the intro-
duction to the philosophy of science, with its vocabulary to capture the experiences 
of my past lives. I have all my life been hopping from one set of doxa5 to another, 
and through intimate experience understand how powerful the notion of normal 
is – while at the same time, how elusive, contextual, path dependent, fundamentally 
non-objective and constructed that normal is. 
So, I still don’t know what is normal, but have learned to sense enough of any 
given normal of a context, to pass as normal (mostly). This developed sensitivity is 
also present whenever I read something – I cannot help trying to read in between 
the lines, to understand the notion of normal through which a given text is written. 
In the scholarly realm this pertains to the philosophical underpinnings of the re-
5 The concept of doxa will be discussed later more extensively, however a brief definition is al-
ready here in order. Doxa, as re-introduced by Bourdieu, refers to a zone of taken-for-granted 
within a specific social group. Like my lived experience shows, it is more fine-grained than cul-
ture or informal institutions (as all my experiences were from within a same national culture, 
reigned in majority by the same informal institutions), while it bears some connection points 
to the bottom level of basic assumptions in the cultural pyramid of Schein (1985). Further 
along this book, I will use doxa to define the notion of normal, the unreflected area through 
which we make sense of the events unfolding around us – we become conscious of things only 
after they have passed the zone of doxa. Behaving against a doxa of a specific group creates an 
unease, an instant intuition of someone not being “one of us”, however identifying the exact 
nature of that behavior that goes against a doxa is difficult, because the taken-for-grantedness 
is highly nuanced, and difficult to grasp exactly because it delineates what is taken for granted 
and as such, not reflected. 
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searchers. Subsequently, I find it difficult to commit to any given perspective, as the 
truthfulness of any understanding doesn’t depend on the chosen underpinnings, is 
merely tinted by them. 
A tree may remain the same even if we view it from different sides and thus see a 
different picture, zoom in to explore the branches and leaves, or zoom out to under-
stand its relationship to the forest. We can debate the existence of the tree beyond any 
of these experientially gained impressions, argue whether the tree is the same when 
endowed with different meanings by people with different experiences about trees, 
but ultimately, all of these discussions and perspectives increase our understanding 
about what the tree is, is not, could or could not be, and as such have value in the 
pursuit of knowledge and understanding.
I cherish and value the scientific mechanism of accumulation of knowledge; the 
incremental additions of the ever deepening insights of minutiae detail, built on the 
specific foundations of previous insights from that specific vantage. However, with 
my background I find it difficult, if not impossible, to stay zoomed in in the scrutiny 
of the one leaf, but need to have the possibility of walking around the tree, wandering 
to the tree line to admire other trees, to return back to marvel the exquisiteness of 
the details of that one leaf, and to embark in questioning the existence of the tree or 
to discuss its meaning.
 I don’t know if the academia of today has use for my type of wandering and pon-
dering individual, but this book is an attempt of illustrating the value of also this type 
of knowledge and understanding creation. In the next subchapter I trace and iden-
tify six fundamental questions that underpin the choices we as social scientists are 
required to make in our pursuit of knowledge and its definition, because recognizing 
them is necessary in the ensuing pursuit of knowledge in this book. 
While the philosophical discussions have roots as old as man, some point of de-
parture is however necessary, and in this book a question posed and to an extent 
answered by Kant serves as the springboard from which to dive into the ocean of 
philosophy. 
2.2 Six ontological questions
What can I know? This famous question Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) devoted a re-
markable part of his remarkable life (IEP Jankowiak, N/A)6 pondering, has by no 
means lost its relevance to the contemporary scholar. Kant makes three claims that 
6 The references denoted by IEP, lacking publication years, are sourced from the peer-reviewed 
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy that doesn’t share the dates of the published articles.
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resonate firmly in all the subsequent branches of philosophy of science: the first is 
the distinction of things into two categories, the ones we can experience through 
our senses (eg. a cat), and the ones we can only conceptualize (eg. God, to use Kant’s 
own example). The second distinction is vital, and has since triggered volumes of 
philosophical debates: regarding the entities that we can through the senses experi-
ence, Kant shows that the nature of those entities in themselves is a different thing 
from the appearances of those entities, which is essentially all that we can through 
our senses (or contemporary scientific devices) grasp. The third key insight is that in 
regards to the entities we can experience, our knowledge of those things consists of 
both the phenomenal part of the specific sensory input of the specific object of our 
observation, and the noumenal7 part of the general concepts we have about those 
objects of observation. 
In essence, Kant claims that ultimately we can only have knowledge about things 
that can be understood through both phenomenal and noumenal input, which means 
that regarding the things lacking a physical appearance (eg. God), we cannot have 
knowledge, only faith. What furthermore intrigued Kant was the question of which 
part of this duality of knowledge comes first, the noumenal imaginable concepts, 
or the phenomenal experience input we glean through focusing our perceptions to-
wards the specific entity we are observing. This question is interesting in the light 
of the contemporary “science wars” between the constructionist and realist schools, 
because fundamentally it deals with the dilemma of whether the entity we experience 
is first formulated in the noumenal realm as a fabrication of the observer resulting in 
the bracketing of the sensory inputs in the form of experience we then continue to 
gain knowledge about, or whether the noumenal generalisations, concepts, emerge 
after the observer has been subjected to the experience through sensory inputs. 
In “Critique of Pure Reason” (1781) Kant argues for his “Copernican” view (IEP 
Jankowiak, N/A): as he had previously come to the conclusion that knowledge per-
tains to entities with both phenomenal and noumenal existence (thus ruling out the 
7 Kant furthermore distinguishes noumena into positive and negative. The positive noumena is 
the intelligible understanding of an object that has also the phenomenal appearance, whereas 
the negative noumena is something intelligible without an object of experiental reference. The 
latter kind of noumena is however moot, because as noumena refers to the intelligible, not 
sensible part of the in-themselves-partness of an object, and as that in-themselves part of an 
object is unreachable but through the possibility of the experiences it yields, the noumenal 
understanding can never actually depict that which it sets out to do, namely the concept of 
the thing in-themselves, without the reference point of the phenomenal part of the equation 
of knowledge. From this insight follows the claim that Kant makes about there being no possi-
bility of having knowledge about the entities lacking sensible (eg. experiencable) appearance – 
instead of knowledge, we can only rely on faith (Kant, 2004, p. 132-138). However, this is where 
the pragmatic maxim of Pearce comes in to suggest some help – more about this later.
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possibility of us having knowledge about God, for example), and having distinguished 
between the objects in themselves and our experiences about them, he claims that as 
all that we have for building knowledge is based on these phenomenal appearances of 
our experiences (because we can never reach the objects in themselves, as all we have 
is the realm of experience), we can focus on all the possible experiences we can con-
ceive to have and based on those, create synthetic a priori knowledge about entities we 
are yet to experience: "All principles of the pure understanding are nothing more than 
a priori principles of the possibility of experience, and to experience alone do all a priori 
synthetical propositions apply and relate." (Kant, 2004, p. 132)
This notion has a deep impact on the subsequent evolution of pragmatism, espe-
cially in the pragmatic maxim as coined by Peirce, and also on the rise of the social 
constructionism even later (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Kant states that while we 
cannot possess a priori knowledge about entities in themselves, we can and do have a 
priori knowledge about the possible experiences those entities provide, which means 
that essentially, this kind of a priori noumenal part of knowledge plays a role in shap-
ing the simultaneous or subsequent phenomenal part of knowledge, which combined 
becomes the knowledge we can possess about the entity. To put it very simply, our 
noumenal concepts impact our phenomenal experiences. This has major implica-
tions for the faith in the possibility of pure objectivity.
These distinctions between the nature of the entities in themselves, our phenom-
enal intuitions about their appearances and the noumenal concepts we subjectively 
can come up with still resonate vibrantly in the contemporary philosophy of science. 
The natural scientist can happily claim to being in the business of knowledge-build-
ing, as the objects of his study have a physical representation by senses (and nowa-
days by sophisticated tools) observable. However even he is subject to making a stand 
about Kant’s suggestion of the ontology of things, which, extremely simplified, comes 
down to four basic onto-epistemological alternatives. 
He can dismiss Kant and claim that the objects of his observation have a real exis-
tence that can be reached through the tools of observation – the entities are real and 
can be truthfully known about through science. This is the stance of naïve realism 
and positivist empiricism, leading to and based on what Popper calls “the bucket 
theory of thinking” (Popper, 1974, p.554-555). In this worldview the knowledge flows 
into us from the real external sources through our senses, and the best way to avoid 
mistakes is to try to be as passive as possible in the process of receiving the knowl-
edge. Objectivity is equated with as little interference as possible with the externally 
originated information, with the role of the researcher limited to the recipient of as 
unfiltered knowledge as possible. 
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The second alternative is to interpret Kant’s statement as a distinction between 
ontology and epistemology as advocated in the realm of scientific realism. This “one-
world” understanding (IEP Jankowiak, N/A) states that ontologically the entities are 
realities consisting of both the entities in-themselves and their appearances, but due 
to the fallibility and imperfection of our tools of observation we can never quite cap-
ture the truth of the entities through the appearances, which are the only aspects of 
the entities we can reach – however, with the advances of science and ever develop-
ing epistemological understandings, we can continuously in our studies get closer to 
understanding the real nature of the entities as they are in themselves (Niiniluoto, 
1999, Niiniluoto and Saarinen, 2002). This interpretation underlies also for example 
Popperian falsification theory of truth (Popper, 1974), which states that while we can 
never prove anything true in the full sense of the correspondence theory of truth8, we 
can however progress in science through falsifying previous theories, thus continu-
ously creeping towards the ultimate truth of an entity.
The third alternative is to take the transcendental idealism as the ontological foun-
dation: ultimately the entities in themselves and their appearances are ontologically 
different (the “two-worlds” interpretation), meaning that the objects of our observa-
tions, the appearances don’t ontologically correspond to the entities as they in them-
selves are9. However, some of the features of the entities as they are in themselves may 
have influence on the entities as appearances, which in contemporary philosophies 
is for example the foundation of Bhaskar’s (1998) critical realism: the middle layer 
between the real and the empirical10, the layer of generative mechanisms and affor-
8 Correspondence theory of truth defines “true” as a full correspondence between a statement of 
an entity and the real existence of that entity. This is problematic for a few reasons: 1) it requires 
faith in the underlying reality to which something can correspond, 2) “correspondence” in 
itself is a difficult concept, the nature of which can be debated, as ultimately in forming a state-
ment we utilize different material (abstractions like words, mathematics) than the materials 
that assumed reality consists of (eg. atoms, quarks in the physical realm), which means that as 
the mechanisms through which the two types of entities (statements and reality) come in to be-
ing are different (language by collective choices, nature not by our choices), the one can never 
fully accurately depict the another, and 3) even if we were to dismiss the ontological differences 
between the statements and the “real” entities, as all we have to go by are the statements, the-
ories, even the most foundational theories are subject to change because the “real” can always 
surprise us when we come up with more and more sophisticated methods of examining the 
entities – we can never know if the theory we hold true in this sense actually captures the full 
extent of the entity in question.
9 Emphasizing Kant’s notion that a) as the appearances exist in the world of time and space, and 
b) our noumenal conceptions do not exist in the same world but point to c) the things in-them-
selves beyond their phenomenal representation in the world of time and space, would suggest 
that this two-worlds understanding is quite close to what Kant actually meant. 
10 For a compact and nicely comprehensive overview of the principles of critical realism I recom-
mend (Volkoff and Strong, 2013)
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dances is the realm that mediates between the unknowable entities in themselves and 
the appearances of them we can reach. 
The fourth alternative is to take the most extreme notions of Kant beyond his crit-
ical idealism by dismissing any ontologically real existence of entities in themselves. 
This line of thinking leads to, what has since Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), become 
known as phenomenological philosophy (IEP Sawicki, N/A). While the branches of 
it are quite diverse (enter Heidegger, Derrida and the postmodernists), ultimately the 
ontological disposition is to deny or ignore the existence of any such realities that 
we cannot through our phenomenal experience of them conceive: in its most radical 
stance, solipsism, this means that there is nothing but my individual perceptions of 
the world around me, no realities but for the ones of my own making. While no se-
rious philosophers have professed to adopting a solipsist view (IEP Thornton, N/A), 
as an ultimate example of the impossibility of proving any philosophical perspective 
wrong11, it warrants mentioning, especially as we move on to the additional problems 
that the social scientists face. 
Remember the natural scientist some sentences back? As he works in the realm 
of physical entities, it is likely that he has chosen an ontologically realist philosophy, 
even while his epistemological viewpoint may take several forms depending on how 
close does he consider the entities in-themselves and our attainable perceptions of 
them to be – essentially, whether it is possible to reach an ultimate or merely a prox-
imate understanding of the objects of the study. However, we, in the social sciences 
are presented by a plethora of additional philosophical issues as the objects of our 
observations have no physical existence – even though it can be argued that they do 
provide other kinds of experiences. 
To begin with, while even the natural science may be engaged in the discussion of 
whether entities can be treated as substances or processes (as ultimately, everything 
undergoes change when encountering time), the nature of social phenomena brings 
the debate familiar already to the Greek philosophers Parmenides and Heraclitus 
(Langley and Tsoukas, 2010, Rescher, 1996) to the fore. So, in addition to questioning 
the ontological realness of the entities of our observations, we need to take a stand in 
11 In his aptly named book “The handbook of everything” (Kaiken käsikirja), astrophysicist Esko 
Valtaoja (2012, p.8-10) illustrates the elusive nature of reality by at length pondering the im-
possibility of proving the solipsist, (solus ipse translates roughly to I alone), view wrong: as 
our neural networks are essentially responsible for creating any of the perceptions we receive 
through external signals, and capable of simulating those perceptions even without any exter-
nal signals, there really is no way of proving to me that there is anything beyond my individ-
ual imaginings. There are no signals we can receive from the outer realm that would not be 
processed by the same mechanisms fully capable of creating the experience of those signals 
without those signals. 
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regards to whether we view the objects of our study as processes or substances: is for 
example an organization a fixed structure or a flow of “choices looking for problems, 
issues and feeling looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions 
looking for issues to which they might be an answer, and decision makers looking for 
work.”(Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972, p. 1)12 Do we for example view change as an 
event in a static background, or do we view changing as the natural state of every-
thing? Making the first choice we can zoom into the event we’ve identified, whereas 
choosing the latter perspective requires us to fathom completely different ways of 
delineating the object of our observation from its background. However, like most 
things in life, this is also not a fully black and white choice, but can be also seen as a 
duality (Farjoun, 2010). For example, we can conceptualize a social phenomenon as 
a video, which we through our senses experience as a process, yet which simultane-
ously is constituted by individual pictures having a more static, substance-like nature. 
Then the ontological question translates into an epistemological choice underpinned 
by what we want to observe – the storyline of the stream of those individual snap-
shots, or the snapshots in themselves?
Another question, strongly influenced by Kant’s questions about the sequence in 
which we acquire the phenomenal and noumenal parts of knowledge, concerns the 
origins of the phenomena we observe: what is the role of our process of observation 
in the construction of the objects (be they substances or processes) of our study? The 
classic Eutrypho problem by Plato hits this nail on the head: do we consider an object 
as valuable, because it has inherent value, or does it have value because we consider 
it to be valuable?13 Or in yet another terms: are there real social phenomena inde-
pendent of our observations or are we as observers responsible for constructing the 
phenomena by for example the use of language (Derrida, 1976), or by the brackets 
we draw to distill the phenomena from the background (Chia, 1994, Hines, 1988, 
Weick, 1979)? Additionally, even if we were to adopt the constructionist viewpoint 
in regards to the origins of the phenomena, for example by choosing to zoom in to 
the genealogy (Foucault, 1978) of those emergence processes, what does that mean 
in terms of the ontological reality of those phenomena – can they still be considered 
to have gained a sense of realness (meaning independent, not observer-dependent 
existence) ex post their socially constructed origins? Are they like houses that remain 
12 While the authors did not explicitly profess to the process philosophy, which has gained foot-
hold in the management studies only relatively recently, this snippet is however quite illustra-
tive of the notion as later on in the seminal paper the authors explicitly deal with the variables 
they mention as functions of time (p.3).
13 Originally Plato stated the problem in regards to piety (is something pious because gods love 
it or do gods love it because it is pious?), however this more contemporary rendition by Jezzi 
(N/A) was chosen here, as it is quite fitting in regards to the context of this book.
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standing maintaining their realness after the builders have left the site, or are they 
like drawings on the water, vanishing the moment the surface is left untouched – the 
phenomenon unobserved?
Talking about social phenomena also evokes the question of the location of those 
entities we observe: considering that they can be conceived as substances or pro-
cesses, to have come into being either by construction or by having somehow inde-
pendently gained realist existence, what is the realm of their existence in relationship 
to the observer? Are they objective in the sense that they have such appearances that 
can be experienced more or less similarly by a set of observers independent of each 
other? Are they subjective in the sense that their appearances can be experienced 
only by a singular individual? Or are they intersubjective, meaning that their appear-
ances are experienced in the interaction between two or more human beings (Cant-
well, 2003, Davidson, 2001)? Karl Popper discusses this theme in his Tanner lectures 
(Popper, 1979), and argues that indeed, all these three worlds exist and need to be 
taken into consideration in social sciences. He names the worlds 1, 2 and 3, with the 
first referring to the physical entities (a book as a physical object of paper and ink), 
the second to the psychological processes within an individual (the thinking that 
drives the writing of the book), and the third to the shared outcomes of those psycho-
logical processes, having potentially a representation in the first world, but gaining 
its meaning through its existence in the third world (the story of the book, which can 
be printed in several similar or different books, exist in digital form, or be verbally 
narrated, maybe play-acted, continuing to exist independently even when the author 
is dead and no-one is reading the book).
Yet another choice warrants mentioning: the role of free will. In looking at hu-
man action, do we consider it to be driven by the causalities reducible to social and 
ultimately biological drivers, the structures, or are we free agents who can swim 
against the tide of structures if we just so choose? Mead (IEP Cronk, N/A, Mead, 
1934) looked at the issue on the individual level, identifying the dual nature of 
myself he named me and I (Joas, 1997, Kuusela, 2001). Me is the part of me shaped 
by and responding to the social stimuli, the part responsible for fitting in the social 
realm and acting driven by the social structures, whereas I is the part of myself 
capable of creativity, free will and surprises. Taking the discussion to the collective 
level, Giddens (1984) explored the constitution of society (in the book of the same 
name) and came to the conclusion that agency and structure are an inseparable 
duality, where agency creates the structures which in turn shape agency. In some 
social theorizing agency is emphasized, in some structure (see eg. a nice illustration 
of entrepreneurship literature as seeking Romeo and strategic management liter-
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ature as assessing the balcony in (Venkataraman and Sarasvathy, 2001)),  whereas 
yet others see these as a duality, and the phenomenologists deny the whole distinc-
tion between the two. 
From these ontological quandaries we can move along to several epistemological 
directions posing problems for the social scientists. While the ontology deals with 
the question of the nature of entities, epistemology asks the question of how we can 
claim to know something about those entities. The two questions are intertwined be-
cause depending on our faith in the nature of the reality of the entities we study, the 
approaches we can take to find something about them differ. To simplify this issue 
breeding volumes and volumes of alternative understandings and choices, I will next 
summarize the previous discussion into categories of ontological choices that each 
spawn a plethora of logically following epistemological and subsequently method-
ological options.
Ultimately the ontological choices can be categorized into six underlying big 
questions (see Table 1). The first question asks simply is there an independent reality, 
and it can be answered in three ways: yes, no, and yes, but what it is, is unknowable. 
The next question focuses on the third alternative, and probes further: if we believe 
that there is an independent reality we cannot fully know about, are those things we 
can know about it appendices of the underlying truth (ontologically same) or is that 
knowledge a distinct entity (ontologically different)? This time we have two choic-
es (while naturally, this being philosophy, attempts have been made to negotiate a 
solution in between) that have major impact on the subsequent epistemological and 
methodical approaches. 
The third question is independent of our answers to the previous two questions, 
meaning that we can ask it whichever answer we gave to the first one because it focus-
es on the ontology of our focus of analysis. If we believe in real entities, the question 
pertains to their nature, but if we doubt the existence of such, the question is directly 
pointed at the nature of the specific entity of our focus, the object of our enquiry 
given to us through and shaped by the phenomenal experiencing of it. The question 
therefore has two forms: is reality a process or a substance, and is this focus of my 
observation a process or a substance?
Also answering the fourth question allows us to have alternative views about the 
existence of reality as essentially it deals with the mechanism through which the en-
tities we observe have come into being. This is most likely the most divisive question 
in the sphere of social sciences, and can be written as a reduction of the Eutrypho 
question: do we see these entities because they are, or are they because we see them 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1967)? The alternative answers to this question, depending 
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on the view on reality, are: 1) the entities are real, and that is why we see them, 2) the 
entities are real, but have become so after enough seeing, 3) there may be real entities 
but all we can see are the things we by seeing create, and 4) there are no real enti-
ties, only the seeing. Each of these answers has their staunch supporters and critics, 
enough so to merit the concept of “science wars”. 
The fifth question has ignited somewhat less heat, however as it deals also with the 
reducibility of social sciences into natural sciences, it needs to be asked in the context 
of social science: do the entities we study exist in the objective realm (which would 
mean that it might be possible to reduce also the social phenomena into physics), in 
subjective realm (remember solipsism?) or in the intersubjective realm, meaning the 
interaction between individuals and collectives? Popper (1979) proposed the three-
world approach: there are objectively real entities, with a physical representation, 
subjectively real entities residing within the individual, and intersubjective entities 
existing only in the collective, intersubjective sphere. While Popper professed to be-
ing a realist in regards to all realms, however there are firm voices acknowledging 
only one or two of these potential locations of the reality. 
This discussion becomes even more relevant when we consider the relation-
ship between the individual and the collective within the social sciences, the struc-
ture-agency duality, constituting the final question. If the entities reside in the realm 
of subjective, the agency of an individual is emphasized, but if the entities were to 
exist in the objective realm, the individual level agency could be quite inconse-
quential as fundamentally everything could be reductively traced down the analyt-
ical levels of biology, chemistry, physics – and ultimately mathematics. Positioning 
the social entities into the intersubjective enables the impact of both structure and 
agency, as it is within that realm where by the collective aggregation of individual 
level actions, guided by collective level structures, those structures form, are main-
tained, change and cease. However, adopting the most extreme phenomenological 
position blurs the distinction between the two: there is no agency/structure issue, 
as all attempts to categorize anything are ultimately just semiotic choices – agency 
and structure are just artificial boundaries with which the overarching flow of ev-
erything is bracketed. 
While some of the choices along these six dimensions are logically incompati-
ble, there are however myriad ways to create logical philosophical vantages based on 
diverse selections of these key questions. Additionally, some philosophical avenues 
zoom firmly into one or some of the aspects, allowing notable variance along other 
dimensions, whereas others form more comprehensive doctrines where answering in 
a specific way to one question requires a specific set of subsequent answers. The next 
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table is a summary of these ontological choices, each set of answers leading towards 
one or more distinct epistemological and methodological choices.
Table 1: Framework for ontological choices
Six questions Ontological choices
Is there an independent reality? Yes
Yes, but it’s different from its appearances
No
If reality and its appearance are 
distinct, are they ontologically same?
Yes
No
Is reality process or substance? Substance
Process
Is reality given or constructed? Given And we can see it
But we can’t see it
Constructed But it becomes given afterwards
Nothing but the process of 
construction exists
Where is reality? In the objective realm
In the subjective realm
In the intersubjective realm
In all of the above




They constitute a duality: agency shapes and is 
shaped by the structure in which it is embedded
There is no distinction between the two as all 
categories are artificial
While the most encountered debate in social science philosophies pivots around 
the question of reality as observer-independent or as constructed, the table 1 is an 
attempt to show that the ontological underpinnings do actually not fall into a nice 
continuum between those perceived ends (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). In their 
pivotal book about sociological paradigms, Burrell and Morgan (1979) created a 
matrix between subjectivism and objectivism as one axis, and regulation and rad-
ical change as another. The first axis refers to scientific approaches and the second 
to the perceptions about the society. Forgetting the latter, let us consider the first 
dimension in order to highlight some insights that follow from refraining to adopt 
the ubiquitous division of objective-subjective categorizing of the ontological foun-
dations.
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Burrell and Morgan define this dimension through four perspectives: ontology, 
epistemology, human nature view, and methodology. Within ontology, they create a 
dichotomy between nominalism and realism, defining the first as “assumption that the 
social world external to individual cognition is made up of nothing more than names, 
concepts and labels which are used to structure reality”, and the latter as a postulation 
“that the social world external to individual cognition is a real world made up of hard, 
tangible and relatively immutable structures”(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.4). However, 
as we can see from table 1, the choices are not quite as black and white, especially if we 
remember the foundational insight of Kant about the distinction between the things in 
themselves and their experience-based appearances. One can quite easily believe in the 
existence of an independent reality while still professing that their researchable appear-
ances are constructed in the realm of both subjective and intersubjective (Lukka and 
Modell, 2010). Or one can believe that once the social entities have been intersubjec-
tively constructed, they gain in a sense an observer-independent state of reality, which 
to an extent even resides in the realm of objective (which is for example the ontological 
foundation underlying the institutional theory (Scott, 1987, 2008)).
Looking at the nuances of these ontological possibilities, the epistemological dis-
tinction by Burrell and Morgan becomes even shallower (Tsoukas, 2000). As several 
of the contemporary philosophical underpinnings of social science put less empha-
sis on the ontological debates and more on the diverse epistemological choices, one 
can easily have a fundamentally realist outlook and still see the value in zooming 
in to the process of construction through methods geared towards understanding 
instead of validating. For example a pragmatist or a critical realist can easily believe 
in the existence of an independent reality while acknowledging that as it can never 
be fully reached, it is more feasible to study the processes of construction reliant on 
the sphere of the experiences requiring such methods that Burrell and Morgan term 
“idiographic”, the getting inside of the unfolding of the entity constituting the object 
of the study (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p.6). 
Interestingly, also zooming in the epistemology of the two approaches of naïve 
realism based empirical positivism and phenomenology (Niiniluoto and Saarinen, 
2002) reveals similarities between the approaches often treated as representing the 
ultimate ends of a continuum: both approaches believe that only by focusing on the 
immediately gleanable inputs of sensory signals can we gain knowledge. The only, in 
itself naturally a vast difference is actually the location of the object of our inquiry: 
for a phenomenologist the entities reside in the realm of the subjective, whereas for 
the positivist they exist in the realm of the objective. However epistemologically the 
distinction is nigh negligible.
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To address the last perspective, human nature, it seems that even Burrell and Mor-
gan struggle to show the connection between the notion of an individual as an agent 
of free will or as a creature driven by structures, predetermination, and their contin-
uum of subjective-objective: “…they must incline implicitly or explicitly to one of the 
other of these points of view or adopt an intermediate standpoint…”(Burrell and Mor-
gan, 1979, p. 6). Essentially they are saying that there are different approaches, which 
do not exclude one another, presenting little arguments as to why would a subjective-
ly oriented scholar be inclined to take one view over the other while the objectivist 
would automatically choose the other. The faith in an independent reality can just as 
easily accommodate the perception of an individual as a free agent (like for example 
Kant and Hegel profess (Popper, 1974, p.555)), as can the notion of an individual as 
a victim of structures follow from the worldview of nihilist constructionism (like 
Nietsche and Foucault ultimately argue (Ahonen, 2001)). Burrell and Morgan also 
completely miss the phenomenological interpretation of there existing no predefined 
categories such as “agency” or “structure”.
This point was further illustrated by Leonardi and Barley (2012, p.33-34) in dis-
cussion pertaining to the ontological assumptions in the constructivist sociotechni-
cal research. The diverse approaches within the field are positioned along two orthog-
onal continuums, the first stretching between determinism and voluntarism (the first 
endowing structure, technology, with the agentic power, the latter the individuals, 
humans), and the second between materialism (physical entities shape human ac-
tion) and idealism (ideas, beliefs, norms shape human action). Leonardi and Barley 
point out that while determinism and materialism, and respectively voluntarism and 
idealism are often joined, there are no logical obstacles to conducting research based 
on deterministic idealism or voluntary materialism, as ample examples from these 
types of research can within their chosen context be found. 
To summarize the discussion in this chapter, yes, ontological choices matter, but 
no, they cannot be put into a continuum between objective and subjective. Addition-
ally, as each set of ontological choices can be logically followed with several different 
epistemological, and subsequently methodological choices, a scholar is ultimately 
presented with a cornucopia of alternatives. This dissertation is not about listing all 
the possibilities, as that would be an undertaking basically covering the whole of 
western philosophy, however what is next discussed are the choices I made in the 
context of this particular endeavor, and how the acknowledgment of these diverse 
choices is essential in the knowledge building effort of this thesis. 
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2.3 Pragmatist credo14
The approach of this thesis heeds the notion expressed already half a century ago by 
Bernard Forscher (1963), who lamented that the focus of science had undergone a 
shift from building edifices into building more and more elaborate bricks. Essentially 
this means that the contribution of this dissertation is to synthesize (MacInnis, 2011) 
existing dots of knowledge into a new picture; instead of digging deep into a brick of 
one theory, this is an attempt to connect a set of bricks into a bigger edifice. 
As this dissertation views the impacts of digitalization on strategizing through 
uncertainty, both strategizing and uncertainty extensively discussed by scholars and 
practitioners alike throughout times, the approach taken is grounded on the attempt 
to understand our knowledge about the issues, not on specific theoretical vantages. 
Theories are in the context of this book perceived as lenses through which a phenom-
enon is viewed, each focused on yielding some insights while bracketing out a set of 
others. It is the ambitious aim of this dissertation to try to stitch together a selection 
of theories, which combined give us a more comprehensive view on the phenomena 
regarded, than would be possible by committing to a specific perspective. 
However, as any attempt at knowledge-creation rests on the specific ontological 
and epistemological foundations of the emerging knowledge, also this approach re-
quires philosophical grounding. After a lengthy philosophical search15, the encounter 
with the pragmatic maxim (Peirce, 1878) seemed to provide an avenue for proceed-
ing with the undertaking at hand. The much-debated maxim was originally coined by 
Charles Peirce (1838-1914) as follows:
"Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive 
the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of 
our conception of the object."(Peirce, 1878, p. 293 in the original)
14 From my immersion in the realm of philosophy of science with its deeply convincing and com-
pletely contradictory discussions, it seems clear that a scholar has two options when seeking for 
the foundations of her knowledge claims: either to become a philosopher herself and spend the 
rest of her days seeking for the ultimate understanding of reality, truth and knowing, or to just 
adopt a set of beliefs (without claiming them to be the ultimate ones), which enable trying to find 
out something of relevance about something of interest. Hence credo: this chapter is about the 
choices I made about the philosophical beliefs that seemed to a) provide fruitful logical avenues 
to exploring the issue at hand, and b) concur somewhat with my admittedly subjective and fully 
personal belief-systems already adopted in the course of my existence so far. 
15 In addition to a set of individual books, articles and even blog postings, the Internet Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy (IEP Fieser and Dowden, N/A) has turned out to be an invaluable source 
in drafting an overarching understanding of the philosophical themes. As already previously 
mentioned, the citations beginning with the acronym IEP refer to the specific pages within 
the Encyclopedia, and as the site doesn't give the actual dates of the updates, the years in the 
references are marked N/A. 
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This requires some explaining. As the corner stone of pragmatism (IEP McDermit, 
N/A, Ormerod, 2006), essentially the point of the maxim is that what we can know 
about something is dependent on the effects we can perceive that something having. 
We know that a stone is hard, because it scratches, affecting an indenture in an element 
we subsequently can deem soft in its effect to stone. In other words, we don’t need to try 
to pinpoint the ontologically real properties of an entity (the stone), because we can de-
duce at least some of its elements through observing the effects it has (the scratch on my 
car). While the contours of pragmatism can hardly be drawn precisely (see e.g. Ulrich, 
2007), it however provides a philosophical foundation for a metatheoretical analysis 
as it focuses not on the ontological nature of an entity (e.g. a theory), but analyses the 
entity through the perceivable effects the entity can be conceived to affect. As such, the 
early pragmatism of Peirce, William James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952), 
complemented by the thoughts of Herbert Mead (1863-1931), is an ancestor of the 
contemporary philosophical streams16 highlighting the intertwined nature of ontolo-
gy and epistemology, the onto-epistemological view highlighting the inseparability of 
the focus of observation (ie. the entity lending itself to the knowledge-building efforts) 
from the existence of the process of observation creating the observation providing the 
material for the further processing of that material by for example theorizing. 
So, what does this approach mean in the context of the knowledge-building at-
tempt of this dissertation? First of all, it is not the aim nor claim of this book to 
provide an account of the ontologically and ultimately true nature of digitalization, 
uncertainty, or strategizing. Instead I adopt a perspective of moderate realism and 
moderate constructionism (Kakkuri-Knuuttila, Lukka and Kuorikoski, 2008, Lukka 
and Modell, 2010, Popper, 1974, 1979) allowed by pragmatism: I choose to believe 
in the ontological reality of the three worlds (objective, subjective and intersubjec-
tive), however while acknowledging the impact of the world three objects, namely the 
role of our perceptions in constructing the social reality, I do not believe in a given, 
pre-existing, independent reality of those social constructs. This doesn’t mean that 
the social constructs are inconsequential, quite the contrary: as the reality claims of 
pragmatism rely on the observable effects of the entities of enquiry, the world three 
constructs are indeed real as judged by their effects on the perceptions, actions and 
outcomes unfolding in and impacting the society. 
16 The 20th century was prolific also in terms of seeding a diversity of philosophies. Some of the 
most contemporary versions of this onto-epistemological take include process philosophy (Re-
scher, 1996), turn-to-practise approaches (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011), which follow in the 
wake of reflexive sociology (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) and of course social construction-
ism (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Neither should one forget the impact of this pragmatist 
notion on the French post-modernists like Foucault, Latour, Lyotard and Derrida. 
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In addition, this pragmatist perspective allows me to observe diverse insights 
from different philosophical origins as effects of certain knowledge building efforts 
growing from diverse soils, and to focus more on those effects of created knowledge 
than on aligning my knowledge building efforts with any given sets of origins. I ac-
knowledge and value the origins, but as already mentioned, try to focus on unveiling 
the object of enquiry through several vantages, as each has yielded invaluable knowl-
edge that when synthetized, can advance our understanding even more. However, I 
also try to stay true in the sense of highlighting the different origins and discussing 
the ensuing incompatibilities – in short try to avoid the sin of building a set of argu-
ments on such foundations from which they cannot be argued from. 
The heritage of pragmatism is heeded also in another way. The forefathers of prag-
matism shared a strong social conscience. The historical context of the origins of the 
school of thought was USA still reeling from the devastation of the Civil War (1861-
1865). Influenced deeply by Kant, the polymath Charles Peirce set out to construct 
a philosophical system furthering Kantian thinking; the "critical common-sensism" 
(Ormerod, 2006, p.896). James and Dewey took this normative tint even further, with 
the latter for example contributing immensely to educational insights.
 In essence, the major difference between the early pragmatists and their late 20th 
century offsprings (eg. the French post-modernists) was the desire to provide foun-
dations and methodologies for such science that could be used in inducing changes 
for the better. While what constitutes "better" is always open for debate, this sinceri-
ty resonates freshly with the contemporary reader immersed in the deconstructing, 
demystifying, decomposing and even destructive ponderings of the post-modern 
cynics (Ahonen, 2001). For example viewing Lyotard's (1984) scepticism about the 
metanarratives through the lenses of pragmatism begs the question of which theo-
retical-philosophical groundings have effected more "good" for the humanity: the 
Judeo-Christian faith in personal God and mercy, the Enlightenment driven faith 
in the omnipotence of science, the grand narratives of money (Ali, 2014), or the 
post-modern unraveling of all metanarratives ultimately resulting in the contempo-
rary blurring of the distinction between a fact and an opinion? 
When we turn our questioning gaze away from the ultimate revelation of the 
nature of truth and reality, and focus on the instrumental effects of any philosoph-
ical underpinnings, the question about the meaning of these meanings emerges: 
considering the physical boundaries of our globe, within which the individuals 
constituting the humanity so far need to co-exist, what kinds of shared understand-
ings, world three social constructs, affect in what ways our ability and aptitude for 
doing so?
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To pursue the theoretical aims of this dissertation within the onto-epistemological 
underpinnings of pragmatism, a suitable methodological choice is essential. Herme-
neutics, especially in its pre-ontological form (IEP Botts, N/A) shaped by Dilthey 
(1833-1911), described by Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) as objectivist, provides a 
logical avenue in its lineage to Kant, and by that detour also to pragmatism. Essen-
tially, hermeneutics is about trying to understand an output through understanding 
the entity responsible for that output and the context in which the output was cre-
ated, and through reflecting this knowledge (output, entity creating it, context of its 
emergence) against the inner reality of the interpreter to create a synthetic under-
standing constituting of both what the output creating entity, and the interpreting 
entity bring to the emerging understanding. This process was conceptualized as the 
hermeneutic circle by a German philologist Friedrich Ast in his work dating back to 
1808 (IEP Botts, N/A), after him prominently discussed and further developed by 
Dilthey through the influence of Schleiermacher, a disciple of Ast and a teacher of 
Dilthey. Originally hermeneutics related to theological endeavors attempting to un-
derstand the word of God, however with the emerging insights about the process of 
social construction of diverse social phenomena, it has since gained a firm foothold 
in the interpretive social studies.
The quest upon which Dilthey embarked to address the “need to get away from the 
reductionist and mechanistic perspective of the natural sciences, and to find an approach 
adequate to the fullness of (social) phenomena” (Palmer, 1969, p.100) resonates still 
vibrantly in the contemporary pursuits of social science. While being impressed by 
Kant, Dilthey however felt that it was necessary to further develop Kant’s thoughts to 
better accommodate the needs of social science, which became his ambition. So, Dil-
they separated the mechanisms required to create understandings in social sciences 
(“productive nexus of history”) from the mechanisms creating knowledge in natural 
sciences (“causal nexus of nature”). The hermeneutic circle oriented towards the pro-
ductive nexus of history flows through three tiers of what Dilthey called “life-mani-
festations”, each yielding the interpreter different insights she then processes through 
her own inner reality and reflects again against the outer sensory experiences (Mak-
kreel, 2016). The life-manifestations consist of the level of general concepts the utter-
ings of which tell nothing about the utterer (eg. two plus two equals four), the level 
of actions suggesting some insights about the intentions of the actor (eg. picking up 
a hammer), and the level of expressions with the outright aim to exclaim something 
about the one doing the expressing (eg. writing a poem – or, indeed, a dissertation). 
Essentially what this approach enables is identifying the social phenomena resid-
ing in the third world of Popper (1979), namely the realm of intersubjectivity. While 
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the acts of utterance (stating a calculus, picking up a hammer, writing a poem) are 
born from impulses within the subjective realm and can be observed in the objective 
realm, our knowledge about the significance of the act of picking up the hammer, or 
the experiences evoked through reading a poem reside in the realm of the intersub-
jective. We share a set of socially constructed codes that enable us to give significance 
to the act of a lifted hammer, or to appreciate the poetic expression. Without the 
intersubjectively constructed meaning mechanism, both the act of picking up a ham-
mer or perusing a poem are empty – their meaning cannot be deduced from their 
objective representation.
In this research, objective hermeneutics is used in deciphering the socially con-
structed intersubjective realm that endows our actions with meaning. It is the Mea-
dian mirror in which my actions are reflected in your actions – the quintessential 
mechanism that allows us to make enough sense of the actions of others that co-ex-
istence is possible.
These building blocks constitute the analytical approach of this thesis. This book 
is a hermeneutical and metatheoretical analysis about digitalization, uncertainty and 
strategizing conducted through the lenses of pragmatism about the constitutions and 
effects of our understandings of uncertainty and strategizing, and a reflexive discus-
sion of the emergence, existence and utility of the meaning structures that construct 
the scales of values we use when trying to define the valence of the options and out-
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“All wisdom grows / from curiousity seeds / 
planted in pots / full of ignorance.”
(Sheri Tepper: The Waters Rising)
Decision-making, strategic decision-making, strategies and strategizing are richly 
researched from several scholarly perspectives underpinned by a plethora of phil-
osophical approaches. The aim of this chapter is to synthetize a set of established 
insights into an integrative framework of strategizing, and in doing so, both provide 
one corner stone for the overarching theorizing of this thesis and to make a theoret-
ical contribution on its own. 
In short, in this dissertation strategizing is interaction with uncertainty, consisting 
of individual level actions and decisions – fused together by social forces – that have 
aggregated, collective level outcomes in the sphere of economic action. This concep-
tualization is argued next.
3.1 Some general(ization) problems
All social sciences share one problem: considering the seeming haphazardness of hu-
man action, how can we create knowledge about how humans behave in general? 
MacIntyre (2013) widens the scope of the problem beyond the scientific realm by 
highlighting a paradox embedded in us individuals: in order for any of us to go about 
our daily lives with any sense of meaning, we need to rely on generalized predictions 
about how other people act. At the same time, in order to hold on to the freedom and 
creativity that makes us humans, we need to reserve for ourselves the ability to act 
unpredictably. The same phenomenon was also identified by Mead (1934), however 
where MacIntyre talks about the inherent needs of us humans, Mead discusses the 
nature of the self-identity: our sense of ourselves is a duality consisting of the parts 
“I” and “me”. According to Mead, “I” is the agentic, subjective part capable of making 
creative decisions that go against the social expectations, whereas “me” is the socially 
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constructed object part, constantly reflecting the expectations of the social environ-
ment, the generalized understanding how a person such as myself should in a given 
setting be and act (Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 2013, Joas, 1997, Kuusela, 2001). 
Sharing the problem, the diverse social scientific approaches differ on the level of 
emphasis on either side of this duality of an individual. In social sciences seeking to 
create macro level knowledge, it seems necessary to reduce individuals into sets of 
“mes”, to seek the dimensions of predictability. This quest is essentially what drives 
the famous “as if ” theorizing of Milton Friedman17, underpinning the majority of 
economic research aimed at creating statistical generalizations through dismissing 
the individual level behavioral variations as negligible counter examples. Consider-
ing the Robbins definition of economics as the science exploring human behavior 
in between ends and scarce means (Backhouse and Medema, 2009, Robbins, 1932), 
the behavior explored consists therefore of the behavior of the “me” objects, which 
surrender to prediction and statistical generalizations. 
At the very far end of the spectrum we find such leadership (Williams, 2004) or 
entrepreneurship (Foss et al., 2008, Kirzner, 1997, Shane, 2003, Schumpeter, 1934, 
Venkataraman and Sarasvathy, 2001) studies that highlight the idiosyncratic abilities 
of the creative visionaries, essentially zooming in to the features of the “I”. While 
contrasting with the more systemic views of for example creativity (Amabile, 2012, 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2014b), these approaches enjoy popularity (as seen in the pleth-
ora of popular management books biographing the successful individuals or listing 
a number of boxes to tick for the ambitious ladder climbers) potentially exactly be-
cause they appeal to the potential of the “I” in doing the unexpected, in holding on 
to the freedom of will. 
The decision-making research reflects this division between the “I” and “me” du-
ality, further enhanced by the plurality of philosophical underpinnings prevalent in 
the social sciences. When the philosophical choices have guided the social scientists 
to emulate the natural scientists, we are in the realm of the assumptions that have 
guided mainstream economics (and its applied offsprings) for the last century: hu-
man beings are reduced to rational beings seeking financial self-interest – the de-
velopment in the assumptions rendering the original notion of full rationality and 
self-interest maximizing into boundedly rational self-interest satisficing, however 
with the underlying mechanism intact (Aharoni, Tihanyi and Connelly, 2011, Ei-
senhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). On the other hand, when the philosophical under-
17 “…the relevant question to ask about the “assumptions” of a theory is not whether they are de-
scriptively “realistic,” for they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for 
the purpose in hand.” (Friedman, 1953, p.153).
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pinnings have evolved in the post-modern sphere18, the whole notion of decision is 
dissolved: human beings are seen as dwelling in the stream of actions, circumstances, 
contexts, path-dependencies, social forces, desires, emotions and intuitions, at most 
engaging in bracketing and retrospective sensemaking endowing the unfolding of 
the events with a semblance of intentionality (Chia, 1994, Chia and Holt, 2006). 
Aligned with my pragmatist choices, the viewpoint adopted in this dissertation 
doesn’t rely on identifying the “correct” way of perceiving reality or individual, but 
instead looks at the accumulated insights diverse perspectives have yielded about 
how human beings act. However, some personal opinions are warranted, as the dis-
cussions in different research streams are to such extent at odds, as to render some 
alternative viewpoints incompatible. My argumentation is grounded on my personal 
philosophical choices19, which allow for the desire to create generalized knowledge in 
addition to viewing the idiosyncratic features inherent to human action. 
It is not the aim of this chapter (nor of the dissertation) to present a compre-
hensive review about the extensive and exhaustive research done on decisions, deci-
sion-making, strategies and strategizing. Instead, in the next subchapters I outline a 
synthetic theory of strategizing by first trying to pin down what is known about deci-
sions and their makers in general, and secondly by trying to understand this activity 
in the context of a firm.
3.2 Pinning down a decision
If one enters the word “decision” into an image search engine (eg. Shutterstock, Goo-
gle images), the results yield a cornucopia of pictures depicting an individual at a 
crossroads. This illustrates nicely the prevalent notion of the concept: a decision is 
a deliberate choice between different paths an individual may embark on, an event 
where the agency reigns over structure, free will over predetermination. However 
taking a look at the scholarly discussions about the nature of a decision blurs this 
intuitive notion dramatically. 
First of all, do decisions exist in the ontological sense? Is decision a conscious or a 
subconscious choice? Is decision really a representation of the free will, or merely an 
18 I’m using the notions of natural science emulators and post-modernists as overarching defi-
nitions of different scholarly approaches based on diverging answers to the six philosophical 
questions outlined in chapter 2. The key distinctions in this context emerge from different 
answers to the Eutrypho question, and to the substance-process question. The natural science 
aspirants see reality as given and substance, whereas the post-modernists see reality as con-
structed and process.
19 Extensively discussed in chapter 2.
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act driven by circumstances and prior conditioning – a placebo we choose to believe 
in, in order to hold on to our sense of individuality? Are decisions made prospective-
ly, or do we construct them retrospectively? Is decision an act of an individual, or the 
result of the symbolic interactionism inherent in any collective?
The next subchapters are an attempt to draw from existing knowledge some in-
sights to sketch some answers to those questions. 
3.2.1 The ontology of decision
In the fertile field of strategic decision-making research, decisions could well be writ-
ten with a capital D. These Decisions are distinct entities, made at a specific point of 
time, by specific individuals (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). Dismissing for now the 
context of firm (the “strategic” part) and zooming in to the conceptualization of Deci-
sion in this perspective, these entities are envisioned as ontologically real actualities, 
and the research focused on these distinct entities has two lineages, decision-making 
and judgement (Goldstein and Hogarth, 1997). Both lineages can be traced to the 
1940-1950’s when the experimental psychology was emerging.
Decision-making literature asks the questions familiar in economics and its off-
springs, grouped by Goldstein and Hogarth (1997) as follows: “How do people decide 
on a course of action? How do people choose what to do next, especially in the face of 
uncertain consequences and conflicting goals? Do people make decisions rationally? If 
not, by what psychological processes do people make decisions, and can decision-making 
be improved?” (p.4) The emergent insights in this stream led to the developments of 
expected utility theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1945, Savage, 1954), its cri-
tique in the studies by the Carnegie School scholars (Cohen et al., 1972, March and 
Simon, 1958, Simon, 1947) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), all 
still vibrantly reverberating in the decision-making studies within economics and its 
applied descendants, including international business studies.
On the other hand, the judgement literature is interested in answering a slightly 
different set of questions: “How do people integrate multiple, probabilistic, potentially 
conflicting cues to arrive at an understanding of the situation, a judgement? How ac-
curate are people's judgements? Does judgement improve with training? How do people 
identify relevant cues and the proper weights to assign to them? How does the task 
environment affect learning and performance?” (p.4) The early proponents of this 
stream of research were Meehl (1954) and Brunswik (1956) who contributed to the 
understandings of the importance of adaptation and learning, subsequently more 
explored in for example research on ethical judgement (Graham et al., 2013, Kohl-
berg, 1969, Treviño, Weaver and Reynolds, 2006) or in the conceptual change stud-
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ies (Vosniadou, 2009) explicitly focused on the (un-)learning processes among both 
adults and children. 
These two streams have at times been more distant, at times more close (Hast-
ie, 2001), however what they have shared throughout their existence are the science 
philosophical underpinnings: both approaches view decisions as distinct entities 
(though in the judgement approach, this entity is more influenced by diverse forces 
and contexts) that can be explored with experimentation drawing its strength from 
the natural scientific methodology. As such, these approaches align well with such 
business studies that have positivist underpinnings.
However, in the business studies emerging from alternative philosophical 
choices, the questions asked in these positivist streams of decision-making and 
judgement, have been questioned. Building on the emergent questioning of the 
taken-for-granted notion of decision-making as the core activity of a firm (March, 
1988, Mintzberg and Waters, 1990), Chia (1994), dug deeper into the philosophical 
groundings of Derrida and Whitehead, to deconstruct the notion of decision. He 
opened the discussion by pointing out that even though Minztberg and Waters 
indeed recognize the futility of trying to pinpoint a Decision from the flow of ac-
tions20, they do not go deep enough to question the ontology of decision. March’s 
approach of looking at causes as effects of effects, and ambiguities as positive en-
ablers instead warrants praise from Chia, however March’s framing of the inquiry 
of decision into the realm of organizations and individuals within, does not go far 
enough in Chia’s view. 
Ultimately Chia states that: “Decision-making is the ontological act of cutting and 
partitioning off a version of reality from what has hitherto been indistinguishable and 
the subsequently presenting the former as representative of the latter… Making ‘inci-
sions’, ex-cising or cutting-out a part from the whole of our phenomenal experiences 
and then finally making that part ‘stand for’ the whole: this is the essential ontological 
character of decision-making.”(Chia, 1994, p.800). This perspective is subsequently 
elaborated in the process philosophical studies of organization (Tsoukas and Chia, 
2002, Chia and Holt, 2006), where there isn’t an observer-independent reality that 
would yield itself to piecemeal studying, but only the phenomenal experience con-
structed reality coming into being through the perceptions and experiences of the 
observer. This phenomenal experience is then bracketed and labelled in ways that 
make it easier for the observer to process – one of those partitioning endeavors being 
20 Mintzberg and Waters (1990) list a number of events from their empirical studies in the context 
of strategy in which trying to pin down the decision is futile. More about their discussions 
follows in the subsequent subchapters, as the questions they raise pertain to also other dimen-
sions of decision than its ontology.
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the naming of some parcels of phenomenal experience as decisions. Viewed this way, 
all of the concepts we use are but labels attached on random parts of the overwhelm-
ing phenomenal experience, and as such carry little explanatory value beyond the 
mechanism that requires their use in making life more tolerable for us. Understood 
such, there are no real entities called decisions.
At this stage this leaves me with a choice to subscribe to either school – do I see 
a decision as a real entity worthy of attention, or do I see it as a random bracketing 
of the unfolding phenomenal experience? Here I must turn to view my choice of 
pragmatist philosophical groundings. It may well be that underlying our phenomenal 
experience of the unfolding process of life there is no observer-independent reality 
to be with ultimate assurance researched. On the other hand, such reality may also 
exist, but in that case all that we can about it know is conveyed to us through our 
phenomenal experiences. However, as it is somewhat futile to try to assess the reality 
as it is in the scope of human life, it is more beneficial to engage in scholarly activities 
aimed at contributing to the accumulated knowledge that may potentially be used to 
improve our ability to co-exist on this planet, to continue our phenomenal experienc-
es of life unfolding. Therefore the act of bracketing a decision as a focus of analysis is 
beneficial, as irrespective of its truth value as a realist entity, we human beings engage 
in that act of endowing the parcel of experience named decision with explanatory 
power while trying to navigate our way. 
So, to summarize this subchapter, in this dissertation an entity conceptualized as 
a decision is considered to exist with enough tangibility to render itself as an object 
of enquiry. 
3.2.2 Witting or unwitting?
At least since the groundbreaking work of Kahneman and Tversky in the 1970’s21, 
there has been a growing acknowledgment that human beings make most of their 
decisions with something else than a reflective full rationality. In the vocabulary of 
Kahneman, our brains have two different operating modes, the fast system one, and 
the slow system two (Kahneman, 2011). In order to conserve energy, we are equipped 
21 The influence of Kahneman and Tversky has been most notable in the mainstream economics, 
however in the sphere of management studies their insights were by no means surprising. 
For example the work by Herbert Simon already in the 1940’s or the subsequent rise of the 
Carnegie School was firmly grounded on the notion of bounded cognition – in essence the 
questioning of the full rationality assumption inherited from the economics. 
 STR ATegIZINg 53
with heuristics and biases22 that rule our mundane actions – in essence the system 
one is a kind of an autopilot taking care of snap judgements and such decisions we 
don’t stop to ponder. 
Neuroscience backs up this distinction in more detail: we indeed function by cre-
ating models in our brains about what we expect and use them in filtering out un-
necessary signals (ie. random noise that disturbs our focus) from our consciousness 
(Berti and Schröger, 2003). This is elemental in enabling us to direct our voluntary 
attention towards issues we deem relevant, without being drowned in paying atten-
tion to such issues that can be taken for granted: a failure in this mechanism is for 
example one cause and effect of burnout (Sokka et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, the impact of the automated brain doesn’t stop at the boundary be-
tween witting and unwitting decision-making, voluntary and involuntary attention 
– we are prone to systematic judgement errors even in our reflective decisions (Be-
nartzi and Thaler, 2007, Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Engaging the slower system two 
requires a reason, energy and effort – the more the more counterintuitive the subse-
quent outcomes of those thinking processes prove out to be. This means that while 
the brain mechanisms that provide us with the models of what can be not paid atten-
tion to (in order to enable saving that energy into paying attention to issues deemed 
more worthy) are elemental in keeping an individual functioning, the efficiency of 
our brain in finding out what can be taken for granted and thus not reflected upon is 
such, that it has the tendency of categorizing also a part of such signals that should be 
paid attention to into the category of assumptions. 
While these insights drawn from the fields of experimental psychology and cog-
nitive sciences have been well acknowledged in organizational theory, it is only rel-
atively recently that the stream of behavioral economics (Akerlof, 2002), grounded 
on these findings, has gained a mainstream position, evident in the economic Nobel 
prizes granted to the representatives of the field (Kahneman 2002 and Thaler 2017). 
This behavioral turn in the economics is reflective of the need to induce the macro 
level knowledge building efforts with the knowledge emerging from the lower levels 
of analysis: essentially the question within the economics being that to what extent 
can the “as if ” formulation of “Homo economicus” (fully rational self-interest max-
22 As it doesn’t fall into the scope of this dissertation to discuss the diverse cognitive biases ex-
tensively researched and recognized, I’d like to direct the interested reader to Wikipedia for a 
comprehensive overview, including a listing and an infographic of the current update of the 
known biases (Wikipedia, 2017). Additionally, a nice attempt to understand the biases through 
four different drivers responsible for creating those biases can be found in Benson’s blog (Ben-
son, 2016).
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imizer) assumption be stretched without the connection to the underlying reality 
being depicted being rendered too thin to result in any meaningful explanations. 
Essentially the label “behavioral” is most often attached to research streams 
within the natural science emulating approaches, even when the fields of the en-
quiry include social phenomena, like behavioral strategy (Powell, Lovallo and Fox, 
2011).  The early examples of behavioral research include studies that explore the 
trigger-response behaviors of animals (we’ve all heard of the Pavlovian dogs), sub-
sequently encompassing also psychological experiments on humans. Therefore the 
philosophical assumptions underpinning behavioral approaches emerge from the 
philosophical groundings of natural sciences, being often tinted with positivism 
and anti-constructivism. 
In the anti-positivist, constructivist and idealist spheres of social sciences, the 
“hard” findings of the behavioral scholars have been less than groundbreaking: in 
that realm it has been long taken for granted that the human beings are all but fully 
rational, their actions being driven by a plethora of assumptions, heuristics, goals, 
intuitions, biases, social forces and emotions that may sometimes even include 
self-utility maximizing. The trigger-response approach is seen as reductionist and too 
mechanistic to capture the nuances of human action and interaction (Weick, 1979).
In this loosely delineated sphere of research, underpinned by more constructivist 
ontology and epistemology, decision-making isn’t an isolated incident, but a nexus 
of both social and psychological forces and drivers (Mintzberg and Waters, 1990). In 
the more constructivist realm, a singular decision-making event reflects the social 
and individual level antecedents (eg. organizational culture and its basic assumptions 
(Schein, 1985), and individual perceptions, competencies, capabilities and expecta-
tions (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005) to the extent of it becoming relevant to ask 
whether anything is actually decided in any specific event, or if what follows is more 
or less an extension of what was and is. Do decisions exist in any defining sense, or 
are they truly just effects of effects (March, 1988)? These questions underlie the di-
verse approaches to strategy: is it deliberate, guided through conscious decisions, or 
emergent, resulting from ongoing actions without conscious decisions (Mintzberg, 
1978) – or to adapt the process philosophical viewpoint, are strategies built (through 
conscious decisions) or do they emerge through dwelling shaped by both individual 
and collective forces and their interplay (Chia and Holt, 2006)?
Interestingly, this distinction is also a focal theme in the research stream of be-
havioral ethics (Treviño et al., 2006). A widely adopted understanding of an ethical 
decision is grounded on a four-stage framework introduced by Rest (1986): moral 
awareness, moral judgement, moral motivation and moral behavior. The two first 
 STR ATegIZINg 55
stages hinge first on conscious identification of an ethical issue, and secondly on the 
cognitive processing of a potential decision in regards to the issue. However, as Jones 
(1991) pointed out, acknowledgement of an ethical issue is closely related to its moral 
proximity, meaning that we are more likely to identify a potential ethical dilemma 
when it concerns for example our family than when it concerns a set of strangers. 
This relates also to the third and fourth stages of moral motivation: awareness and 
the ability to construct a potential ethical decision require a will to act morally, and 
the ability to actually carry out the moral actions. These stages also depend on the 
moral proximity of the ethical issue, especially as research has also shown that the 
awareness and reflective processing of an ethical issue are decoupled from the real-
ized ethical behavior – moral actions are often highly intuitive (Graham et al., 2013, 
Haidt, 2001). Furthermore, we employ different standards of morality when ethical 
issues concern what we consider “us” than when they concern what we deem “them” 
(Opotow, 1990). 
In short, ethical decision-making is only partially underpinned by moral aware-
ness and witting judgement: instead, also our ethical decisions are grounded on sub-
conscious processes highly influenced by the social settings enveloping the individ-
uals. Based on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development (1969), where in the first 
stages morality is understood only as direct personal consequences of a decision (ie. 
if I will do this I will be punished), a research found that only less than 20% of the 
American adults had reached such a level of moral development where they actually 
could reflect on the morality of a decision based on reflecting the principles of some 
universal norms (Rest, Thoma and Bebeau, 1999).
So, to build bridges between the philosophically plural viewpoints on decision, 
one shared theme emerges: humans do indeed make most decisions, including the 
ethical ones, unwittingly, without reflection. An example in the more post-modern 
worldview comes from Bourdieu who explored the impact of doxa23: the socially con-
structed realm of taken-for-grantedness through which all signals are processed (Ea-
gleton and Bourdieu, 1992). Essentially the human action is bounded by the diverse 
doxic structures constraining our ability to reflect on our actions – only after break-
ing out from the sphere of doxa can we engage in reflection (Myles, 2004). It falls out 
of the scope of this dissertation to dive deeper into Bourdieu, however the example 
of the notion doxa serves to highlight that through both the vantage of post-modern 
23 Bourdieu gives an example of doxa in France: “When you ask a sample of individuals what are 
the main factors of achievement at school, the further you go down the social scale…the more 
they believe that those who are successful are naturally endowed with intellectual capacities. And 
the more they accept their own exclusion, the more they believe they are stupid...”.(Eagleton and 
Bourdieu, 1992)
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sociology, and the vantage of positivist behavioral economics, the decision-making 
of a human being is first and foremost unwitting, influenced both by the cognitive 
features and the social forces.
Here a quick remark on the different approaches towards the dominance of 
the unwitting part of the decision-making is in order. While both Bourdieu and 
Thaler, from their very different vantages, recognize the impact of unwitting deci-
sion-making, their viewpoints as to what should be done about that highlight clear-
ly the very different undertones in the sociological and economic worldviews24. 
Bourdieu is concerned about removing the veil of doxa in order to give the people 
more power to reflect on the societal structures in which they are embedded – ul-
timately he sees the doxa as sophisticated means of dominance, difficult to fight 
against as long as it is invisible in its taken-for-granted role (Calhoun, LiPuma and 
Postone, 1993, Vaara and Fay, 2011). On the other hand, Thaler proposes utilizing 
the behavioral insights to “nudge” people towards making better decisions: the aim 
is not to help people become aware of their heuristics and biases, but to arm the 
policy makers with knowledge about how to exploit the cognitive biases in ways 
that would change individual behavior – of course towards the improvement (as 
judged by some criteria defined by the nudgers) of the quality of life of those indi-
viduals (Leonard, 2008).
A further defining caveat is however here in order: for Bourdieu, the concept of 
doxa is primarily a social, collective phenomenon, gaining its strength from the prev-
alent social forces and assumptions of any given setting, diffused within that specific 
social setting. In contrast, the cognitive studies vanguarded by for example Kahneman 
and Thaler are primarily viewing the intraindividual, psychological mechanisms em-
ployed in reaching decisions, with little emphasis given to the social forces, except 
as situation-specific influences on a given act of decision. While acknowledging the 
incompatibility of these approaches, in this dissertation I’m adopting the concept of 
doxa to describe the zone of taken-for-granted in general, irrespective of whether 
the origins of what an individual takes for granted and unwittingly processes can be 
traced to external institutional biographies and social forces, or to internal psycho-
logical mechanisms. 
24 Of course I am not claiming that Bourdieu or Thaler would represent their respective fields 
of study in totality, with both fields occupied by myriad warring viewpoints. However I am 
here using them as archetypes in order to illustrate the impact of the very different and 
incompatible perceptions of human overarching the whole realm of social sciences. Funda-
mentally this is a normative discussion underpinning also such applied fields as internation-
al business research, which is why drawing attention to these different meaning structures is 
in my view merited. 
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So, both the positivists and anti-positivists agree on the impact of the unwitting 
decision-making, however the diverse views cannot be made compatible when look-
ing at the ontological nature of the entity decision. For the sake and purpose of this 
dissertation therefore it is assumed that while decisions exist, most of them are made 
unwittingly, which renders the efforts of pinning down the exact causal relationships 
between an individual event of decision and its potential outcomes somewhat im-
possible. This sphere of unwitting decision-making is in this dissertation referred to 
as doxa.
On the other hand, there are also decisions made wittingly, through reflection, 
especially when it is the Meadian “I” who is making those decisions. While even the 
processes of making reflective decisions are subject to heuristics and biases, I do be-
lieve, and therefore ground my subsequent argumentation on, that there are instanc-
es where we human beings can actually engage in reflective thinking and unbiased 
analyses – even when the issues are complex ethical dilemmas. While we humans ex-
cel in saving cognitive effort and absorb the unspoken normative social assumptions, 
ultimately we are not mere puppets. 
3.2.3 enter time: prospective and retrospective decision-making
After one summer holiday a colleague of mine was quite exasperated. He had spent 
the summer reading Karl Weick and reached a conclusion that there is little Weick 
left for the rest of us scholars to unveil, as he had so convincingly captured a lot of the 
organizational phenomena. Indeed the contributions of Karl Weick are extensive, the 
least of which isn’t his insight about retrospective sensemaking.
Prevalently, the conceptualization of the sequence of decisions and actions pivots 
around the notion that decisions precede actions. This is natural, as most of the tradi-
tional decision-making research has been interested in how people could make better 
decisions about what to do next: decisions are envisioned as the interface between 
the past and present influences and future outcomes. However, in his seminal book 
“The Social Psychology of Organizing”, Weick (1979) reverses this commonsensical 
notion. 
Essentially his insights are captured in the sequence of enactment-selection-re-
tention together constituting what has since been known as retrospective sensem-
aking. The underlying worldview is kin to the flow of phenomenal experience dis-
cussed previously in connection to Chia, however Weick grounds his arguments on 
the pragmatist philosophy of William James (1890), and the symbolic interactionism 
introduced by Charles Mead. Weick envisions life as flowing and equivocal, consti-
tuted of chaos given to us through our senses; a chaos we subsequently try to make 
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sense of. In contrast to the phenomenological approach of Chia25, Weick however re-
futes the possibility of an experience preceding action: “Passive reception of a shower 
of inputs is not synonymous with having an experience…experience is a consequence 
of activity.” (p.148). In Weick’s view only through our actions of bracketing, interact-
ing, sorting, ignoring, attending, relating and responding to certain stimuli, do we 
gain the experience of that stimuli. This activity through which the shower of inputs 
becomes experience we can subsequently cognitively process Weick gives the name 
of enactment. 
So, in Weick’s world, there is no imposed, pre-existing order to deal with, but a 
flow of elements agents are subjected to. When perceived, these elements are equiv-
ocal, meaning that there are several ways of making sense of them. In order for us 
to make sense of those equivocal elements, we draw from our past, from such causal 
maps we have previously constructed. Constructing those maps emerges from the 
realization that actions and events constitute systems, which can be more or less loose 
– the looser the system, the less strict are the causal relationships between the differ-
ent nodes, however backcasting from the effects we can deduce that some causes have 
existed, even when those causes were unidentifiable. 
At any given moment we are therefore equipped with certain causal maps we have 
previously used to make sense of the “shower of inputs”. When something changes in 
the environment, we engage in an attempt to reduce the equivocality of that change 
by doing something that would create such changes that would give us more clues to 
explain the original change: this is called enactment26. From those emerging changes 
and clues we then select some and fit them into the existing causal maps we then 
position onto the novel perceptions of changes to see if that reduces the equivocality: 
this is called selection. If the chosen set of enacted clues and the resulting elabora-
tion of the previously existing causal map succeeds in aiding us to make sense of the 
25 The difference between Chia and Weick reflects the difference between phenomenological and 
constructivist philosophical underpinnings. While both views share the notion of life as an un-
folding stream of chaotic signals human being are subjected to, in the phenomenological realm 
the boundary between an agentic experiencer of those signals and the external life constituting 
of those signals is non-existing, meaning that the cognitive processing of any signals is just 
another input of elements into the chaotic flow of randomness. On the other hand, in the social 
constructivism, the distinction between the agent constructing sense of the randomness and 
the external “shower of inputs” is clear: through the agentic powers of the actor, the stream of 
chaos becomes constructed into shapes, which subsequently provide the actor with the ability 
to deal with the unfolding life. 
26 “The manager literally wades into the swarm of “events” that surround him and actively tries to 
unrandomize them and impose some order. The manager acts physically in the environment, at-
tends to some of it, ignores most of it, talks to other people about what they see and are doing. As 
a result the surroundings get sorted into variables and linkages and appear more orderly.” (Weick 
1979, p.148)
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changes, we store the successful explanation as a new causal map we can later use: 
this is called retention.
 This process Weick summarizes with the sentence: “How can I know what I think 
before I see what I say?” To open up the sentence, saying refers to the process of enact-
ment in which the agent engages in activities that create more clues for the knowing 
(sensemaking). Seeing refers to selection, which has two inputs, the retained prior 
knowledge (causal maps) and the results of saying, enactment. For Weick, decisions 
reside in the selection phase of this process, and constitute of the choices of which 
cues to select from both the existing explanations and the enacted clues pertinent in 
the present situation. 
Therefore for Weick, the decisions are retrospective, as they are made after the en-
actment (which feeds into them) and the retention (of older explanations). In addi-
tion, not only are the decisions retrospective, but also aimed at sensemaking (know-
ing and thinking). This means that in making a decision, we are actually not making a 
decision about a future course of action, but choosing such actions which contribute 
to making sense about what has happened before and is happening now. 
This sensemaking perspective as since become a fruitful stream of research (Mai-
tlis and Christianson, 2014, Maitlis and Sonenshein, 2010, Weick, 1988, Weick et al., 
2005) in the organization studies, rich with empirical findings (Brown, 2000, Gioia 
and Thomas, 1996, Kaplan, 2008, Sonenshein, 2007). Therefore it is safe to assume 
that at least a part of what are labelled as decisions are retrospective in the sense that 
instead of opening the set of outcomes following from decisions to include complete-
ly new avenues, decisions are grounded on the previous paths and used as validating 
the already chosen outcomes27. 
The interesting question therefore is, are there genuinely prospective decisions? 
One way of viewing Weick’s insights is to reflect them against the notion of doxa, 
discussed in the previous subchapter. While Weick explicates the mechanism of how 
our actions emerge as effects of effects (as discussed elsewhere by March), ultimately 
the sensemaking approach is but a detailed analysis of one mechanism embedded in 
the doxic realm of our decision-making. As such, Weick seems to perceive the cre-
ative agency of the Meadian “I” to be limited to rationalizing, having little faith in the 
ability of us humans to engage in genuine prospective and reflective decision-making 
27 Interestingly the “sunk cost” bias deals with exactly this tendency in decision-making. When we 
have invested a lot in following a certain path, even when we are presented with evidence of the 
badness of that path, we prefer to invest even more in following that path instead of finishing 
following that path. This is a familiar phenomenon in R&D departments: when there has been 
heavy investments in a certain development, even when faced with the outcome that the results 
will not be what has been expected, instead of “killing” that line of pursuit, more money is poured 
in to the project in the hope of salvaging what has already been so heavily invested in. 
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preceding any potential action. What follows is yet again the question of my fun-
damental view of humans: to what extent do I believe in the possibility of reflec-
tive creativity, the latter being understood here as the ability of a human to come up 
with something previously non-existing, to add something new to the chaotic flow of 
events, assumptions and ripple effects? 
This is a crucial point in the subsequent discussion of the impacts of digitaliza-
tion, and for the sake of the overall theses of this book, I choose to believe in the 
creative agency of the Meadian “I” – and therefore also in the possibility of genuinely 
prospective decisions. 
3.2.4 Individual and collective decision-making
Looking at the decision-making and the firms requires a specifying question: are we 
looking at the decision-making in the firms, or the decision-making of the firms – or 
are they maybe the same? If we choose to focus on the first question, the summary 
by Elinor Ostrom is a good starting point: “For all of the work, empirical findings have 
not yet been integrated into a revised theory of collective action. Thirty-five years of 
extensive empirical research could be summarized with the weak statement that ‘some 
groups do and some groups do not succeed in overcoming social dilemmas to achieve 
collective action.’”(Ostrom, 2000, p. 1-2). 
Of course, this statement needs to be contextualized into its proper background: 
while knowledge about collective action viewed through the lenses of economics is 
narrowed due to the underlying perception of humans as Meadian “me”s, we do have 
ample knowledge of collective action when shifting the vista to encompass sociology 
and several management research streams. The context for the statement is the dis-
cussion about the generalizability of human behavior, the same discussion already 
touched upon in this thesis, ie. essentially the question of whether we can assume one 
set of behavior (self-interest optimizing full rationality) to describe adequately (in the 
“as if ” world) the behavior of individuals as an aggregated collective. Ostrom’s point 
is essentially the same Bowles (1998) makes, however where Bowles discusses the 
impact of extant institutions in shaping endogenous preferences, Ostrom draws from 
evolutionary theorizing and neurosciences to highlight the impact of diverse learn-
ing and socialization paths in endowing individuals with different types of behavior. 
In short, grounding decision-making research on one single behavioral assumption 
cannot work even in the “as if ” world, as people simply are too different28.
28 This doesn’t stop Ostrom from instead trying to categorize humans into some behavioral types 
to try to see if replacing one set of assumptions with several stereotyped assumptions would 
help in trying to explicate collective behavior.
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However, if we relinquish the “as if ” assumption of treating collectives as groups 
of uniform (by some chosen standard) individuals, and instead zoom into the col-
lectives as entities both consisting of diverse individuals and shaped by social forces 
emerging in interaction, we can say something about collective action, including its 
elusive aspect of decision-making. In essence, this requires turning towards the more 
sociologically oriented insights emerging in organizational theory (Tsoukas and 
Knudsen, 2005), consisting of research streams each zooming in to a specific part of 
organizational, collective action.
We know that organizational routines constitute such collective capabilities that 
impact the outcomes of firm level activities (Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002, 2009, 
Zbaracki and Bergen, 2010), and we even know what constitutes a routine (Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003), and how they form, endure and change (Dionysiou and Tsou-
kas, 2013, Miller, Choi and Pentland, 2014, Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011, 
Pentland, Hærem and Hillison, 2011). Routines are not merely sources of organiza-
tional stability, but play equally a role in driving endogenous changes within a collec-
tive (Rerup and Feldman, 2011), as such being an invisible component in guiding the 
collective action without the explicit moments of Decisions. 
We know that organizational identity plays a major role in organizational deci-
sions and actions (Albert and Whetten, 1985, Gioia and Thomas, 1996, Gioia et al., 
2013, Pratt et al., 2016, Ravasi and Schultz, 2006), and understand the impact of 
sensemaking (Maitlis and Sonenshein, 2010, Maitlis and Christianson, 2014, Son-
enshein, 2007, Weick, 1988). Organizations have schemata (Rerup and Feldman, 
2011), a collectively sensemade understanding of the core, enduring and distinctive 
features of identity that contribute to the emergent (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) 
actions, to the shaping of the mode of dwelling (Chia and Holt, 2006) delineating 
the sphere of acceptable and desirable actions and behaviors. In addition, we know 
that there are sensegivers in the organization (Gioia et al., 2013, Monin et al., 2013), 
leaders, managers or influencers who guide the collective actions through the pow-
er of narratives (Boje, Haley and Saylors, 2016, Vaara, Soneshein and Boje, 2016), 
influencing both the actions and institutional contexts of strategizing (Jarzabkow-
ski, 2008).
There is also ample knowledge for example about organizational culture, and the 
interaction of and within teams (Edmondson, 1999, Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999, 
Schein, 1985, Zander, Mockaitis and Butler, 2012), each contributing pieces to the 
puzzle of collective action. In addition, the rich and diverse streams of research ex-
plicitly focused on the interface of strategic decision-making and organizational ten-
dencies (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012, Brunsson, 1985, Cohen et al., 1972, Cyert and 
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March, 1963, Dean and Sharfman, 1996, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992, Elbanna, 
Child and Dayan, 2013, Hough and White, 2003, Lindblom, 1959, March, 2006, Si-
mon, 1947, Sund, Galavan and Huff, 2016, Vecchiato, 2012), enriched further by top 
management team research (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) has explored and contrast-
ed the interplay of the actions of the designated Decision-makers and the overall 
unfolding of actions and decisions within an organization.
In sum, zooming in to view decision-making in the firms, we know that people 
make decisions differently as a part of a collective than individually: not only do 
people have multiple selves (ie. a ruthless murderer can be a loving mother, or less 
dramatically, a CEO firing without a twinge thousands of people can be the most gen-
erous donator to the soup kitchen feeding homeless; people can have a different pro-
fessional and domestic persona), but making a decision within a group brings to the 
table both the different explicit perspectives, assumptions and aims, and the implicit 
social mechanisms and power constructs influencing the interaction of the individu-
als present, further muddled by the intertwining doxic elements present both within 
the group and within each constitutive individual. Referring again to the neurosci-
ences, we simply are hardwired into forming our opinions based on the social forces 
surrounding us (Izuma, 2013, Wood, 2000, Wu, Luo and Feng, 2016).
This means that the decision-making in a firm is different from individual deci-
sion-making even though some features of the individual decision-making processes 
travel also between different contexts. So, the key question in strategic decision-mak-
ing studies is, to what extent can we treat the decision-making of the firms (as judged 
by the outcomes of firm level activities) as a reflection of the decision-making in the 
firms? And furthermore, to what extent can we reduce the collective decision-mak-
ing into the decision-making processes and actions of the individuals constituting 
the collective – be the individuals the designated Decision-makers, middle managers 
or operative employees?
The rising turn to practice in management research further emphasizes this dis-
tinction: from that perspective the collective decision-making is less about the con-
stitution of the individuals making the decision than about the social forces emerging 
in the in-between – the decision-making events are populated not only by the indi-
viduals and their baggage, but also predominantly by such social forces, made flesh in 
practices, that emerge out of human interaction, exist in the Popperian world three. 
This is for example the focus of analysis in the strategy-as-practice (Vaara and Whit-
tington, 2012) research stream (discussed more shortly), which is more interested in 
how events unfold within the collective setting, than in the firm level outcomes in 
terms of firm actions and for example performance. As such, it not only severs the 
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link between the decisions in and of the firm, but also the link between individual 
and collective decision-making processes.
However, a popular choice in the strategic management research has been to black 
box the messy interplay of individuals and social forces, and instead shift the locus of 
agency into the level of the firm. The focal actor is the firm, irrespective of how its ac-
tions and decisions emerge. It is the firm that makes decisions and has a strategy. This 
viewpoint is exemplified in for example the well-known Porterian approach to strate-
gy (Porter, 1980a, 1980b): the firm, as the focal actor, faces different exogenous forces 
in regards to which it needs to position itself. This view was nicely contrasted with 
the prevalent choices in entrepreneurship research using the metaphor of Romeo 
and balcony: Venkataraman and Sarasvathy (2001) highlighted how the (majority 
of) research on entrepreneurship is focused on the agency of Romeo, neglecting the 
essential backdrop of the balcony, whereas the (majority of) strategic management 
literature dismisses the role of Romeo in paying more attention to the positions of the 
props and other players. 
So, in regards to decisions and firms, where is the agency: within the individual 
level or within the collective level of the firm? Ultimately the choice comes down to 
the set of philosophical lenses through which this question is explored, and the unit 
of analysis (human behavior, outcome of firm action) focused on. The microfounda-
tional perspective (discussed more deeply later) suggests that the agency is and will 
always be on the level of the individual, however both the aggregated outcomes of 
agentic action and other collective level forces impact the agency in ways that cannot 
be dismissed in the analysis. 
In other words, we can talk about firm performance as a distinct entity, detached 
from the direct individual level actions and decisions, because it is not only the ac-
tions and decisions of the individuals that are responsible for the firm performance, 
but also the amorphous processes and practices emerging in-between the individuals 
have a major impact. A firm is constituted by more than its individual constituents. 
Therefore it is not illogical to talk about firm as an agent, with its decision-making 
detached from the decisions of the individuals within. However at the same time, it 
is illogical to discuss the actions and decisions of the firm without accounting for 
the myriad individual and intra-individual processes ultimately responsible for those 
aggregated outcomes expressed in firm level actions and decisions. There are no cau-
salities on the collective level, like soon discussed in more detail. 
To summarize this subchapter as a building block for further theory construc-
tion, collective decision-making constitutes of more than the sum of its constituent 
individual’s decision-making processes. The collective decisions and actions within 
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an organization are an amalgam of 1) idiosyncratic individual features, 2) collective 
practices such as routines, and 3) collective forces, such as identity, power, culture, 
and normative and regulative institutions. Due to these myriad forces present in the 
setting of collective decision-making, the aggregated outcome can be expressed as 
the notion of an agentic firm – while the firm doesn’t exist (and as such, does not 
“act”) but as a collection of individuals and agreements, due to the impossibility of re-
ducing the firm actions into the actions of its components, the firm can be perceived 
as having agency. 
3.3 Cursory overview of strategy: from content, process and 
practice to strategizing
Strategy is one of the concepts so diffused in both scholarly and practitioner parlance 
that defining it comprehensively and parsimoniously is quite difficult. Originally a 
military term, now even the most peace-loving organizations pursue diverse strate-
gies (as evidenced by the recent appearance of our university’s strategy on my desk). 
To begin with the concepts of strategy and strategizing, strategy is a noun and refers 
to an entity consisting of priorities, plans, implementations, analyses, and outcomes, 
to name a few components. In turn, strategizing, a verb, refers to the activities un-
dertaken within the context of the strategizing entity, most often an organization, 
spanning the actors from the top management to the bottom level of the collective.
Research on strategy has traditionally been interested in the firm performance 
and the relationship between strategy-as-noun and the resulting outcomes. In his 
entertaining and informative book “Good Strategy / Bad Strategy”(Rumelt, 2011) 
one of the leading strategy scholars, Richard Rumelt laments on the widely spread 
misuse and misunderstanding of the concept, and through illustrating a good strat-
egy draws attention to bad strategy, which is both a lack of strategy and a misguided 
understanding of the whole notion.
According to Rumelt, strategy is about applying strength to weakness. Essentially 
this means that a good strategy consists of an honest analysis of both endogenous 
and exogenous elements and forces, and an insight about how to exploit the endoge-
nous strengths to reap the benefits emerging from the exogenous circumstances. This 
strategy content view consists of two established approaches, the industry-based view 
(Porter, 1980a, 2008), which seeks to explain the firm performance through different 
exogenous forces and the position of the firm, and the resource-based view (Barney, 
1991, Penrose, 1959, Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997), which looks at the role of the 
endogenous capabilities of the firm in explaining performance. Additionally, a third 
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proposition has been made to include the impact of institutions in the explanations, 
to add the institution-based view as the third leg of the strategy tripod (Peng, Wang 
and Jiang, 2008, Peng et al., 2009). While the institutional approach (Dimaggio and 
Powell, 1983, North, 1990, Scott, 1987, 2008) in itself isn’t new, its identification as a 
distinct strategy perspective is: institutions are formal (regulative) or informal (nor-
mative, cognitive) collective level social constructs that shape (enable and restrict) 
individual level perceptions and actions, and as such influence the strategic, collec-
tive level outcomes.
In parallel of, and even preceding the rise of the resource-based view, another 
realization emerged: the strategy is not only a content, but also a process (Bourgeois, 
1980) – a stream of actions and decisions (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992, Mintz-
berg, 1990, Pettigrew, 1992, Rumelt, Schendel and Teece, 1994). This process view of 
strategy consists of a diversity of approaches29 zooming in to the diverse strategic de-
cisions made within the firm, most notably by the top management team (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984). However, like for example Minztberg and Waters already early on 
noted (Mintzberg, 1978, Mintzberg and Waters, 1985, 1990), looking at the strategy 
process as a linear evolution from one clear cut strategic decision to another, renders 
the far more unstructured unfolding of the actual process too simple to capture the 
messiness of real life. This realization led to understanding that the strategies can be 
either emergent or deliberate.
With the rise of turn-to-practice worldview within the social sciences (Feldman 
and Orlikowski, 2011), the research of the strategy processes took also another turn, 
guided by the adoption of a more constructivist philosophy: the strategy-as-practice 
approach (Whittington, 1996). While the strategy process view is also interested in 
the actions of the individuals within the firm, there are two major differences be-
tween the process and the practice approaches. 
The process view tries to unveil how the diverse decisions and actions of the in-
dividuals contribute to the firm performance – the unit of analysis being the rela-
tionship between the endogenous elements of the firm and its business performance: 
29 In their widely referenced paper, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) juxtaposition three strategic 
decision-making approaches they name paradigms: the rationality-bounded rationality ori-
entation, the power and politics approach, and the garbage can model. The first “paradigm” 
gains its explanatory power from the discussions of how the individual rationalities impact 
decision-making within the firm, the second views the impact of the political forces within the 
firm, and the third approach zooms in on the happenstances (Cohen et al., 1972). All of these 
approaches can be considered to belong to the strategy process stream, with the philosophical 
underpinnings of a more positivist kind: in those views decisions are ontologically real and 
prospective, made wittingly with a bounded rationality influenced by the political power rela-
tionships and sometimes contingencies. Quite rightly Eisenhardt and Zbaracki conclude that 
the differences between the approaches are quite negligible. 
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the question being how actions explain performance. In contrast, the practice view 
isn’t interested in the performance outcomes of the decisions and actions, but instead 
wants to understand the actual unfolding of the events within the firm, the focus 
of analysis being the actions and activities in themselves: the question being how 
to understand the actions of people in the organization (which can be a firm or a 
non-profit organization). As hinted by the chosen words of “explain” and “under-
stand”, the second difference results from the different philosophical underpinnings 
of the approaches. 
The worldview of the strategy process view consists of a given singular real-
ity, which can be parceled into variables and their interactions. In contrast, strat-
egy-as-practice view subscribes to a constructivist worldview (and increasingly to 
process philosophy (Chia and Holt, 2006)), where the organizational realities are 
constructed in action and interpreted in diverse ways. 
Vaara and Whittington (2011) further analyze the strategy-as-practice approach 
and identify three different levels of analysis, sharing the same philosophical under-
pinnings: practices and protocols (eg. what kinds of meetings, attended by whom 
are in place), praxis (how action and interaction unfolds in microevents), and prac-
titioners (how individuals act). As such, strategy-as-practice view comes close to the 
organizational studies interested in routines from the practice perspective (Dionys-
iou and Tsoukas, 2013, Feldman and Pentland, 2003, Howard-Grenville and Rerup, 
2015, Pentland and Hærem, 2015, Pentland et al., 2011), whereas the capability view 
on organizational routines (Felin et al., 2012, Barreto, 2010, Eggers and Kaplan, 2013, 
Winter, 2003, Zollo and Winter, 2002) shares the heritage of the strategy process ap-
proach (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). 
While the concept of strategizing is most widely used in the strategy-as-practise 
perspective (Denis, Langley and Rouleau, 2007, Jarzabkowski et al., 2007, Samra‐
Fredericks, 2003, Whittington, 2003), following also from Karl Weick’s construc-
tionism-based insight about the essentiality of -ing in the context of organizational 
phenomena (organizing, managing, sensemaking, strategizing), in this dissertation 
the concept is extended to include also the linkage to the firm performance. This is 
achieved through discussing the differences and similarities of the strategy-as-prac-
tice and microfoundational perspectives in the next subchapter, however before dig-
ging deeper, a short clarification of my position in the field of strategy and strategiz-
ing is necessary.
Summarizing, the industry-based strategy (Porter, 1980b, 2008) views strategy 
as positioning the firm, resource-based view emphasizes the firm-specific capabili-
ties and advantages (Barney, 1991, Penrose, 1959), including the microfoundation-
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al perspective of the individual underpinnings of such capabilities, and the institu-
tion-based view explores the fit between the strategic choices and the environmental 
institutions in which the firms are embedded (Peng et al., 2008, Peng et al., 2009).  In 
turn, the strategy-as-practice, or strategizing view focuses on explicating the events 
and mechanisms between the individual level perceptions (shaped both by exoge-
nous and endogenous elements) and individual level actions, further complemented 
by intersubjectively emergent phenomena within an organizational setting – howev-
er without a keen interest on the subsequent firm level outcomes.
As such, the approaches differ in their levels (and units) of analysis. A diagram by 
the sociologist James Coleman highlights the relationships between diverse levels of 
analysis and will be discussed more in the following subchapter, however in order to 
position my research in the wider context, the “Coleman’s tub” is introduced already 
now, with the diverse approaches positioned according to their respective areas of 
analysis.
Collective level forces
Individual level perceptions Individual level actions
Collective level outcomes
Industry-based view on strategy
Resource-based view on strategy
Institution-based view on strategy
Strategizing, strategy-as-practice
p.64
Figure 2: Areas of strategy-related analysis, diagram adapted from Coleman
While this figure is naturally a dramatic simplification, it however helps to posi-
tion the discussions of this thesis. The macro level strategic management research, 
especially as evidenced in the industry-based literature, explores the firm level re-
sponses to the exogenous conditions, and the subsequent outcomes as firm level per-
formance. The resource-based view is interested in the impact of the individual level 
actions represented as routines, capabilities, competencies and firm-specific advan-
tages, on the firm level performance. The additional contribution of the microfoun-
dational perspective, originating in the field of resource-based view, is evidenced in 
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the interest of tracing the individual level actions backwards to the perceptions and 
collective level influences. 
The institutional approach explores strategic choices from the perspective of an 
institutional fit: do the aggregated individual level actions create such collective lev-
el outcomes that fit the institutional setting in which they are embedded? Finally, 
the strategy-as-practice, or strategizing view focuses on explicating the events and 
mechanisms between the individual level perceptions (shaped both by exogenous 
and endogenous elements) and individual level actions, further complemented by 
intersubjectively emergent phenomena within an organizational setting – however 
without a keen interest on the subsequent firm level outcomes.
This research is positioned on the bottom of the tub. The chosen perspective is an 
attempt to negotiate the interests within the strategizing approach with the interests 
expressed in the microfoundational viewpoint, both viewing the actions and unfold-
ings surrounding the nodes of individual perceptions and actions. However, while the 
level of analysis and the fields of interest are similar, the microfoundational approach 
and the strategizing perspective differ in their philosophical underpinnings. These 
contradictions and my subsequent choices are addressed in the next subchapter. 
3.4 Microfoundations and strategizing: same interests, different 
lenses
Business and management research is an offspring of two warring families, namely 
the economics and sociology30. This is a strong simplification, and while the paradig-
matic tensions underlying the field can be discussed infinitely (see for example the 
highly sophisticated dissertation of Ari Ahonen (2001) identifying four overarching 
paradigmatic tones), ultimately many objects of management research are explored 
with approaches rooted in either one or the other line of heritage. 
Without rendering economics into a strawman, it can be said that most approach-
es within firm and management studies descending from that branch have realist un-
derpinnings. A similar simplification, with the same caveat, can be made about how 
the approaches with more sociological forefathers often have a more constructionist 
outlook. These have resonated also in the choices about the levels of analysis: where 
the more sociological approaches have focused on the individual level and on the 
processes of unfolding through the vantage of the participants, the influence of eco-
30 Which, going little more than a century back, were actually interested in solving the very same 
issue of human co-existence as societies, emerging from the very same streams of scholarly 
discussion. 
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nomics has been evident in the many realist management theories taking the firm, or 
an even wider collective, as the focal actor and the level of analysis. 
Ultimately the microfoundational research stream is a realist approach to the 
individual, and even intra-individual level phenomena (Barney and Felin, 2013, 
Felin and Foss, 2005, Felin et al., 2015, Goldman, 1999).  The fundamental claim 
of microfoundational approach is that there are no macro level causalities (Foss, 
2011). Instead, the macro level forces influence the perceptions on the individual 
level, which in turn underlie the individual level activities. Collective level out-
comes are the aggregated congregations of these individual level actions (Coleman, 
1986, 1990).
The microfoundational approach emerged within the field of strategic manage-
ment (Felin and Foss, 2005, 2009b). Due to the complexity of the explored phenom-
ena, Felin and Foss (2005) called for research that would take also the micro level of 
individuals seriously. However, choosing to wear the microfoundational lenses posi-
tions a scholar somewhat at odds with both the realist management studies focusing 
on the collective level of analysis, and with the constructionist organizational studies. 
The latter tension is evident in for example the duals fought around the themes of 
routines and performativity, quickly illustrated next.
In the constructivist sphere of organizational studies, taking individuals seriously 
is not a novelty: the discussion about the microfoundations of routines (Felin and 
Foss, 2011) was met with a level of derision from the sociologically oriented, con-
structivist routines scholars (Pentland, 2011) claiming essentially that microfounda-
tions approach was merely re-inventing the wheel, but with less attention to the un-
folding of the actual real life phenomena. In the ensuing retort (Felin and Foss, 2012), 
the impact of the different philosophical underpinnings were clear: where Pentland 
called for understanding the messiness of human action, Felin and Foss called for 
explanations based on construct clarity. In essence, where the practice perspective of 
routines (Feldman and Pentland, 2003) focuses on the collective construction pro-
cesses of the in-between individuals, the capability perspective of routines (Parmi-
giani and Howard-Grenville, 2011) focuses on the agency of the individuals, shaped 
by the collective forces. 
The debate around the concept of performativity a few years earlier pivoted on 
a similar theme: Felin and Foss (2009a) questioned the power of social constructs 
over the “real life realities”, reflecting the self-fulfilling nature of economic theo-
ries as discussed by Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton (2005). Summarizing, Ferraro et 
al argued that the strawman of humans as fully rational self-interest seekers in 
economic theories has resulted in shaping the humans accordingly. Felin and Foss 
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countered this by stating that if that were the case, humans should be not only self-
ish but also fully rational: however as the reality is that the humans cannot be fully 
rational, the underlying reality limits the scope of the performative power of theo-
ries. The exchange (Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton, 2009, Felin and Foss, 2009b) served 
to further clarify the philosophical underpinnings of microfoundations as a realist 
alternative to exploring individual level phenomena, previously mainly focused in 
constructivist research. 
In looking at the interplay of individual level mechanisms and collective forces 
and outcomes, microfoundational view addresses also change, which requires ac-
knowledging the alternative of process philosophy (Howard-Grenville and Rerup, 
2015, Rescher, 1996, Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). Microfoundational approach is un-
derpinned by the substance philosophy, aligned with its realist foundations. Where 
process philosophy takes the unfolding of the object of the inquiry as the unit of anal-
ysis, microfoundational view regards the process of unfolding as individual frames 
constituting the experienced flow.
In their comprehensive review of strategy-as-practice (SAP) research, Vaara 
and Whittington (2011) draw attention to the similarities and differences between 
SAP and strategy process studies, institutional approaches, and microfoundational 
streams including behavioral strategy31. Like Vaara and Whittington point out, the 
key differences in the microfoundational perspective and SAP emerge from a) the 
level of interest in the linkage between intrafirm activities and firm performance, 
and b) philosophical differences Vaara and Whittington coin as “methodological 
individualism” and “reductionism”. According to Vaara and Whittington, in prac-
tice philosophy “organizations are made of practices and it is practices that enable 
individuals” (p. 321), whereas in the microfoundational view individuals are the 
focus of analysis. Winter (2013) joins the list of critics: the reductionism inher-
ent in the realist approach of methodological individualism requires tackling two 
problems. First of all, how can the “rock bottom” level of analysis be defined – why 
should the reduction stop at the level of the individual? Secondly, in unison with 
the strategy-as-practise scholars, considering social action constituting of more 
than the sum of the actions of the individuals, how can the intersubjectively emer-
gent phenomena be addressed? 
31 A list of similarities and differences according to Vaara and Whittington 2011, can be found in 
a nice table in p. 319 in that article.
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The microfoundational school answers these issues through relying on the in-
sights of Coleman32 (Foss, 2011, Felin et al., 2015, Powell et al., 2011): as it is the 
meaning of social science to explore social phenomena, it is logical to focus on the 
actors constituting that social phenomena, the individuals, including the diverse en-
dogenous and exogenous forces impacting their actions, constituting the intersubjec-
tive, collective forces. The simple yet comprehensive diagram known as “Coleman’s 
bathtub” captures the idea nicely.
Collective level forces 
Individual level perceptions Individual level actions
Collective level outcomes
p.68
Figure 3: Coleman's tub, adapted
The ultimate claim of microfoundational approach, in itself lauded by the con-
structivist organizational studies, eg. the strategy-as-practice stream, is that the ar-
row from collective level forces to collective level outcomes doesn’t actually have 
stand-alone explanatory power: there are no causalities on the macro level. Instead, 
the collective level forces impact the perceptions and dispositions of the individuals, 
constituting also of the idiosyncratic personal features (Powell et al., 2011). These 
32 “Methodological individualism defines, as it were, the “rock-bottom” limits to reduction in social 
science, because it implies that the social science explanation will have to stop at the level of indi-
viduals, and there is no need to proceed further down the explanatory ladder. Though hotly debat-
ed throughout the history of ideas of the past century or so, methodological individualism comes 
in different forms (…), and in the dominant version it is a position that is sufficiently flexible to 
allow variables at higher levels than individuals to influence the conditions of those individuals 
(cf. Coleman, 1990) or moderate their interaction… I here associate micro-foundations with this 
broad notion of methodological individualism. To the extent that management scholars embrace 
the notion that the aim of social science is to identify and theorize the causal social mechanisms… 
that generate and explain observed associations between events (…), they should also embrace the 
notion that the discovery of how human action and interaction causally produce collective-level 
phenomena is what social science is all about (…). Micro-foundations thus mean theorizing such 
micro-level causality (…).” (Foss, 2011, p. 1416.)
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individual level perceptions in turn drive the individual level actions, coalesced in the 
organizational setting to capture also the intersubjective phenomena emergent in the 
interaction. It is the aggregation of the individual level actions that then ultimately is 
realized as the collective level outcomes. 
I’m yet again faced with the choice of negotiating diverse approaches, both 
well-grounded in their arguments from their respective vantages, addressing a crit-
ical theme in my dissertation. Holding on to my pragmatist credo, I fully acknowl-
edge the role of constructionism in social action, and agree with the importance of 
the intersubjectively emergent reality not reducible to its individual components. 
At the same time, the call for construct clarity, reverberating in the microfoun-
dational approach, appeals to me – as does the possibility of some types of realist 
elements underpinning and influencing at least to some extent the constructionist 
processes. 
The addition of the feedback arrows in the previous picture from the individual 
actions and the collective outcomes is my first step in trying to accommodate the 
two perspectives I find highly sensible. Following Weick (1979) and the sensemak-
ing insights, not only are our actions driven by our perceptions, but our perceptions 
are susceptible to change following our actions. We enact our reality: in confusing 
situations we just do something to enable retrospective sensemaking of the situation 
through reflecting the outcomes of our action. This pertains to both the individual 
level actions and the collective level outcomes of those actions. 
In essence, the addition of the feedback arrows captures one part of the doxic 
action, the mechanism of sensemaking. However, aligned with the previous discus-
sions, both the arrows from the collective level forces and the bottom arrows are in 
big part constituted by also other elements responsible for creating the spheres of 
doxa. Considering for example institutions, either through Scott’s sociological per-
spective or through North’s more economic take (Scott, 1987, 1995, 2008, North, 
1990), they consist of both doxic and reflective elements: laws, regulations and rules, 
the formal (in North’s vocabulary) and regulative (in Scott’s) are external, reflectively 
acknowledged forces shaping, restricting and enabling collective action. In turn the 
norms, cultures and ethics, informal (in North) or normative (Scott), are in majority 
absorbed and internalized as doxic action shaping forces.
Likewise, the individual level social action, following from the individual level 
perceptions is a tangle of both doxic and reflective elements, further muddled by the 
internal individual features and dispositions playing an equal role. The additional 
arrows in the following figure explicate these elements.
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Collective level forces 








both doxic and reflective
Internal individual features,
both doxic and reflective
Figure 4: Doxic and reflective elements in Coleman's tub
In this figure I’m committing a mortal scholarly sin of lumping together a va-
riety of research streams with the only intent of arguing that human action, both 
individual and social, constitutes of both doxic and reflective realms. To begin from 
the left hand side of the figure, the collective forces impacting the perceptions of the 
individual form the institutional biography of any given individual, partially doxic, 
in part reflectively acknowledged. These collective forces have been studied from sev-
eral perspectives and levels of analysis: for example institutional studies and research 
on the impact of national culture, ethnicity, religion or socio-economic analyses take 
a highly macro level perspective, whereas research on organizational identity, culture 
or schemata explores the collective forces within a specific closed setting (of an or-
ganization). 
To move on to the node of individual perception, in addition to the collective 
forces, the idiosyncratic personality features and psychological processes, including 
the heuristics and biases, endogenous tastes and preferences, and the cognitive ca-
pabilities, contribute to the unique blend of the both doxic and reflective disposition 
of the individual, carried along to the social action. Insights from these elements 
accumulate in the research streams of psychology, cognitive sciences and for example 
neurosciences.
Moving on towards the action, it should be stated that the individual level action 
can be either carried out alone or socially: in the first case, the doxic and reflective 
processes born out of the doxic and reflective external influences and internal fea-
tures interact in resulting in the decisions and actions of one individual. In the case 
of social action, these elements brought along by the individuals are complemented 
74 STR ATegIZINg
with the intersubjectively emergent phenomena, for example organizational routines 
or practices. 
There are several ways of fleshing out this skeleton of synthesis by zooming deep-
er into any of the research avenues captured in the figure. However for the sake and 
purpose of the overarching quandary of this dissertation, the insights in behavioral 
strategy about the importance of the choice of rationality, the perceptions of human 
and organization, and the perception of the firm and environment interface provide 
relevant building blocks. Before finishing this chapter on strategizing with an integra-
tive framework subsequently viewed through the changes wrought by digitalization, 
mediated by changes in uncertainty, a detour in behavioral strategy is therefore next 
in order. 
3.5 Behavioral strategy
Behavioral strategy emerged from the wider microfoundational discussions cen-
tered on the organizational routines and capabilities research essential in the re-
source-based view of the firm. Its specific area of interest was coined by Powell, 
Lovallo and Fox (2011) as follows: “Behavioral strategy merges cognitive and social 
psychology with strategic management theory and practice. Behavioral strategy aims 
to bring realistic assumptions about human cognition, emotions, and social behavior 
to the strategic management of organizations and, thereby, to enrich strategy theory, 
empirical research, and real-world practice.” (Powell et al., 2011, p.1371). 
So, behavioral strategy draws from psychology, social psychology, sociology and 
cognitive and neurosciences to create knowledge about both the individual and col-
lective level drivers of strategizing (in this context including also the linkage between 
organizational and individual action, and the firm performance). As such, true to 
its realist underpinnings, its focus area pivots around the nodes of individual per-
ceptions and individual actions, with little emphasis given to the intersubjectively 
emergent phenomena. While I acknowledge this as an omission meriting a mention, 
the three dimensions identified by Gavetti (2012) within that stream provide use-
ful building blocks for the ensuing discussion of the core theme of this dissertation, 
which is why those dimensions will be explored here in some detail. 
In his perspective towards creating a model for the behavioral theory of strategy, 
Gavetti (2012) focuses on the perceivable difference between the Schumpeterian no-
tion of superior performance (Schumpeter, 1911, 1934, 1950) and the prominent take 
on the drivers of superior performance as expressed in the management and strategy 
research built on the foundations of the Carnegie School (Cyert and March, 1963, 
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Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002). Both views hinge on the importance of the man-
agerial cognition processes, and as such regard the connections between individual 
level phenomena and firm level outcomes. Gavetti (2012) creates a three dimensional 
model to “identify the behavioral drivers of superior performance systematically” (p. 
268). He identifies the dimensions of rationality, plasticity (of the organization) and 
the ability of the firm to shape the environment, and elaborates the ‘behavioral fail-
ures’ (e.g. p.268) that lead organizations to excel in realizing close opportunities but 
to ignore the more distant ones. According to Gavetti, these distant opportunities 
however are the ones that would yield superior performance, as they are the ones 
missed also by the competitors (acting under same behavioral failures) in the same 
markets. 
In discussing the rationality dimension, Gavetti criticizes the ubiquitous notion 
of bounded rationality (Cyert and March, 1963, March and Simon, 1958, Simon, 
1947), which has helped to understand the myopic propensities of the management 
that cause the firms to excel in incremental opportunity recognition and exploitation 
(elaborated also by for example March in his seminal discussion of explorative and 
exploitative organizational learning capabilities (March, 1991)). However, as the go-
to understanding of rationality, the bounded cognition view gives little insight into 
what drives the exploratory capabilities of the firm (March, 1991), the pursuits of 
seizing the more distant opportunities. This leads Gavetti to trying to unbind the 
rationality, to showing that the opportunities yielding superior results actually reside 
beyond the limits of bound rationality on the rationality dimension axis. 
On this pivotal point my following discussions take another turn and wonder 
what if there is nothing wrong with the notion of bounded rationality in itself? What 
if the distant exploration opportunities cannot be identified with more of the same 
kind of rationality, be it bound or unbound? What if the rationality that lends itself to 
identifying the distant opportunities is of a different nature than the type of rationali-
ty discussed as full or bounded – especially if we consider that the type of uncertainty 
tackled by causal rationality is considerably different than the type of uncertainty 
becoming more relevant with the increasing availability of big data?
As has been extensively discussed in this dissertation, as scholars we have differ-
ent philosophical vantages from which we try to contribute to the accumulation of 
knowledge. The next discussions assume that the different worldviews thus emerging 
are however not limited to us scholars, but that many of the choices we scholars make 
through extensive philosophical search, practitioners make also, however maybe 
with less deliberation. My point therefore is that assuming that we researchers aren’t 
the only ones viewing reality in diverse ways, how would that be reflected along the 
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dimensions of behavioral theory of strategy, rationality, perception of the individual 
and organization, and the perception about the firm/environment interface?
One implication relates to the more plural nuances of what is considered rational-
ity, as just hinted at: there is the type of omnipotent rationality of the economic man 
(Friedman, 1953, Taylor, 1914), and its bound version utilized by the administrative 
man of Simon (1947) and the Carnegie School (Cyert and March, 1963, March, 1978) 
or the muddling man of Lindblom (1959, 1979). Born out of different origins, there 
could then be a selection of rationalities of different nature: the effectual rationality 
wielded by the effectuating entrepreneurs, sketched and introduced by Sarasvathy and 
colleagues (Sarasvathy, 2001, Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005, Sarasvathy and Venkatara-
man, 2011); the improvisational or reflexive33 rationality (Elbanna, 2006, Elbanna et 
al., 2013, Mendonça et al., 2004, Miner, Bassof and Moorman, 2001, Sudnow, 1978, 
Weick, 1998, Yanow and Tsoukas, 2009); or the rationality of the bricolateurs (Baker 
and Nelson, 2005, Fisher, 2012, Levi-Strauss, 1966) – all identified to play a part in 
some instances of organizational action. 
Furthermore, how do the different viewpoints of the nature of human, and sub-
sequently organization impact strategizing? The lay examples of this include for ex-
ample the perception of an individual as an inherently trustworthy or inherently un-
trustworthy being34, or the mental representation of the firm as a machine or a family, 
a vehicle for oppression or an instrument of self-expression35. Does the entrepreneur 
or manager view people as something to be strictly governed, or as individuals per-
forming best when left alone? Do the agentic individuals constitute the firm, or are 
the individuals interchangeable building blocks of the structure?
In addition, what is the relationship between the firm and the environment? Is 
the boundary solid or porous? Can environment be predicted, or only adapted to? 
Can environment be changed and controlled? (Reeves, Haanaes and Sinha, 2015, 
Wiltbank et al., 2006) These questions underpin the discussion related to the third 
dimension of behavioral theory of strategy, even though the approach taken in this 
dissertation expands the initial discussion by Gavetti. For Gavetti, the key issue is 
33 It should be noted that the notion reflexive rationality should not be mixed with reflective 
rationality in this context. In the discussion by Yanow and Tsoukas (2009), reflexive rationality 
is kin to the improvisational rationality, thinking-in-action in contrast to thinking-on-action. 
Reflexive rationality refers to the ability to react rationally to external signals amidst action, 
whereas reflection, by definition, is something done at a different point in time – one can re-
flect on either past or future action.
34 The scholarly discussion of this theme can be seen in the basic assumptions underlying the 
transaction cost based theorizing and the discrepancy between them and the innovation liter-
ature, discussed later in this dissertation.
35 For an extensive discussion of these four types of firms as metaphors, see Ahonen, 2011. 
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the ability of the firm to legitimize its actions for the environment, however, as soon 
delved in more detail, the questions pertaining to the firm/environment relationship 
do not end there.
To further argue for the following discussions in the context of this book, digitali-
zation changes the business environment in ways that require deep, assumption level 
changes from the actors involved in strategizing. These perception level transforma-
tions include the type of rationality needed in tackling the transformed nature of un-
certainty, pertain to the conception of the human and the nature of the organization, 
and impact the interface between the firm and environment.
3.5.1 Rationality
“Where, then, does variety and novelty –whether in the biological or economic 
sphere– originate from? Perhaps the best place to start is with reference to extant 
biological arguments that deal with similar questions about the origins of vari-
ety and novelty in nature. evolutionary models that focus on selection require a 
counterpart to explain where the selection set comes from. In other words, wheth-
er biology or economics, we need to not just explain the survival of the fittest but 
also the ‘arrival’ of the fittest” (Felin et al., 2014, p. 7)
Felin et al (2014) coin the issue of opportunity in the evolutionary paradigm aptly: 
bounded cognition allows us to explain the selection process and exploitation of the 
opportunity, but it gives us little tools to understand where the material to exploit 
originates. This question itself Felin et al (2014) ponder at some length, with a clear 
underlying message: the computational approach even in its sophisticated form as 
evidenced in the bounded rationality paradigm, and subsequent evolutionary theory 
of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963, Gavetti et al., 2012a, Nelson and Winter, 1982, 
2002, 2009) cannot answer the question of where does the novelty stem. This novelty, 
as defined by Felin et al (2014) can be likened to the distant opportunity as defined 
by Gavetti (2012). Furthermore the notion of entrepreneurial opportunity, the nov-
elty, is not limited to existing merely in the entrepreneurial realm, but is taken as the 
seeking of new openings sought after also in established companies (Lumpkin and 
Dess, 1996, Werhahn et al., 2015).
In entrepreneurship literature this discussion circles around the debate of the 
nature of opportunities: are they created or discovered (Alvarez and Barney, 2007, 
2008, 2010, Mainela, Puhakka and Servais, 2014, McMullen and Shepherd, 2006, 
Venkataraman et al., 2012)? After an interesting discussion of the extant literature of 
the mechanisms through which the entrepreneurial opportunities emerge, Venkata-
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maran, Sarasvathy, Dew and Forster (2012) make an attempt at resolving the debate 
by embracing the notion of science of artificial as put forth in a later work by Simon 
(1996): 
“(M)ost entrepreneurial opportunities have to be made through the actions and interac-
tions of stakeholders in the enterprise, using materials and concepts found in the world. 
Opportunities are, in fact, artifacts. And their making involves transforming the extant 
world into new possibilities.” (Venkatamaran et al., 2012, p. 26)
This brings us closer to the overarching theme of this subchapter and the Gavetti 
model: if we consider the distant opportunities referring to the entrepreneurial op-
portunities in the sense that they open up possibilities not exploitable by incremental 
advances, the focal point is not if the opportunities are created or discovered but how 
they are created or discovered. Wielding bounded rationality explains the discovery 
of close opportunities, but makes little advances towards explicating either the cre-
ation of opportunities or discovering distant opportunities. However, if we adopt the 
discovery view (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003, Kirzner, 1997, Shane, 2003, 2012), we be-
gin to approach the suggestions proposed by Gavetti (2012). Unbinding the rational-
ity would indeed open up our vista to discover also the more distant opportunities, 
provided that the opportunities exist to be discovered. This would lead us towards 
what Alvarez and Barney (2010) defined as a critical realist approach to entrepre-
neurial opportunity: the distant opportunities exist and can be seized by superior 
individuals who stretch the bounds of rationality, requiring the strategists pursuing 
the opportunities to be ‘alert’ (Kirzner, 1997), something that can well be defined as a 
disposition to stretch the bounds of what others deem rational – however while con-
tinuing to wield rationality, which is essentially of the same nature than the bounded 
cognition, just an expanded version of it.
But should we go back to the key insight of Gavetti (2012) about the discrepancy 
between the entrepreneurial action as described by Schumpeter (1911, 1934, 1950) 
and the Carnegie School driven paradigm of management and strategy, we begin to 
understand the limits of even unbounded rationality. In their analysis of Schumpete-
rian and Kirznerian notions of entrepreneurship, Endres and Woods (2010) reflected 
the underpinnings of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship and the thinking of Carne-
gie School driven contemporary management and strategy discussion, and came to 
a similar conclusion than Gavetti (2012) – the original insights of Schumpeter are 
fundamentally different from those of the Carnegie School driven paradigm. Inter-
estingly, what Endres and Woods found to resemble closest the Schumpeterian para-
digm in the contemporary entrepreneurship research, was the effectuation approach 
(Sarasvathy, 2001, Chandler et al., 2011, Perry, Chandler and Markova, 2012).
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Effectual approach sees opportunities as created. Sarasvathy began by observing 
how the expert entrepreneurs go about making their decisions, and noticed how they 
seemed to follow a completely different type of logic as traditionally perceived as 
rational. Instead of beginning with identifying a goal, the entrepreneurs began with 
identifying their immediate resources, namely what they themselves can and have, 
and what kinds of people they knew. Instead of proceeding by procuring the requisite 
resources in order to reach the goal, the entrepreneurs continued by exploring with 
what they could do with the possibilities at hand, “transforming the extant into new 
possibilities” (Venkataraman et al., 2012). 
Alvarez and Barney (2010) identified this approach of created opportunities as be-
ing based on evolutionary realism (Campbell, 1974, Hausman, 2002), which emerged 
with pragmatist roots from the debate following the rise of the social constructionism 
paradigm (Berger and Luckmann, 1967) arguing that social actions and institutions 
don’t have an independent reality but are constructed through the actions and in-
teractions of people in specific contexts. Mellowing the criticized (Godfrey and Hill, 
1995, Goldman, 1999, Kwan and Tsang, 2001) constructionist perspective, evolution-
ary realism36 accepts the existence of both, stating that indeed there are entities which 
exist independently of the observer, but that there are also entities, which come to 
existence through actions, the construction – ultimately the same point Venkatara-
man et al (2012) made about the ontology of the entrepreneurial opportunity, and the 
credo overarching this dissertation, however with a different label.
The original actors of effectuation theory (Sarasvathy, 2001) were expert entrepre-
neurs in a context where Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921), Marchian goal-ambi-
guity (March, 1978, 1982) and environmental isotropy played a role: meaning that the 
consequences of chosen actions are impossible to calculate to any relevantly probable 
degree, that the preferences are not given, ordered or even identified, and that the 
environment is so noisy that it is impossible to determine which signals are worth 
paying attention to resulting in a situation where the only way to keep functioning is 
by deeming irrelevant a mass of obtainable information (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005). 
36 In business and management sciences there seems to be a dire need for philosophical under-
pinnings that allow for both moderate realism and moderate constructionism, and this need 
is answered in several ways in diverse subjects and spheres of the field. The version of critical 
realism in IB, as promoted by for example Welch et al (2011, 2017) seems different from the 
version of critical realism as interpreted by Alvarez and Barney, and instead more kin to their 
interpretation of evolutionary realism. On the other hand, the adoption of pragmatism in for 
example accounting (eg. Lukka and Modell, 2010), entrepreneurship (Read et al 2016) and 
international relations research (eg. Friedrichs, 2009) stems from exactly the same need, with 
practical suggestions highly similar to the suggestions of the proponents of the critical realists 
in IB, bearing notable similarities to the evolutionary realism as explicated by Alvarez and 
Barney here. 
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In circumstances like this, no amount of unbound cognition is useful, as it is not 
about knowing more, but about lacking a standard of desirability (Thompson, 1967) 
against which the causes and effects can be organized in terms of more or less desired 
– partially because the options and subsequent chains of events are yet to materialize. 
How do you, with traditional (bound or unbound) rationality choose between the 
options you cannot know to exist nor set on a scale of better-worse? 
This discussion reflects the types of uncertainty soon discussed in more detail in 
this thesis: in short, there are three types of uncertainty, the lack of knowledge, the 
lack or abundance of standards of desirables, and the lack of meaning structures. 
The ample research on decision-making has mostly focused on the first type of un-
certainty, lack of knowledge, making therefore little advances towards explicating 
decision-making processes, and underpinning rationalities used, in environments 
characterized by the two other types of uncertainty. However the argumentation for 
effectual rationality accommodates also the two other types of uncertainty, focusing 
especially on decision-making rationality under such uncertainties.
This is the realm of distant opportunities that take the form of created entrepre-
neurial opportunities. The ontological difference between the different rationalities, 
effectual and causal (as Sarasvathy termed the traditional rationality residing on the 
continuum of bounded or unbound) is evident when one views the ontological dif-
ferences of the opportunities reached by the distinct rationalities: the discoverable 
opportunities exist in the (naïvely) realist domain, where they either are or are not, 
independent of the observer. The task of the wielder of causal rationality is to iden-
tify the realistically existing opportunities and to map the cause-effect relationships 
required to reach them. However, in the realm where the opportunities are created, 
the existence of the opportunities depends on the actions of the individual or firm 
transforming the available elements into novel opportunities. They are constructed, 
and this requires rationality that allows the notion of constructionism – there is no 
absolute reality waiting to be uncovered, but the reality I make through my actions. 
The actors in strategizing aspiring to seize the distant and possibly disruptive 
entrepreneurial opportunities not visible through the limitedness of problemistic 
search need to adopt a different rationality than the one geared towards exploiting 
the incrementally achievable opportunities in the vicinity. Therefore philosophical 
underpinnings of the entrepreneurial rationality are distinctly different from the tra-
ditional managerial rationality, which mainly relies on a given reality, existing inde-
pendently of the actions of the agent. 
To summarize, considering that the created and discovered opportunities have 
different ontologies, also the epistemological tools, rationalities, with which they can 
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be grasped need to be different. Discovered opportunities are recognized with the aid 
of bound rationality, when near, and require an attempt at stretching the boundary 
when distant. Created opportunities are constructed, and have no ontological ex-
istence prior to being brought to existence by effectual rationality based on a more 
constructive epistemology.
 The answer to question posed by Felin et al (2014) of the origins of novelty is 
therefore twofold: if we adopt the naïvely realist paradigm, novelty indeed appears 
from thin air, as the novel opportunities just exist somewhere prior to being iden-
tified; however if we allow for the possibility of a more constructive paradigm, the 
novelty stems from exaptation and novel combinations of existing entities – from the 
ability of the strategist/entrepreneur to see all the different uses a screwdriver can be 
put to (see discussion in Felin et al., 2014, p. 5). This has huge implications for strat-
egizing: if the worldview is naïvely realist, and the notion of rationality causal, it may 
hinder the ability to notice the possibilities of creating the opportunities that could be 
reached through the use of effectual rationality in a more constructivist realm.
This impacts also the opportunities emerging through digitalization, under-
pinned by data abundance and novel feasibilities – in short, in digitalizing reality the 
crucial questions are no longer predominantly about solving a predefined problem, 
but the utilization of the extant materials (emergent from digitalization) in figuring 
out the new problems and accompanying opportunities. Take Internet-of-Things as 
example: realizing an organization wide IoT requires the given problem solving ra-
tionality, causal logic. However, coming up with business opportunities based on the 
IoT requires a completely different type of rationality, the effectual – or entrepreneur-
ial – logic.
These discussions of the underlying logics and perceptions reflect the diverse 
types of organizational capabilities identified by James March. In his seminal article, 
March (1991) discusses the two types of learning capabilities he names exploitation 
and exploration. The exploitative capabilities refer to making the most of existing 
assets and abilities, seeking refinement, efficiency and excellence in execution. The 
explorative capabilities relate to innovation, flexibility, adaptability – in essence to 
seeking new opportunities. These capabilities constitute a paradox (Birkinshaw and 
Gupta, 2013, Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008, Smith and 
Lewis, 2011), as while allocating resources to the development of one set of capa-
bilities leaves less resources to developing the other set, both sets of capabilities are 
essential to ensure long term survival of the organization. Upholding this duality 
requires upholding paradoxical aims: cost-efficiency requires the removal of waste 
(i.e. anything not essential to the core process), whereas innovation requires both or-
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ganizational slack (Nohria and Gulati, 1996) and redundancies, as from the present it 
is impossible to see which of the alternative new options will prove out to be relevant 
in the future (Weick, 1979). 
March also points out that as exploitative approaches yield faster results, it is 
tempting for organizations to focus on honing their exploitative practices on the ex-
pense of the more uncertain explorative practices – further emphasized by the group 
behavioral tendencies in organizations and industries, resulting in shared under-
standings of reality, which may or may not correspond with the external reality (Paz-
zaglia et al., 2017). In sum, the basic assumptions (Schein, 1985) of the organizations 
reinforce and are reinforced by such practices that are perceived to yield desirable 
outcomes with speed and certainty: myopic exploitation trumps risky exploration. 
Additionally, the centralization of firm activities, necessary to an extent when the 
organization grows in size, supports exploitation while impacting negatively the ex-
plorative innovation capabilities (Jansen, Van Den Bosch and Volberda, 2006). 
While there is little empirical research linking the effectual and causal rational-
ity on the individual level to the organizational level capabilities of exploration and 
exploitation, it is possible to deduce that as the explorative capabilities hinge on cre-
ativity and innovation, the effectual approach might be well suited to the endeavors 
relying on entrepreneurial abilities. In turn, the causal problem solving logic is useful 
in the exploitative actions, working on increasing the efficiency of a given process. 
The individual level, microfoundational choices of rationality, or at least logic, have 
organizational impacts.
3.5.2 Perception of human and organization
For Gavetti (2012), this dimension relates to the plasticity of the organization, ie. its 
capability change in pursuing the distant opportunities. However, in the following 
discussion I’m not interested in the actual changing capabilities of the firm, but in 
the perception of the manager about the organization, and more profoundly, human 
beings in general. It makes a big difference in strategizing whether people are viewed 
as inherently untrustworthy or trustworthy; if the metaphor of the firm is closer to a 
machine or a family. 
An example of the impact of the managerial perception regarding the trustwor-
thiness of individuals is illustrated in the transformation37 of the R&D division within 
37 I chose this example as in addition to the scholarly article written about the case, through my 
previous work I had access to observing the transformation as it unfolded. I even used this 
change as the empirical context of my master’s thesis, in addition to working with the organi-
zation in two separate instances in 2014 and 2016 for a period of six months in both cases. 
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a Finnish pharmaceutical company (Thong and Lotta, 2015). When a new leader 
entered the organization in 2007, the department was highly siloed, with capabilities 
not exploited to their full potential. The atmosphere was highly introverted, “every-
thing was deemed secret, unless there were excellent reasons for sharing it” (from an 
interview with the leader38), with several control mechanisms in place resulting in 
even minor decisions being escalated to the top management. 
While the organizational change was triggered by market needs and business 
threats, fear was explicitly not used in communicating the need to the personnel. 
Instead the focus was on cultural change, in the aim of creating the “best R&D in 
the world” in terms of both performance and employee satisfaction. This reflected 
the perception of the leader of human beings as inherently trustworthy and capa-
ble of making the best decisions by themselves. Organization was transformed both 
structurally, and first and foremost culturally: “everything is deemed open and shared, 
unless there are excellent reasons for keeping something secret” (see previous footnote). 
The business impact of these changes driven by the different perception of human as 
trustworthy of the new leader were immense, in more detail discussed by Thong and 
Lotta (2015), the latter having been involved in the process throughout the transfor-
mation. 
In addition to research on organizational trust (Frederiksen, 2014, Jarvenpaa and 
Leidner, 1999, Six and Sorge, 2008), the implications of the impact of managerial 
perception of the inherent trustworthiness of individuals is also discussed in innova-
tion and creativity research (Amabile, 1997, 2008, Catmull, 2008, Csikszentmihalyi 
and Sawyer, 2014, DiLiello and Houghton, 2008, Nohria, Groysberg and Lee, 2008, 
Nooteboom, 2013, Williams, 2004, Woodman, Sawyer and Griffin, 1993). 
For example, Williams (2004) found a clear linkage between the creativity out-
comes of the personnel and the managerial attitude: the need for exerting control 
and structures, or the tolerance of divergent thinking on behalf of the manager had 
an impact on the creative outcomes, this first hindering it, the latter supporting it. As 
we know that creativity requires (at least to an extent) intrinsic motivation (Amabile, 
1997), which in turn is driven by sense of autonomy, mastery and belonging (Deci 
and Ryan, 2000), a managerial disposition emphasizing the need for hierarchical con-
trol, grounded on the perception of humans as inherently selfish (as assumed in the 
transaction cost economics (Forsgren, 2013) can severely hinder the innovation pur-
suits of the organization – while being helpful to an extent in the efficiency pursuits.
It falls out of the scope of this dissertation to try to list all the possible mechanism 
through which the managerial perception differences impact organizational action. 
38 Material in my master’s thesis (Wirén, 2015).
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However these examples hopefully clarify adequately that in looking at the dimen-
sion of human and organization in the behavioral theory of strategy, it is not only 
the nature of the organization per se that is important, but also the perception of the 
manager of human beings in general and the organization in specific matter.
This is an essential point in the post-digitalization organizations where the work 
is dispersed in both time and space dimensions. It is no co-incidence that the com-
panies currently dominating the digital realm, Google and Facebook to name few, 
are also renowned for their work place policies. The digitalization induced volatility 
requires new levels of organizational agility: how fast can environmental signals or 
internal learnings be diffused throughout the organization in ways that result in req-
uisite changes and developments (Kogut and Zander, 1992, Nonaka and Takeuchi, 
1995, Volberda, 1996, Zollo and Winter, 2002) – and what are the managerial dispo-
sitions that enable this type of learning? 
Here the relative smallness and organizational flatness of the firm is an advan-
tage, and many of the organizational innovations emerging within the highly digi-
talized industries highlight the essentiality of a specific kind of organizational cul-
ture. Examples include the holacracy endeavor by Zappos (Van De Kamp, 2014), 
celebrating failure with champagne at Supercell (Murphy, 2013), or rewarding peo-
ple who quit during their trial period with a bonus (Vincit, 2016) – all created to 
contribute to a specific type of work setting more adaptable to the high velocity 
environment through lowering the costs of internal communication by emphasiz-
ing organizational culture.
Essentially these choices hinge on the managerial perception along the dimension 
of internal control vs trust in individuals. Paradoxically, work place digitalization 
enables control on an unprecedented level39 while reaping the benefits of digitaliza-
tion requires such entrepreneurial attitudes and organizational flexibility as can be 
reached only through creating a trusting organizational culture. 
3.5.3 Perception of firm/environment interface
Gavetti argues (2012, p. 275) that even if the manager was to succeed in recognizing 
a distant opportunity, and had an organization that would be quick to react upon the 
opportunity, the success of the attempt to realize the opportunity still relies on the 
external acceptance of the novelty – the actions of the firm need to gain legitimacy 
39 See for example Hitachi, a firm offering such ID badges that monitor the conversations of the 
employees and report to the employers not only with whom any given individual has con-
versed, but also the nature of the conversation and level of enthusiasm expressed. http://edi-
tion.cnn.com/2014/02/02/opinion/greene-corporate-surveillance (Greene, 2014)
 STR ATegIZINg 85
in the markets. This is a key point – however what Gavetti (2012) points out from 
the viewpoint of legitimacy, Wiltbank, Dew, Read and Sarasvathy (2006) take fur-
ther. They initiated their study by reviewing 187 strategy articles, and distilled those 
into 16 articles they deemed to identify the cornerstone approaches (for findings, see 
Wiltbank et al, 2006, appendix) to strategy making. This led them to open with an 
observation:
“Studies in mainstream strategic management boil down to two fundamental 
prescriptions for how firms can decide what to do next (…): They should either 
try harder to predict better (rational strategies advocated by the planning school) 
or move faster to adapt better (adaptive strategies espoused by the learning 
school).” (Wiltbank et al., 2006, p.983)
In this review, Wiltbank et al could distinctly identify the ontological approach-
es underlying the prediction (Ansoff, 1979, 1991, Hough and White, 2003, Porter, 
1980a, 2008) and learning (Lindblom, 1959, 1979, Mintzberg, 1978, 1990, Mintzberg 
and Waters, 1985, Pettigrew, 1992) based approaches, and the approaches seeking 
to bridge them, like scenario planning (Amer, Daim and Jetter, 2013, Schoemaker, 
2012), and dynamic capabilities (Augier and Teece, 2009, Barreto, 2010, Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000, Eisenhardt, 1989, Teece et al., 1997, Teece, 2007, Winter, 2003). 
Let’s shorten the elaborate discussion in Wiltbank et al to two snippets:
“Deterministic frameworks in strategic management all share a basic conception: 
prediction is useful in strategy making because the consequences of what can be 
predicted can be controlled.” (Wiltbank et al., 2006, p. 987)
“In environments characterized by Knightian uncertainty, prediction and control 
are not just empirically mismatched; they are conceptually at odds. Prediction 
can never be adequate for the purpose of control, even in principle, because of 
the role of human creative action in actually producing a non-existent, not just a 
hard-to-predict, future.” (p. 988)
In essence, the key contribution of Wiltbank et al (2006) stems from questioning 
the view inherent in both the prediction and learning approaches: the relationship 
of the firm and its environment is controlled by the environment – environment is, 
and the firm can either try to predict it or adapt to it. What Wiltbank et al proposed 
was that there is an alternative take on this relationship: the firm can also exert a level 
of control over the environment in which it operates. In addition to predicting or 
adapting, the firm can transform the environment. Therefore their approach inverts 
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the relationship between prediction and control: what can be controlled, doesn’t need 
to be predicted (Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005).
The emphasis of the discussion in Wiltbank et al (2006) is on the strategic mind-
set, and essentially emphasizes the perceptions of the environment, whereas Reeves, 
Haanaes and Sinha (2015), in their subsequent discussion adopt a more realist view 
in looking at the more objectively determinable malleability of the environment. In 
short, Wiltbank et al pay attention to how the perceptions in the firm about its ability 
to control the environment impact the subsequent strategizing, whereas Reeves et al 
try to gauge the objective features of the environment, and suggest diverse strategic 
choices based on the environmental dimensions of predictability and malleability. 
These discussions are fused into the following figure.












Figure 5: Four firm/environment relationships, adapted from Wiltbank et al 2006 and 
Reeves et al 2015
The discussions of the nature of the environment (Reeves et al., 2015) and the 
perception of the nature of the environment (Wiltbank et al., 2006) hinge on two 
axes; the predictability and malleability of the environment40. In the quadrant of 
planning (in the vocabulary of Wiltbank et al) or classical (according to Reeves et 
al), the strategic approaches of the firm are based on the (perceived) predictability of 
the environment (Ansoff, 1979, Porter, 1980a). In turn, the strategic approaches in 
the adaptive quadrant (Eisenhardt, 1989, Mintzberg, 1990, Teece et al., 1997, Teece, 
40 Reeves et al identify yet a third environmental element, the level of threat. If the environment 
is hostile enough to threaten the very survival or the firm, neither of these four approaches can 
be utilized, but in turn a survival strategy needs to be implemented.
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2007) rely on organizational agility to react to unpredictable events, as for example 
discussed at length in the dynamic capabilities literature. 
Neither of these approaches acknowledges the ability of the organization to shape 
the environment, which in turn characterizes the strategic approaches in the trans-
formational (in Wiltbank et al) or shaping (in Reeves et al) (Kim and Mauborgne, 
1997, Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005) quadrant and the visionary (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1991, Rindova and Fombrun, 1999) approaches; the distinction between the two be-
ing the time perspective along which the firms perceive themselves able to exert a 
level of control over the environment, the level of predictability. 
The proposition of the importance of the (perceived) malleability of the environ-
ment resonates vibrantly with the shaping ability axis by Gavetti – instead of settling 
for legitimizing their actions in the environment the firm is embedded in, the firm 
has an opportunity to shape the environment. Let’s view the example Gavetti men-
tioned through these lenses:
“For example, in the early days of Internet portals, at least two alternative con-
ceptions competed for legitimacy. Some firms, such as lycos and Infoseek, repre-
sented their industry as a technology business and saw themselves as high-tech 
competitors; others, such as Yahoo!, adopted a media representation and pro-
actively attempted to persuade external stakeholders that this perspective was 
viable.” (Gavetti, 2012, p. 274)
Essentially, what did Yahoo! do? It didn’t gain legitimacy by predicting the future 
of Internet, or by adapting to the extant environment. Instead it engaged in proactive 
interaction with stakeholders that contributed to the transformation of the nature 
of the emergent field. One could also argue that even if Google took a more tech-
nologically pronounced approach (Gavetti, 2012, p. 274) reminiscent of Lycos’ less 
successful approach, what Google has subsequently achieved is in no small amount 
attributable to its success in transforming how we view Internet: it’s a place for (mis)
information accessible through google.com. 
Wiltbank et al argue that if we consider Knightian uncertainty (Knight, 1921), we 
enter the realm where we cannot know the consequences of actions not conceived yet 
– prediction is impossible. For example, prior to the success of Google or Facebook, 
we would have been hard pressed to calculate the consequences of founding such 
firms (McNamee, 2018), as there existed no examples of that kinds of operators in 
the markets ex ante. We could grasp the elements that subsequently led to the launch 
of these internet giants as they now are, however before their founders created the 
opportunity from those elements, transformed the extant into new possibilities – as 
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we remember from Venkataraman et al (2012) – we simply could not have predicted 
the following sequence of events. 
From the juxtaposition of the discussions in Wiltbank et al and Reeves et al an 
interesting question arises: which matters more in strategizing, the somehow objec-
tively determinable malleability of the environment, or the perception of that poten-
tial malleability? This fundamental point was inadvertently clarified by a misunder-
standing by Arend, Sarooghi and Burkemper (2015) in their ontologically misaligned 
evaluation of effectuation theory (Read et al., 2016). They criticized the beginning 
point of effectual action by questioning the abilities of the effectuating entrepreneur, 
wondering how the entrepreneur could truly be in possession of adequate qualities 
to successfully exploit contingencies. However, the claim of effectuation does not in-
volve the objectively provable abilities of the entrepreneur, but his/her belief in what 
he/she feels is immediately possible for him/her – the perception of the entrepreneur. 
Ultimately this means that there are two potential types of misperceptions underpin-
ning the strategizing: the environment may be perceived as more or less malleable 
as can be through the firm actions realized. This discussion will be returned to later 
in this dissertation, in the context of the impact of digitalization on the (perceived) 
environmental malleability, however for now the conclusions in Wiltbank et al are 
given some room before continuing with another pertinent theme in regards to the 
firm and environment interface.
Wiltbank et al adopt an effectual disposition where the world is seen as more mal-
leable, something that can be bent to enable the formulation of novel opportunities. 
From that perspective the opportunity and the environment are not separated, but 
mere extant elements that can be transformed into new possibilities. As this process 
may already include shaping the environment to realize the opportunity, realizing 
the opportunity requires no additional legitimatization, as part of the opportunity 
creation process includes the environment being simultaneously co-created with the 
external stakeholders to enable the realization of the opportunity. This means that 
in this perspective the focus of strategizing shifts from trying to identify the extant 
opportunities and finding out ways of realizing them to the creativity required in 
bending the malleable reality in ways that result in novel opportunities. This changes 
strategizing: it’s not about identifying a goal and coming up with resources to reach-
ing it, but about utilizing the existing resources in coming up with new goals.
As mentioned, in addition to the perception of the malleability of the environ-
ment, the firm/environment interface discussion has another dimension: the bound-
ary between the firm and the market. This is the target area of one of the most diffused 
theories within the international business research stream, the internalization theory, 
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derived from the fusion (Buckley, 2016) of transaction cost economics (Buckley and 
Casson, 1976, Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1975) and resource-based view (Penrose, 
1959). The transaction cost theory looks at the interface of the firm and market as 
forming along the line of whether it is more cost-efficient to control the required 
assets within the firm through the mechanism of hierarchy, or to leverage the price 
mechanism of the market. In turn, Edith Penrose vanguarded the notion that the 
internal capabilities of the firm play a role in the subsequent growth of the firm. Both 
approaches merit a quick overview before returning to the overarching discussion of 
this subchapter.
Edith Penrose (1959) is often considered as one of the first scholars to outline 
what since became known as the resource-based view (Barney, 1991, Teece et al., 
1997). In her theory of the growth of the firm she suggests that firms have two types 
of capabilities, entrepreneurial and managerial. The entrepreneurial capabilities drive 
the firm to grow through organic means or through vertical and horizontal integra-
tions, whereas the managerial capabilities are essential in ensuring that the exist-
ing assets and resources are well managed in ways that actually provide revenues41. 
Penrose was interested in finding out whether there are limits to the size of the firm, 
and concluded that the only limits emerge out of the need to balance the managerial 
capabilities with the entrepreneurial ambitions: if firms grow too fast they may lag 
in the managerial capabilities in ways that render the firm unable to utilize its assets 
in a profitable way, and on the other hand, if there is an excess in the managerial 
capabilities, entrepreneurial growth ambitions are required to provide the managers 
something to manage. 
The control mechanisms of hierarchy and price as understood in transaction cost 
theorizing also require further explanation, which Hayek (1945) provides: essentially 
the question is about the nature and location of knowledge. In his profound article, 
Hayek defines the “economic problem of society” as the problem of “utilization of 
knowledge not given to anyone in its totality” (Hayek, 1945, p. 520). Through this 
definition of the problem, he explains the mechanism of price, the market. 
In a closed system where all components are known, any problems between the 
means and ends can be solved by simple calculus. However, in a system where the 
knowledge is dispersed and fragmented, in the possession of diverse agents not in 
contact with everyone else, the knowledge of either available means or the diverse 
41 In this she is actually also precedes the subsequent exploration and exploitation approach 
coined by March (1991), later extended to the discussions of the ambidextrous capabilities of 
the firm (Birkinshaw and Gupta, 2013, Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004)
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ends pursued is not available, and thus cannot be used in solving the economic prob-
lem between the diversity of means and ends through planning or calculus.
The ingenuity of price in this type of setting is that it reflects the significance of 
a particular item in the whole means-ends structure that item is a part of. Price, un-
derstood in this way, does not refer to any internal qualities of the item, but indexes 
numerically the relative value (rate of equivalence, margin of substitution) of that 
item. This means that an agent dealing with that specific item in any situation does 
not need to know all the elements (the whole means-ends structure) contributing to 
the value of that item, but instead can deal with the locally available knowledge rep-
resented in the price (the relative value of that item). 
This is the underpinning idea of markets. The relative prices of the offerings of 
any vendor reflect the overarching supply and demand of those offerings in a sys-
tem where no entity possesses full knowledge of all the elements contributing to the 
supply and demand. The validity of the price mechanism is therefore dependent on 
the following assumptions: 1) supply and demand indeed have equilibrium-seeking 
tendencies, and operate in a closed system42 2) prices are not artificially manipulated 
by contracts or by hiding knowledge about supply or demand, and 3) full knowledge 
about the markets is unavailable to any single actor, while diverse actors can possess 
different levels and types of knowledge. 
Instead, a firm relies on the control mechanism of hierarchy, essentially based 
on the availability of all relevant pieces of knowledge within a (more limited) closed 
system. The control mechanism of hierarchy hinges on centralized knowledge. There 
is an actor on top of the hierarchy pyramid possessing all knowledge pertaining to 
the objects of transaction within the hierarchy. This central savant is therefore left 
with the task to organize the hierarchy in ways that best support the realization of the 
value. However, as the assumption goes (Forsgren, 2013), the individuals within the 
hierarchy are interested in pursuing their individual interests even when they col-
lide with the interests of the hierarchy, which means that they need to be controlled 
against two problems: harmful actions and shirking. Both are achieved by discon-
necting the outcomes of action from those actions, and instead rewarding obedience 
(Williamson, 1993, 2003). 
The control mechanism of hierarchy relies on the self-interest seeking nature of 
individuals to be geared towards achieving the goals of the omniscient savant at the 
top of the pyramid. This is in dire contrast with the entrepreneurial reward mech-
42 However this understanding of the market as an equilibrium seeking relatively closed system 
is the key point of difference between the neoclassical and Austrian schools of economics: the 
latter highlight the power of innovation in bringing completely new things into the system, 
meaning that ultimately the system is at no point fully closed (Chang, 2014, Kirzner, 1997).
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anism, where the outcomes of actions provide the rewards (or punishments). The 
validity of the hierarchy as a control mechanism therefore relies on the following 
assumptions: 1) there is centralized knowledge that can be fully or boundedly ra-
tionally deployed to ensure the best course of action within the hierarchy, 2) human 
beings are financial self-interest seeking entities, whose actions can be controlled by 
financial rewards and punishments, based on the level of obedience, not tied to the 
actual outcomes of the work activities.
What Buckley and Casson (1976) essentially did, was to merge together the 
economic insights from the transaction cost theory and Penrosean view on the 
importance of the required capabilities of the firm. This led to the formulation of 
the internalization theory explaining the formation and internationalization of the 
multinational firm: firms grow and internationalize by internalizing assets and mar-
kets which contribute to the development of firm specific advantages (FSA), which 
make transactions within the firm more cost-efficient than market transactions. The 
boundary between the firm and the market is positioned at the point where the FSA 
both contribute to the cost-efficient internal markets (cost-efficient in comparison 
with the external market), and provides leverage when dealing with external markets. 
However, this dichotomous understanding of the distinction between the firm 
and the market has been somewhat questioned in regards to the powerful emergence 
of business networks (Aarikka-Stenroos and Ritala, 2017). Especially in the mobile 
and IT industries, the best performing firms have succeeded by creating business eco-
systems43 (Basole et al., 2015, Clarysse et al., 2014, Iansiti and Levien, 2004, Moore, 
1993), essentially characterized by coopetitive relationships. The neologism refers to 
business interactions which are simultaneously collaborative and competitive, thus 
blurring the distinction between a firm and a market. 
The academic jury is still out regarding the question of whether these novel business 
networks are just a hybrid of firms and markets (Möller and Halinen, 2017), a new way 
43 There is ample discussion about whether the concept of business ecosystem is just a fashionable 
word referring to the older concept of business network. In short, whether the distinction exists 
only on the level of the signifier or also on the level of the signified. To explain the issue, accord-
ing to Ferdinand Saussure (1857-1913) a concept expressed by a word consists of the signifier 
(eg. the word and sound-image of cat) and the signified (the animal cat) (De Saussure, 1916). 
Peirce, a contemporary of Saussure and also avid researcher of semiotics, reached independently 
a similar conclusion about the constitution of a concept, however with the added element of 
the interpretant (Ormerod, 2006), meaning both the individual doing the communication (I'm 
thinking fondly of my mother's orange cat) and the one receiving it (you're thinking about the 
ominous black cat you just saw crossing the road), in essence the institutionalized understanding 
of the linkage between the icon of referral (signifier) and the parcel of reality bracketed out for 
that referral (signified). So, the question is, do the concepts of networks and ecosystems refer to 
a same phenomenon, to different phenomena, or is their use dependent on whoever is using the 
concept at any given moment? Möller and Halinen propose one solution (2017).
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of defining the boundary between the two archetypes, or something completely differ-
ent, however with the growing impact of global value chains (Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon, 2005, Saliola and Zanfei, 2009, Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck and Gereffi, 2008) 
or global production networks (Kobrin, 2015) it would indeed seem wise to at least 
acknowledge that a bipolar approach to firms and markets yields little insight into the 
contemporary networked business environment growing in complexity. Additionally, 
the decoupling of a mass of firms from the production function44 begs a new approach 
to understanding the nature of a firm in the first place.
In one part this is related to the ability of the firm to utilize external assets and 
resources without committing to ownership liabilities (Shivakumar, 2014). A good 
example are the digital platforms (Kenney and Zysman, 2016) within the telecom-
munications industry: both Apple and Android provide both a distribution channel 
(App Store, Google Play), and a set of resources (application developer interface), 
which have enabled the booming growth of for example game developers. In essence, 
especially multihoming in diverse ecosystems (Hyrynsalmi et al., 2012, Hyrynsalmi, 
Suominen and Mäntymäki, 2016) enables the firm to exploit external resources with 
minimal investment risk in those resources, which in turn increases the adaptability 
of the firm as it can rapidly move between such sources of external resources it deems 
most beneficial at a given time. However what this phenomenon contributes to is the 
blurring of the divide between the firm and the market, the increasing porousness of 
the boundaries of the firm.
What this essentially pertains to, in regards to the perceptions driving strategiz-
ing, is the requisite scope of strategizing: is it enough to perceive strategy and strat-
egizing as a firm-specific entity and activity, and if so, where should the boundaries 
of the firm be drawn (or where are they perceived to be)? How and in what scope 
should the networks be considered? In addition, considering the malleability of the 
environment, what is the scope of that potential (perceived) malleability – the down-
ward value chain, the network, the ecosystem or should the firm engage in a potential 
battle between diverse ecosystems?
These themes will be further explored in the discussion chapter. For now, it has 
been the aim of these insights to highlight the relevance of choices of rationality, 
perceptions of humans and organizations, and the perceptions of the firm and envi-
ronment interface. The next subchapter ties together these themes discussed under 
44 How do we draw the firm boundaries of for example the world’s largest media with no con-
tent production (Facebook), or world’s largest accomodation provider with no real estate 
(AirB’n’B)? 
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the umbrella of strategizing, in order to introduce an integrative framework of strat-
egizing, the dependent variable of this research. 
3.6 Integrative framework of strategizing
So far this chapter has introduced several bricks now in need of some masonry. The 
resulting edifice of this subchapter should enable the reader to understand the link 
between strategizing and uncertainty in such a way that tracing the impact of digi-
talization first on uncertainty and subsequently on strategizing reads as a coherent 
narrative. 
The first building block is decision. As discussed, decisions are both distinct enti-
ties bracketable from the flow of actions, events and experiences, and unbracketable 
ripple effects of prior actions, events and experiences constituting the phenomenal 
flow of life. Some of the decisions are genuinely prospective, but some are retrospec-
tive, preceded by actions subsequently made sense of by granting specific bracketed 
entities the label of decision. 
When this flow of actions and decisions takes place within an organization co-
alesced around some reason involving the sphere of economic action, we enter the 
realm of business. Strategy, as a noun, is then the mental map used to harness the 
collective action, the sensemaking and sensegiving mechanism employed to first per-
ceive a here and to conceive some future there, and to subsequently impact the flow 
of actions and decisions from the here to a there. Strategizing, as a verb, in turn con-
sists of the actions and decisions that have an impact on both the conception and the 
realization of the following there. 
In this dissertation the concept of strategizing consists of three dimensions over-
lapping in time. The simplest is founded on the notion that in order to get from here 
to there, we need knowledge of how to do that. The second dimension is also familiar: 
in order to have a goal, a given there, we need to have a standard of desirability along 
which we can position that goal, and choosing that standard constitutes the second 
dimension. The third dimension is more complicated, as it takes place mainly in the 
doxic realm: we can only choose between standards of desirability if they exist in the 
first place, which means that the third dimension consists of the meaning making 
mechanisms through which we create those standards of desirability. The following 















Sphere of reflective decision-making
External, collective forces
Internal, individual forces
Substantive, external and internal
Procedural, organic and algorithmic
p. 90
Doxa: Sphere of taken-for-granted, unwitting decision-making
Figure 6: Core of srategizing
At any given moment of here, an organization is on its way to a future there. The 
knowledge required for moving towards a conceived there consists of substantive 
and procedural elements (Dosi and Egidi, 1991). There is the raw information we 
get from both external and internal sources, and that raw information is processed 
somehow in order for it to apply to our circumstances. The information pertains 
to the organization (eg. resources, assets, capabilities) and to the environment (eg. 
competition, market needs, events), and it is processed by humans and computers in 
ways that are geared towards making the information relevant in aiding us in moving 
towards a conceived there.
The standard of desirability means a scale along which one direction is better 
and another worse (Thompson, 1967). For example, a goal defined by terms of profit 
is positioned on the monetary standard of desirability, or a goal defined by its en-
vironmental impact is positioned on the environmental sustainability standard of 
desirability. The choices between different standards of desirability, ie. the position-
ing of the goals of there, are influenced by both external forces, such as institutional 
impacts, and by internal tastes, preferences and values (March, 1982).
Underpinning the diverse standards of desirability are the meaning making mech-
anisms creating them. For example, for the monetary standard of desirability to exist, 
there must be a mechanism that gives money, ultimately bits of paper, metal or digits, 
its perceived value – for example as a means of exchange or a symbol of credit (Ali, 
2014, Ryan-Collins et al., 2012). Or for the environmental impact to be important, 
there has to be a mechanism of meaning creating the value of our ongoing existence 
on this planet. These meaning making mechanisms reside in big part in the doxic 
realm – our perceptions of value and meaning reflect both the external influences 
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of our institutional biographies and our internal dispositions and psychological fea-
tures. 
These three dimensions will be discussed extensively in the next chapter focusing 
on uncertainty, but for now these dimensions form the nucleus of individual level 
actions and decisions. However, remembering that in this dissertation the concept 
of strategizing includes also the collective level outcomes, the tub needs to be evoked 
again. Firstly, viewing the individual level actions and decisions through these three 





Figure 7: Explicated impact of collective forces
The collective forces include elements processed through reflective thinking, es-
pecially as they pertain to the dimension of knowledge, including information about 
markets or events relevant for the organization. In addition they include doxic el-
ements, eg. normative (informal) institutions, which contribute to the creation of 
the meaning making mechanisms, and to the choices of the standards of desirabil-
ity. These influences from the collective level target both the individuals within the 
organization and the intersubjective elements emerging in the social setting of the 
organization. 
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To move on from the individual level perceptions towards action, the three themes 
identified by Gavetti (2012) in behavioral strategy play a role. While the three themes 
constitute but one part of the idiosyncratic individual disposition, in the context of 
business activities understanding their impact cannot be underestimated. The choice 
of rationality, the perceptions of humans and organizations, and the understanding 
of the firm and environment interface impact the direction of the action. These influ-
ences are shown in the following figure. 
Rationality Perception of human
and organization
Perception of firm and 
environment interface
p.92
Figure 8: Impact of rationality and key perceptions on dimensions of strategizing
To begin with rationality, it impacts the understanding of the here, forms the there 
and shapes the use of knowledge in between. The judgements of what is possible for 
us, whether the opportunities are created or discovered, and how those opportunities 
can be realized as desirable theres hinge on the type of rationality wielded. 
The perception of human and organization has an impact on the understanding of 
the here, on the uses of knowledge in pursuing a there and additionally, a more pro-
found impact as an influence on the meaning making mechanisms. The fundamental 
worldview of humans (eg. as inherently trustworthy or untrustworthy) shapes the 
subsequent perception of organizations (eg. as machines or families) and constitutes 
one element of the meaning making mechanisms.
In turn, the perception of the firm and environment interface has a similar impact 
as rationality: it shapes the here and there, and the use of knowledge in between. The 
here and there look different depending on how malleable the environment is envi-
sioned to be, and how porous the boundaries of the firms are considered to be. These 
different perceptions create different paths for action. 
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Rationality, perception of humans and organizations, and perception of the firm 
and environment interface have both doxic and reflective nuances. While all of them 
can be reflected, without a specific triggering impulse to do so, these elements easily 
form and reside in the realm of doxa. Reading one type of management literature 
highlights the prevalent doxic constitution of these elements: the taken-for-granted 
rationality is causal, the fundamental assumption of humans is self-interest seeking 
and subsequently untrustworthy, and the firm is a separate entity, distinct from the 
market and the operating environment, in competition with other separate entities. 
On the other hand, each of these doxic beliefs have been criticized and discussed to 
the extent of criticizing the critique, especially in the fields of more sociologically 
oriented critical management studies (Hühn, 2014, Spicer, Alvesson and Kärreman, 
2009, Ford, Harding and Learmonth, 2010). 
So far the discussion has focused on the strategizing process of an individual, 
swayed and influenced by both exogenous and endogenous forces processed to an 
extent in the realm of doxa and to an extent through deliberate reflection. However, 
when the action becomes social, involving more than one individual, these are not 
the only forces and processes at play. In the vocabulary of the strategy-as-practice, 
these elements pertain to the practitioners, whereas in order to understand the prac-
tices (the procedures), or even more interestingly the praxis (the unfolding of the mi-
croevents constituting the procedures), more is involved than the aggregated melee 
of these elements impacting the individuals. 
This area of intersubjectively emergent elements is the core focus of the prac-
tice oriented research streams (Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011, Jarzabkowski et al., 
2007, Jarzabkowski, Lê and Feldman, 2012, Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011, 
Peppard, Galliers and Thorogood, 2014, Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011, Tsoukas and 
Hatch, 2001, Whittington, 1996, 2003). Relevant themes include for example coordi-
nation, routines, identity, culture, sensemaking and sensegiving, power – in essence 
each consisting of rich research streams that have increased our knowledge about the 
minutiae of organizational action. However, for the sake and purpose of the integra-
tive framework here being drafted for the purpose of engaging in the overarching dis-
cussion of this dissertation, none of the avenues are here explicitly delved. Instead, I 
yet again commit the academic sin of lumping together diverse streams of knowledge 
by stating that there are intersubjectively emergent phenomena, which play a major 
role in the aggregation of social action into collective level outcomes. 
The following figure captures the so far mentioned themes from the individual 
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Figure 9: Integrative framework of strategizing
As discussed, the collective level forces impact the individual perceptions in re-
gards to the substantive and procedural knowledge processed reflectively, the choices 
of standards of desirability in both doxic and reflective ways, and the meaning mak-
ing mechanisms mainly in the realm of doxa. In addition, the collective level forces 
contribute also to the constellation of the intersubjectively emergent phenomena in 
social action, for example through both the formal and informal institutional ele-
ments. 
The dispositions of the individuals are, in addition to the impacts of the collective 
forces, constituted of the idiosyncratic individual personality features, tastes, values 
(in short, preferences) and cognitive processes taking place both in the realms of 
doxa and reflection. A relevant subset in the context of business activities consists of 
rationality, perceptions of human and organization, and perceptions of the firm and 
environment interface. 
The rationality impacts the understanding of both the moment of here and the 
shape and position of the subsequent there, and the type of procedural knowledge 
used to process the substantive knowledge in both doxic and reflective ways. The per-
ceptions of the human and subsequently the organization are reflected in the doxic 
meaning making mechanisms, influencing the choices of goals and the understand-
ing of the moment here. In turn, the perception of the firm and environment inter-
face impacts the same elements as rationality: the perceived shapes of the here and 
there, and the processing of the substantive knowledge. 
When the action becomes social, these individual bundles of doxic and reflec-
tive elements meet in ways that create the intersubjectively emergent phenomena 
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of coordination, routines, identity and for example sensegiving and sensemaking. 
In short, the social action consists of more than the respective bundles of individual 
participants, however the individual bundles contribute to the creation of the inter-
subjective elements – as per structuration theory (Giddens, 1984a) the humans shape 
the structures in which their actions are embedded.
The aggregation of these social actions constitute the collective level outcomes. 
Depending on the perspective, these outcomes can be viewed through the lenses fo-
cused on the firm performance as aligned on the standard of desirability of financial 
value, or through the sociological lenses more interested in the social outcomes of 
these actions, including the impacts on the human, organization or society. 
This integrative construct captures the essence of the concept of strategizing as 
used in this dissertation. As it is the premise of this dissertation that the impact of 
digitalization on strategizing is mediated through the changes in uncertainty, the 
next chapter focuses more deeply on the nature of uncertainty as dealt with in this 
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" ‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’ ‘That 
depends a good deal on where you want to get to,’ said the Cat. ‘I don’t 
much care where--’ said Alice. ‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,’ 
said the Cat,’ ‘-so long as I get somewhere,’ Alice added as an explanation. 
‘Oh, you’re sure to do that,’ said the Cat, ‘if you only walk long enough.'”
(Lewis Carroll: Alice in Wonderland)
As strategizing is ultimately dealing with uncertainty, it is the impact of digitalization 
on uncertainty that constitutes a link between digitalization and strategizing. This 
chapter digs deep into what we understand as uncertainty in order to highlight what 
are the most critical types of uncertainty we need to address in the globally unfolding 
digitalization. 
4.1 Overview
Humanity has always struggled with uncertainty. With the advances of science and 
technology we have become better and better in acquiring knowledge aimed at re-
ducing uncertainty. An ancient seafarer would have been thrilled if introduced to 
the contemporary weather forecasting abilities. However, the exact same processes 
geared towards mitigating the impact of some types of uncertainties have resulted in 
creating more complex and dynamic novel sources of uncertainties.
Paradoxically, we live in an era where we know more that humanity has ever 
known – and face uncertainties on the scale humanity has never dealt with before 
(Artigiani, 2005, Peat, 2007). The converging trends of radical technological advanc-
es (Linturi et al., 2014), geopolitical turbulence (Kobrin, 2015, 2017) and the en-
vironmental issues (Jones, 2015, Wilenius and Casti, 2015) constitute a dense fog 
of uncertainty that limits our visibility in an unparalleled way. Quite fittingly, even 
the ubiquitous concept of uncertainty used in defining our contemporary times is 
shrouded in haze: what do we actually mean by uncertainty?
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Uncertainty as a lay term is quite intuitive – a coffee table discussion about some-
thing uncertain most likely pivots around a shared understanding of what is dis-
cussed. But when we take a look at the scholarly literature and the operationalizing of 
the concept, a shared understanding of uncertainty becomes – well, uncertain. 
One of the first and most influential texts dealing with the concept of uncertainty 
is the "Risk, Uncertainty and Profit" by Frank Knight (1921). Summarizing his exten-
sive discussion, risk refers to something of which the probability can be calculated 
(there are eight green and two red balls in an urn - you can calculate the risk of draw-
ing a red ball), normal uncertainty refers to knowing the nature of the entities ad-
dressed, but not their number (there are green and red balls in the urn, but you don't 
know how many of each), and true uncertainty, also known as Knightian uncertainty 
refers to not even knowing the nature of the entities addressed (there might be balls 
or scorpions in the urn – or maybe even no urn to begin with). 
Complementing Knight's approach with the set theory and the theory of potential 
surprises discussed by Shackle (1949, 1961), Packard, Clark and Klein (2017) delve 
deeper into the concept: essentially they create a typology of uncertainties based on 
two axes consisting of two sets of options (of action) and outcomes (of that action). 
If both sets are open, meaning that there's an infinite number of available options 
and equally infinite number of potential outcomes, the uncertainty is absolute. The 
quadrant of finite outcomes (closed set) but infinite option (open set) they define as 
creative uncertainty, whereas the reverse (closed set of options, open set of outcomes) 
they name environmental uncertainty. The quadrant of both closed sets of options 
and outcomes they further divide along the line of whether the distribution of the 
elements in the sets is known (risk) or unknown (they name ambiguity). 
While the sets of options and sets of outcomes constitute two different sources of 
uncertainty, essentially they are grounded on the lack of knowledge present in either 
the sets of options or outcomes. What is missing in the discussion, is the mechanism 
through which the sets of outcomes could be assessed, positioned on a scale of bet-
ter and worse. Taking a detour through Thompson (1967), essentially Packard et al 
discuss the dimension of knowledge about causes and effects, but ignore the other 
pertinent dimension of standard of desirables Thompson remarks to have an impact 
on the decision-making process. March (1982) in turn focuses on this dimension, 
which he ultimately calls goal ambiguity. 
What Alice lacks, in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, is the standard of 
desirables: she doesn't have a way of comparing the potential destinations in terms 
of better or worse, because she lacks the value scale on which she could assess them: 
based on what would one place be better than another? This dimension can be con-
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ceptualized as ambiguity, following the goal ambiguity notion attributable to March 
(March, 1982, Sarasvathy, 2001). It should be made clear that this use of the concept 
of ambiguity45 is not the same as the use proposed by Packard et al (2017), but while 
the discussion of the "right" meaning of the concept of ambiguity in literature would 
certainly be beneficial in enabling shared understanding of this particular dimen-
sion, this book isn't about to embark on that. Ambiguity in the context of this dis-
sertation is used with attached clarification of whose understanding of the concept 
is referred to. 
Understanding the dimension of the Marchian goal ambiguity however reveals 
yet a third relevant dimension contributing to the uncertainty: where do these stan-
dards of desirables and subsequent scales of preferences46 come from? This question 
was pondered extensively by the post-modern French philosophers, with for example 
Foucault creating his archaeology and genealogy of science approaches, Lyotard con-
ceptualizing the notion of metanarratives, Derrida deconstructing the pre-existing 
notions by highlighting the absent and emphasizing the impact of language in creat-
ing the reality we perceive, Latour rendering everything into actors in network, and 
Bourdieu discussing the notion of doxa (Ahonen, 2001, Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992, Derrida, 1978, Eagleton and Bourdieu, 1992, Foucault and Rabinow, 2000, La-
tour, 1987, Lyotard, 1984) to name a few prominent examples. Essentially the biggest 
contribution of post-modernists has been to highlight and illustrate the underlying 
assumptions and meaning structures, which guide our actions. The standards of de-
sirables are not given, nor can their origins be reductively traced back to any sets of 
fundamental principles (though not for the lack of trying). They come from some-
where through some mechanisms on both individual and collective levels. It is the ir-
reducible nature of these mechanisms that create the third dimension of uncertainty: 
the lack of meaning. 
45 Packard et al (2017) employ the concept of ambiguity in the way originally introduced by 
Ellsberg (1961), further elaborated by Dequech (2004, 2011) meaning a lack of some portion 
of information potentially available to others but not to the decision-maker. It can be argued 
that if we take the ambiguity as defined by March (1982) as the lack of the scales of preference, 
then that lack could be perceived as information potentially available to others, but not to 
the decision-maker – someone else might, in some limited cases indeed possess information 
about the valence of the outcomes on some assumed standard of desirability. In that case the 
Marchian goal ambiguity could be a subset of the Ellsbergian/Dequechian ambiguity, with a 
distinct reference to the type of lacking information the latter concept of ambiguity consists of.
46 Thompson referred to this as the standard of desirables, whereas March discusses preferences. 
In this dissertation the concepts are used so that the standards of desirables are seen as the 
fundamental root causes for creating the scales of preferences, along which the particular goals 
can then be aligned. 
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These three dimensions of uncertainty coincide with the three dimensions of the 
individual process of strategizing, as captured in the following figure based on the 
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Figure 10: Dimensions of uncertainty
So, essentially the concept of uncertainty in the context of this thesis refers to the 
three types of voids we need to overcome before choosing our next steps of action, 
either wittingly or not. However, not all types of uncertainty share similar philo-
sophical foundations, which may offer an explanation of why these three dimensions 
are seldom discussed in the same context. Drawing from the aleatory vs epistemic 
distinction by Perlman and McCann (1996), and the ontological vs epistemological 
typology of Davidson (1996), Dequech (2004) discusses at length how the uncertain-
ties can be either ontologically real, namely exist in the exogenous reality indepen-
dent of the experiencer, or epistemologically constructed, meaning that they come in 
to being endogenously to the experiencer. 
However, Dequech (2004) explicitly defines uncertainty as lack of knowledge, 
meaning either the real unknowables (ontological/aleatory uncertainty) or the in-
ability of the experiencer of the uncertainty to have knowledge, existing of not (epis-
temological/epistemic uncertainty). Here he comes close to Dosi and Egidi (1991) 
who divide uncertainty in substantive and procedural uncertainties: the first type of 
uncertainty refers to the ontologically real vacuum of knowledge whereas the second 
type refers to the uncertainty due to the imperfect processing capabilities of individ-
uals to create knowledge out of existing or non-existing information. Interestingly 
Dequech (2004) links this to the notion of bounded rationality (Cyert and March, 
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1963, March and Simon, 1958, Simon, 1947) made famous by the Carnegie school, 
and the insights of Kahneman and Tversky (1982), who studied the cognitive biases 
employed in decision-making. The bottom line of the argument is that uncertainty 
constitutes of lack of knowledge of real external information that doesn’t exist (yet), 
and the imperfection of us individuals to make sense of all the information regardless 
of whether the information existed or not. In short, uncertainty as lack of knowledge 
has both an exogenous and an endogenous facet. 
Accepting that the lack of knowledge dimension of uncertainty resides therefore 
at least in the objective realm of reality (when referring to non-existing knowledge, 
Knightian uncertainty), and in the subjective realm (when referring to the imperfect 
processing capabilities of us humans, procedural uncertainty), we can ask the ques-
tion of whether or not that dimension of uncertainty resides also within the realm 
of intersubjective? This is where an insight from Huff (1978) provides us with leads: 
a part of uncertainty is construed by the difficulty of understanding how others per-
ceive uncertainty in a specific context, and another part by the unpredictability of 
changes people undergo in the process of diminishing the experienced uncertainty 
(Sund et al., 2016)p.6). These examples of the lack of knowledge dimension of uncer-
tainty are not dependent on the ontological realness of the lack of knowledge, nor are 
they merely constructs of our individual cognitive functions. So, the lack of knowl-
edge facet of uncertainty resides in all three ontological reals, objective, subjective 
and intersubjective. This insight leads us further in exploring the ontological location 
of the two remaining dimensions of uncertainty. 
Returning to the familiar distinction of means and ends creating the foundation 
of the uncertainty matrix by Thompson (1967), we can continue with distinguishing 
the dimension of knowledge from the dimension of standards of desirables. When 
standards of desirables construct a clear scale of preference, we can define a goal we 
then pursue with the aid of the knowledge we possess. A perfect example is the mon-
etary scale, as it provides the most familiar scale of measures against which the ac-
tivities of a firm or an individual are often assessed: while the goal can be positioned 
in the vague way of “the more the better”, it still is a goal, which aligns the activities. 
Another example is environmental impact, which provides an intuitively reasonable 
standard of desirables, and yet another the well-being of an individual.
What these chosen examples hopefully reveal is that while it can naturally be ar-
gued that a goal positioned along the monetary scale can also align with a goal along 
the environmental scale (Bansal and Roth, 2000), the alignment is nothing to take 
for granted (Jones, 2015, Kolk, 2016). The goals positioned on the monetary scale 
may well lead to (and has indeed countless times been pointed out having led to – 
106 UNDeRSTANDINg UNCeRTAINT Y
one needs but to read almost any climate change report from the past few decades) 
calamities on the environmental scale. Real life is riddled with choices of goals where 
opting for one scale collides dramatically with another potential scale. This translates 
into uncertainty about the lack or abundance of the scales of preference: out of the 
existing and competing ones, how do I pick the one along which I position my goal? 
The dynamism on both endogenous and exogenous side creates additional problems. 
How can I know that having chosen a goal along these measures, by the time of 
reaching the goal they are still valid? My individual preferences may have changed, 
and similarly, the scales of preferences dominating at the time of formulating the goal 
may have undergone changes rendering the goal irrelevant, detached from the scales 
of preference persisting at the time of reaching the goal. 
To begin with the ontological realm of subjective, the Popperian world two, my 
individual tastes, desires, values all form endogenous scales of preferables, which re-
side in the realm of the subjective. The uncertainty here consists of the tendency of us 
humans to change – there are no guarantees that my tastes, desires and values are the 
same tomorrow as they were yesterday (March, 1982). 
To move on to the realm of intersubjective, organizational research provides in-
sights: the interesting research by Ravasi and Schultz (2006) highlights the process 
of how an organization undergoes change, which impacts the scales of values the or-
ganizational identity is based on. The rich stream of organizational identity research 
(Gioia et al., 2013, Pratt et al., 2016) focuses, among other things, on this particular 
dimension of uncertainty as it resides in the realm of intersubjective, within the level 
of organization. However, it is not only on the level of the organization that these 
shared scales of preferences form, are maintained, change and disappear. For exam-
ple, on the wider level it is not long ago that the skin color or gender of an individual 
constituted a scale of preference. What creates further uncertainty is the fact that few 
scales of preferences are even in any fixed point in time non-controversial, or shared 
across diverse collectivities. 
An interesting question about the ontological loci of this dimension of uncertain-
ty emerging from the difficulty of choosing between the diverse standards and scales 
therefore follows: while there is the type of endogenous uncertainty residing in the 
realm of the subjective, and the type of exogenous uncertainty inhabiting the inter-
subjective, can we fathom any instance where these standards of desirability would be 
located firmly in the realm of the objective? In other words, are there such scales of 
preferences that would unarguably be objectively real in all contexts for all participants? 
The postmodernist answers this with a firm “no”, while the naïve realist might 
want to say “yes”. The naïve realist might not see the intersubjective and constructed 
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nature of our scales of preference and would therefore see little value in looking at the 
uncertainties inherent in the act of choosing between them, and the postmodernist 
would disengage from any sentiments suggesting any realness to these scales, being 
therefore inclined to merely shrub off all scales as mere narratives, leading therefore 
towards the realm of moral relativism.
The question of the objective nature of these standards of desirables is a quest for 
the philosophers of ethics. This question preoccupied Kant, who came up with his 
categorical imperative47, a close kin to the biblical formulation known as the golden 
rule of doing onto others that which one wishes to be done onto oneself, further 
spinned by Rawls (1971) in his political philosophy paraphrased into the question of 
what kind of a society would you create if you didn’t beforehand know your position 
in it (Brennan and Buchanan, 2008). As this is not a dissertation in the domain of 
philosophy, I really cannot venture a position on the existence of the objective stan-
dards of desirables, but true to my pragmatist credo, instead utilize the existence of 
this problem to embark on the discussion of the third dimension of uncertainty.
If we can assume that there is no objective scale of preferences (at least so far 
indisputably unearthed), but simultaneously acknowledge that aligning both our 
individual and collective actions requires some standards of desirability – and that 
indeed, as evidenced by the purposive action we witness in our everyday lives, such 
scales are adhered to, and thus can be by their effects judged to exist at least in the 
realms of subjective and intersubjective – we are dealt with another question. Where 
do those scales of preferences come from? How do they emerge, gain stability, change 
and sometimes evaporate?
If we were to believe in the objective nature of these standards of desirables, these 
questions would not constitute uncertainty. However, as discussed above, we are far 
from having found such objective standards, yet obey some sets of standards and in-
deed align our goals along a plurality of them, monetary and environmental already 
used as examples. The myriad mechanisms we employ on both individual and collec-
tive level in constructing those standards of desirables to enable our daily decisions 
and actions therefore constitute the third dimension of uncertainty. To clarify the dis-
cussion so far, choosing between diverse scales of preferences creates a different type 
of uncertainty, than does the process of constructing those scales in the first place. 
What Harari and Lyotard have in common is the suggestion that these scales of 
preferences are constructed through shared narratives we believe in, in order to give 
meaning to our actions. Narratives are therefore the mechanisms through which we 
47 “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become 
a universal law” (Kant, 1785)
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construct the value scales, however the reason for employing those mechanisms is 
the elemental need to reduce meaninglessness and randomness. There is a deeply 
ingrained need within us to make sense of our experiences, to attach meaning to our 
perceptions and actions – even to the extent that losing that sense of meaning has 
debilitating effects on our abilities to go about our daily lives (Park, 2010). 
This third dimension of uncertainty, lack of meaning, is therefore born out of 
these two drivers: the need for meaning (in both individual and collective level ac-
tion), and the lack of fundamentally objective standards of desirables that could fulfill 
that need once and for all. This type of uncertainty resides in all three realms of real-
ity, discussed in more detail in a later subchapter. 
To summarize and move on, purposive action requires a direction aligned on 
a standard of desirability, and knowledge of causes and effects contributing to the 
movement towards that direction. While knowledge exists in all three realms of re-
ality, subjective, intersubjective and objective, the value scales exist (so far) only in 
the realms of subjective and intersubjective. This lack of objective standards of desir-
ability means that those standards need to be and are constructed through meaning 
structures on both individual and collective levels. Therefore uncertainty any purpo-
sive action needs to deal with consists of lack of knowledge (type one uncertainty), 
lack or abundance of the standards of desirability (type two uncertainty) to be chosen 
from, and the complex meaning-seeking processes and mechanisms through which 
those value scales are constructed, the lack of meaning (type three uncertainty). 
4.2 Lack of knowledge
Like suggested in the introduction, this facet of uncertainty is definitely the one most 
deeply discussed in the existing uncertainty-related literature. In this dissertation, the 
lack of knowledge dimension will be dealt with by relying on the recent framework 
by Packard et al (2017), which is based on a thorough discussion of the diverse ways 
uncertainty has been categorized and conceptualized in previous literature, provid-
ing a comprehensive mapping of these prior typologies onto their novel framework. 
As the context of the discussion in Packard et al is the dynamic decision-making 
processes of entrepreneurs, their framework pertains to uncertainty as perceived, not 
uncertainty as real (p. 7 in the approved manuscript), as essentially the entrepreneur-
ial judgments are grounded on the perceptions of uncertainty, the ontologically real 
uncertainty being somewhat elusive to delineate. However, the framework provides 
a comprehensive starting point for discussing the dimension of lack of knowledge, 
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especially as elaborated with a view through the three realms of reality, subjective, 
intersubjective and objective. 
Like Packard et al note, the typologies of uncertainty have most often been 
grounded on the seminal work by Knight (1921), mostly distinguishing between the 
probabilistic types of uncertainty (risk), and the non-probabilistic types of uncertain-
ty (normal and true uncertainty) (Figueira-de-Lemos, Johanson and Vahlne, 2011). 
However, heeding the familiar notion of means and ends48 they define as options and 
outcomes, Packard et al utilize set theory and show that both the options and out-
comes constitute sets, which can be both open or closed (finite or infinite). In their 
framework, Packard et al ultimately show how and why the open or closed nature of 
these sets create uncertainty, and how dealing with these uncertainties influences the 
dynamic decision-making processes of entrepreneurs. 
Risk and normal uncertainty (what they call ambiguity following Ellsberg) re-
side in the quadrant where both sets are closed, the distinction emerging from the 
knowledge of distribution available to the decision-maker: in risk the distribution 
is known, in normal uncertainty not to the decision-maker, while that information 
could be possessed by an omniscient observer. In the vocabulary of Dequech (2011), 
this constitutes weak uncertainty, which can be substantive or procedural (Dosi and 
Egidi, 1991), meaning that this uncertainty can be created by either not having ac-
cess to external knowledge, or lacking the cognitive or other processing capabilities 
to wield that knowledge. In the practitioner oriented VUCA-matrix, Bennett and 
Lemoine (2014) distinguish between volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambigu-
ity (used yet again in a different way, as Knightian uncertainty), however in a way 
where the dimensions of VUC actually reside merely in this quadrant of closed sets: 
volatility and complexity moderate this weak uncertainty (meaning risk and ambigu-
ity in the Ellsbergian sense) rendering it in practice quite potent, even when the sets 
of options and outcomes are closed. 
The lack of knowledge in the quadrant of closed sets of options and outcomes 
can therefore be ontologically objective (complexity, volatility and Ellsbergian am-
biguity render substantive knowledge objectively unreachable even in cases where 
both options and outcomes are finite), intersubjective (the diverse understandings of 
lacking knowledge, and diverse learning processes between individuals create further 
uncertainties (Huff, 1978)), and subjective (procedural uncertainty and Ellsbergian 
ambiguity). 
48 This duality of means and ends is one of the characterizing themes in economics, as stated in 
the most prominent definition of economics as science originally expressed by Robbins (1932): 
“economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between ends and 
scarce means which have alternative uses” (p.12)
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The quadrant of closed options but open outcomes Packard et al name environ-
mental uncertainty. This quadrant is well addressed in research exploring managerial 
decision-making processes (eg. in the context of policy-related uncertainty (Engau and 
Hoffmann, 2011), or pharmaceutical industry (Granlund and Lukka, 2017), interna-
tional business (Mascarenhas, 1982), internationalization process (Figueira-de-Lemos 
et al., 2011) to name but a few examples), especially through the diverse constructs, 
which attempt to map out the different elements contributing to the uncertainty emerg-
ing from the open set of outcomes. For example the work of Miles and Snow (1978) or 
the subsequent Perceived Environmental Uncertainty framework (Miller, 1992, 1993, 
Werner, Brouthers and Brouthers, 1996) are attempts to reduce the open set of out-
comes into something more manageable. Miller (1992, 1993) for example identifies six 
categories of environmental uncertainty: 1) the uncertainty of government policies, 2) 
macro-economic uncertainties, 3) the uncertainty of the resources and services used 
by the company, 4) the uncertainty of the product market and demand, 5) the uncer-
tainty of competition, and 6) the uncertainty of the technology in the industry. Each of 
these categories are further divided into sets of subquestions, through which the PEU 
can then be calculated. While the PEU framework is an attempt to reduce the open set 
of outcomes, what it essentially highlights is managerial decision-making bounded by 
closed set of options, attempting to operationalize the open set of outcomes into some-
thing calculable – forcing the open set closed.
The lack of knowledge emerging from the open set of outcomes can present itself 
as state, effect or response uncertainty (Milliken, 1987): we don’t know the state in 
which the future outcomes are realized, neither do we know the effect of those out-
comes on us, nor the responses we should thereof engage in. The lack of knowledge 
can be both substantive and procedural, however whenever either of the sets is open, 
we are dealing with strong uncertainty (in Dequechian terms). The lack of knowledge 
in this environmental uncertainty quadrant has representations in all three realms of 
reality. It is an objective fact that considering the infiniteness of potential outcomes, 
there is real uncertainty. Like highlighted in the constructs like PEU, essentially we 
can deal with outcome uncertainty only through our perceptions of it, which means 
that this lack of knowledge is also highly subjectively tinged. In addition, again refer-
ring to Huff ’s insight, a part of the lack of knowledge about the outcomes results from 
the different interpretations in between individuals, and the dynamism inherent in 
the changes of those interpretations, which means that this dimension of uncertainty 
is also present in the intersubjective realm. 
Packard et al name the quadrant of open options but closed outcome creative 
uncertainty, linking this theme into creativity research (Amabile, 1997, 2012, Csiksz-
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entmihalyi, 1997, 2014a, 2014b), which shows how means scarcity under given ends 
pursuits actually enhances creativity. This is also the discussion theme in the brico-
lage approach (Baker and Nelson, 2005, Fisher, 2012, Levi-Strauss, 1966) looking at 
entrepreneurial behavior under resource scarcity. Imagine for example a composer 
with a looming deadline to produce a 20 minutes piece of music for a violin quartet: 
the outcome is clearly defined, however there is an infinite number of ways in which 
to combine the individual notes in meaningful ways49. The lack of knowledge consti-
tuting uncertainty in this quadrant is underlined by the impossibility to narrow down 
the potential options available into a finite set – the choices can be limited, but never 
to anything less than infinite (Packard et al., 2017, p. 11 in the accepted manuscript).
The lack of knowledge in creative uncertainty is primarily subjective (Foss et al., 
2008), as essentially it arises out of the need of an individual outcome pursuer to 
choose between the perceived infinite options. However it has objective underpin-
nings, as it simply isn’t objectively possible to close the set of options – quite the 
contrary, as objective knowledge about the options would only serve to increase the 
infinity. Introducing intersubjectivity into the melee doesn’t change the quality and 
quantity of the lack of knowledge, while potentially having an impact on the compo-
sition of the lack of knowledge: the intersubjectively arising understandings of op-
tions would be different than purely subjective options, however as we are dealing 
with infinite sets in each case, uncertainty exists.
Absolute uncertainty reigns when both sets, options and outcomes, are open. As 
the context of their article is the dynamic decision-making processes of entrepre-
neurs, Packard et al (2017) highlight that this is the realm in which most entrepre-
neurs act. They provide an illustrative sequence of questions an aspiring entrepreneur 
might make: first she wonders if she should start a business, and then if she should 
start this business50. Answering yes to the first question comes with an infinite set 
of options and outcomes, while the second yes can transition the entrepreneur into 
the quadrant of creative uncertainty. Packard et al show how these two questions 
delineate the discussion in the recent research stream within entrepreneurship stud-
49 Or to take an example closer at hand: there’s a clear goal of producing a dissertation on the 
themes of digitalization, uncertainty and strategizing, however there are infinite ways in which 
to go about such an endeavor. Packard et al show a similar example based on how a sculptor 
goes about dealing with a block of marble.
50 Of course, in real life the questions can occur in different order, as shown by McMullen and 
Shepherd (2006): an aspiring entrepreneur might first become aware of a specific business op-
portunity in general, and then engage in self-reflection of whether that would be a business for 
her. The question of whether or not to become an entrepreneur at all would therefore overarch 
the process of opportunity identification. 
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ies, namely the effectuation approach (Sarasvathy, 2001, Sarasvathy and Dew, 2005, 
Sarasvathy and Venkataraman, 2011). 
The difference between causal and effectual logic51 is the difference between 
creative and environmental uncertainty, and highlights the different approaches to 
dealing with the absolute uncertainty: entrepreneurs acting causally start with a pre-
defined goal (essentially by closing the set of outcomes), and proceed by addressing 
the options at hand, what they have and what do they need to acquire in order to 
reach the defined outcomes. The effectuating entrepreneurs instead do not start by 
trying to reduce the infinity of outcomes, but instead start by focusing on the most 
easily available resources (by tolerating the open outcomes, but limiting the options), 
engage in stakeholder interactions, which result in both additional resources and 
some goal restraints. Ultimately the outcomes emerge as a result of the process of 
this cycle of expanding resources and converging expectations. So, essentially the ef-
fectual entrepreneurs limit the infinity of options by seizing the nearest options, and 
subsequently limit the outcomes through collaboration.  
The diverse mechanisms with which an entrepreneur can deal with absolute un-
certainty serve to highlight this quadrant of lack of knowledge type uncertainty. 
When both options and outcomes are open, uncertainty becomes so paralyzing, that 
in order to keep moving, we must artificially try to reduce either set to something 
more bearable. Ultimately, heeding Sartre or Nietsche (Ahonen, 2001), this is actu-
ally the reality we inhabit, which means that all our perceptions of finite sets are just 
artefacts we construct in order to be able to hold on to the illusion of purpose and 
meaning of our actions.
While we are still dealing with the lack of knowledge, the existence of this absolute 
uncertainty begins to nudge us towards the other two dimensions of uncertainty. Ab-
solute uncertainty is objectively real, however we human beings are excellent in our 
attempts to intersubjectively and subjectively construct mechanisms, which allow us 
51 This was discussed further in a preceding chapter, but to recapitulate, the most used metaphor 
to describe the differences between effectual and causal logic comes from cooking. One can 
either start with knowing exactly what dish one wishes to make, continue by finding the recipe, 
shopping for the exact ingredients, and then by following the recipe to produce the desired 
dish. This is the causal approach. The effectual approach to cooking is for the aspiring cook 
to enter the kitchen, open the cupboards to see what is at hand, and then just cooking what 
she can with those ingredients found in the kitchen. In the expanding cycle of effectual entre-
preneurship other people enter the kitchen with their own ingredients they wish to be a part 
of the dinner, meaning that the effectual cook has not only access to accumulating amount of 
ingredients, but also becomes restricted by an increasing number of people whose palate she 
needs to satisfy with the result. At some point having another ingredient just isn’t enough of 
a motivation to try to modify the simmering stew to satisfy yet another eater (Sarasvathy and 
Dew, 2005). 
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to not experience life as pure open sets of options and outcomes, ultimately the only 
objectively emerging limitations following from causalities, normal or counterfactu-
al. This essentially means that while in any point of time the options and outcomes 
are infinite, through the causes and effects of our actions we narrow both sets. Having 
eaten the cake I no longer have it, me not having the cake being in a causal relationship 
with my action of eating it, thus limiting the options I have concerning the cake. The 
standards of desirables, scales of preferences, values are essentially such constructs. 
Therefore the lack or abundance of them is the next dimension of uncertainty.
4.3 Lack (or abundance) of standards of desirability
The discussion of goal ambiguity in the 1982 paper by March can be seen as an exten-
sion of the work known as the Carnegie School driven behavioral theory of the firm 
(Cyert and March, 1963, Gavetti et al., 2012b, March and Simon, 1958, Simon, 1947). 
The notion of bounded rationality refers not only to the imperfect processing capa-
bility of humans and the impossibility of attaining all relevant knowledge, but also 
to the decision-driving mechanism March and colleagues termed satisficing. Prior 
to the insights of the Carnegie School, the assumptions underlying macroeconomics 
about humans as "Homo economicus", meaning fully rational, self-interest maximiz-
ing actors was prevalent also in the firm level theories. However, what March and 
Simon (1947, 1996) showed, supported by for example the insights of the muddling 
man (Lindblom, 1959, 1979), was that people rarely make decisions based on max-
imising the benefits, but instead settle for the first satisfactory solution, influenced 
by different social forces like political elements, contingencies and diverse personal 
attributes (Cohen et al., 1972). 
This led March to ponder at length the existence of any goals built on the max-
imisation maxim, and resulted in the understanding that not only are there en-
dogenous elements like tastes, aspirations and other personal preferences, which 
change within an individual, making it impossible for even one person to know if 
what I like today is something I like also tomorrow, but also exogenous elements 
resulting from the changes in the environment that make it essentially impossible 
to know if the outcomes of my choices today are still valid at the future time of their 
realization. 
While Packard et al (2017) allocate a position in their framework also to the dis-
cussion of uncertainty by Thompson (1967), they actually conflate this dimension of 
lack of standards of desirables Thompson explicitly touches upon with the open sets 
of outcomes. However, the choices between the diverse standards of desirability in 
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my view constitute a different dimension of uncertainty than the lack of knowledge 
pertaining to the infinite sets of outcomes, as I’ll shortly elaborate.
Thompson’s approach is distinctly different from the Carnegie School driven dis-
cussion. Where March and colleagues focus more on the endogenous view, Thomp-
son creates a decision-making matrix based on the existence of more exogenous fac-
tors, namely knowledge of the causes-and-effects and the possession of a standards of 
desirables. Thompson further explicates guidelines for how to pursue (and evaluate) 
action in both, either or neither, however he keeps the discussion about the axis of the 
standard of desirables quite short, more or less merely remarking that in the context 
of business, it is natural to utilize the monetary scale as the scale of preference: more 
profit equals better along that scale. 
Even though Thompson doesn't dig deeper into this discussion, it nonetheless 
opens up an interesting avenue in this present endeavor. Yes, it is quite intuitive that 
in the realm of business, there's the given profitability (or cost-efficiency if we take 
a look at the fundaments of for example Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 
2003) or the internalization theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976)) as a scale of pref-
erences, however we need only to look at politics to see that while economic issues 
are prominently discussed, the fundamental distinction between business and public 
policy is the impossibility of aligning all the activities along the scale of monetary 
issues. While we can calculate the cost and benefits of for example childcare, road 
infrastructure, education, military might and medical facilities, we cannot position 
the value of each pursuit along a singular standard of desirability, the monetary scale. 
We have to choose between diverse standards of desirability.
It is exactly this type of uncertainty, the difficulty of choosing between diverse 
standards of desirability, that the institutions reduce. The discussion of institutions 
can be considered to have emerged from the economist Thorstein Veblen (1898, 
1899), an avid critic of the full rationality assumption. Vanguarded by Veblen, the old 
institutional economics school exerted influence over the drafting of the New Deal in 
the US (in 1933 and 1935), focusing the efforts towards the institutional elements (fi-
nancial regulations, social security, trade unions to name a few) of the administrative 
decision-making (Chang, 2014). 
With the increasing might of the neoclassical school of economics and its focus on 
the individual-based, universal assumptions, the old institutional school faded. With 
a clear distinction made to the old institutionalism, a new institutional economics 
however began to emerge in the late 20th century, with the publication of the book 
“Institutions, institutional change and economic performance” by Douglass North 
(1990). In the parallel universe of sociology, an institutional theory was coined by 
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Richard Scott (1987, 1995, 2008), further developing the insight of DiMaggio and 
Powell about the isomorphism between diverse institutions (Dimaggio and Powell, 
1983).
These institution-based views (Peng et al., 2009) share the understanding that hu-
man action is constrained and enabled by diverse institutions, which provide the 
guidelines of acceptable behavior. The institutions may be formal (in North’s vocabu-
lary) and regulative (in Scott’s semantics), or informal (North) and normative/cogni-
tive (Scott). Laws, rules and regulations constitute the first category whereas norms, 
cultures and ethics exemplify the second. Essentially what the institutions do, is to 
reduce the uncertainty emerging from the diversity of different standards of desir-
ability: when something is customary or the law, it provides a standard of desirability 
that can be taken for granted. 
The institution-based views have been diffused widely in for example interna-
tional business research (Peng et al., 2008, Dunning and Lundan, 2008, 2010) as they 
provide a comprehensive52 approach towards looking at the differences and similari-
ties of diverse collectives. Also the concept of institutional void (Khanna and Palepu, 
1997, 2005, Khanna, 2015) is notable, as it highlights the absence of such structures 
in for example emerging markets that are taken for granted in the developed markets. 
This illustrates the discussion about the type two uncertainty at hand, as the insti-
tutional voids create exactly the type of uncertainty that emerges from the lack (or 
abundance) of standards of desirables. 
Essentially what the ample research on institutions or their effects highlights, 
is the need for such mechanisms that reduce the uncertainty inherent in choosing 
between diverse standards of desirables. This is captured by the phrase that insti-
tutions constrain and enable action. The constraining of action essentially happens 
through removing some potential standards of desirability and diffusing some tak-
en-for-granted standards of desirability within a collective, thus limiting the need to 
choose between all potentially available scales of preference at any given moment. 
The enabling of action refers to the assurance that within a specific set of institutions, 
an actor may be fairly certain about how others act, which enables collective activities 
(like driving a car – a feat not possible if not for both the existence of the regulatory 
traffic rules and the normative faith that others abide by them to at least some extent).
52 In the 1980’s there was a lot of discussion about the importance of culture, with the seminal 
work of Hofstede (1984) highlighting the impact of different regional cultures in organiza-
tional action. However, with the growing globalization the construct of regional culture has 
become more and more elusive, with the emphasis shifting towards looking at the culture as 
only one element of the informal (normative) institutions influencing action. 
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While the impact of the institutions on the individuals emerges exogenously, the 
diverse institutional biographies of individuals however contribute to the endoge-
nous processes within the individual: as we are creatures of both idiosyncratic per-
sonal features and socially conditioned beings, the exogenous institutions partially 
define our personal assumptions of what we take for granted53.
Institutions are man-made constructs, fully intersubjective creations with no 
objectively real and immutable underpinnings. However, after the institutions have 
been formed, they gain an objectively real existence: they exist independently of the 
observer, and have solid enough representations to allow them to be studied with 
even the most rigorously positivist empirical approaches. They can also be consid-
ered objectively real in the sense that their effects on an individual aren’t dependent 
on the intersubjective or subjective processes of that individual. Put simply, even if I 
choose to ignore or disobey institutions, they still influence me: if I break the law, I go 
to prison, if I misbehave, I’m frowned upon. They are not mere figments of individual 
or collective imagination.
In essence, institutions provide sets of solidified, collectively constructed answers 
to the questions of what is wrong and right, better and worse, desirable or not desir-
able. What their might shows, is the acute need for such answers, in other words, the 
need to reduce the uncertainty of choosing between potential standards of desirabil-
ity. Institutions, however, are not the only constructs created to reduce that type of 
uncertainty: they fulfill the purpose on a macrolevel, leaving firms and individuals 
to battle the Marchian goal ambiguity in the more microlevel choices. Even though 
the number of microlevel choices of standards of desirability is limited through the 
constraints of institutions, those choices are still quite infinite. 
On the level of both organizations and individuals, routines are one of the most 
prominent ways of dealing with this type of uncertainty. Routines can be defined 
as recurring sets of action, continuously honed by repetition to save cognitive ef-
fort (Feldman and Pentland, 2003, Felin et al., 2012, Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002, 
2009, Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011). While the saving of cognitive effort 
pertains also to the attempt to reduce the type one uncertainty (lack of knowledge), 
it equally serves in reducing the type two uncertainty by rendering the need to pause 
and identify the various possible standards of desirability available invisible.
Ultimately the easiest way to conceptualize the type two uncertainty, lack or abun-
dance of standards of desirables, is by envisioning a world without institutions and 
routines. We can still possess all the knowledge we currently have, but the lack of such 
53 More discussion about institutional biographies and the nature of man as both the subject “I” 
and the object “me” can be found at the onset of the Strategizing chapter.
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structures that would inform us about the desirability of any possible goal, would also 
make collective action impossible. While the self-utility maximization maxim of eco-
nomic theories is hotly debated, theorizing grounded on that assumption provides a 
given standard of desirables against which the individual and collective behavior can 
be imagined to be positioned, thus enabling prediction and aggregation. Whether 
that is an accurate depiction of human behavior, is another question, explored in 
more depth elsewhere in this dissertation, however the existence of that particular 
assumption is yet another way of trying to reduce type two uncertainty. 
Ultimately the lack or abundance of standards of desirability dimension of uncer-
tainty is most visible through the diverse mechanisms constructed for dealing with 
it. Zooming in to the verb “constructed” brings us closer to the third type of uncer-
tainty. In discussing institutional economics, Chang (2014) points out that the inher-
ent weakness in the old institutional economics is still a discussion not sufficiently 
addressed in the new institution-based views: where do these uncertainty reducing 
institutions come from? How do they emerge, stabilize, change, persist and fade out? 
This question resonates vibrantly in this dissertation, as it highlights acutely the third 
type of uncertainty. How do the diverse standards of desirability emerge and gain 
their value?
4.4 Lack of meaning
In his popular book "Sapiens: A Brief history of humankind", Harari (2014) takes 
the reader on a journey to the history of human civilization asking the question of 
why did our breed of humans conquer the neanderthalian man, and why did some 
civilizations end up the winners of history where others vanished. Essentially the 
answer he comes up with is that Homo Sapiens has the ability to imagine and believe 
in abstract things, which enables us to join forces to pursue rewards beyond the im-
minently present survival needs of sustenance and shelter. Translated into a scholarly 
discussion, essentially Harari subscribes to the post-modern notion of narratives and 
metanarratives (Lyotard, 1984). Put simply, we live by believing in stories that give us 
the meaning of what we encounter, provide us with the notions of right and wrong, 
good and evil – shared values and common goals. 
This importance of meanings penetrates all levels of human action. On an individ-
ual level, the stream of meaning-making in psychology has explored how individuals 
surviving hardships cope afterwards the better the more meaning they have been able 
to retrospectively give to their difficulties (for a review see (Park, 2010), the better life 
stories they have been able to create to imbue their experiences with meanings. Also 
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on the individual level, the importance of meaning is further revealed in the concep-
tual change research (Vosniadou, 2009). Enlightening examples come from the de-
velopmental psychology insights about how children learn, and how those learning 
processes follow us throughout life: ultimately we begin with “naïve theories” based 
on our immediate experiences, which we then enrich or revise (Vosniadou, 1994). 
We, as children, are not empty vessels into which the learning is poured bit by atom-
istic bit until a full picture emerges, but instead start out with complete frameworks 
giving meaning to our experiences, through which we then negotiate the information 
gained in learning processes.
When the new, “correct”, information is easily applied into our existing frame-
work, we enrich that corner of our framework with that knowledge. However, when 
the new information doesn’t fit into our existing framework, three things can happen: 
we either neglect the new, ill-fitting information, create a misconception54, an attempt 
to assimilate new knowledge into the existing conceptual structures containing con-
tradictory information (Vosniadou, 1994, p. 45), or revise the old structures. Interest-
ingly, these “naïve theories” persist through our lives, as it seems that they can only be 
overridden, not overwritten (Shtulman and Harrington, 2016). In essence, from very 
early on we need meaning: our brains are wired in a way that makes it impossible to 
process knowledge when it cannot be applied to a pre-existing structure of some kind 
of meaning – a worldview as Cobern (1994) discusses. But where do those very early 
meaning structures, worldviews come from? 
On an organizational level, the rich stream of sensemaking looks at how collec-
tives create shared understandings, reduce equivocality by giving experiences mean-
ings – or struggle when failing to do so (Maitlis and Sonenshein, 2010, Maitlis and 
Christianson, 2014, Weick, 1979, 1988, 1995, Weick et al., 2005). Essentially Karl 
Weick’s impactful contribution was to show how these individual level processes of 
us individuals assimilating new information through our existing mental models 
and schemas (“maps” in Weick’s terminology) translates also to collectives: equipped 
with presuppositions constituting the mental representations through which we view 
the world, we enter a baffling situation and engage in enactment, in other words 
do something, which then provides us some material we can use to assimilate the 
54 An enlightening example can be found in studies looking into how children negotiate the ex-
perience of living on a flat surface with the given, scientific information that the Earth is round. 
When asked directly, they would repeat what they had heard, namely that the Earth is round, 
but when explored in more depth, what they actually had done, was to fit the new knowledge 
into their original framework constructed out of their everyday experiences. This resulted in 
mental models of Earth as for example a sphere within which the people lived on a flat surface, 
or a sphere with flattened top on which people lived, or a disc with ends you could fall off from 
(Vosniadou and Brewer, 1992).
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baffling experiences into our pre-existing mental models. In a collective setting this 
assimilation is a shared process, carried out through cues from actions and verbal 
expressions, which may or may not result in a shared representation, sensemaking. 
Essentially the discussion about how routines emerge (Dionysiou and Tsoukas, 
2013) opens up this theme even further. Positioned in the routines process research 
approach55 and drawing from the insights of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969, 
Fine, 1993, Joas, 1997, Mead, 1934, Snow, 2001), Dionysiou and Tsoukas show how 
routines emerge to reduce the inherent uncertainty of shared settings. Symbolic in-
teractionism is grounded on Mead’s notion of the duality of the concept of myself: “I” 
represents the agentic subject with a free will, and “me” the social object, reflecting 
the expectations of how a person like myself should in a given setting be. Routines 
emerge in shared settings when people initiate interaction and continuously asses 
both themselves and others and align their actions through the cues they perceive 
from others about themselves. This coalescing process results in a shared understand-
ing that reduces the initial (type three) uncertainty about the situation, including the 
expectations of what the interaction, routine, is supposed to accomplish. 
The key contribution of Dionysiou and Tsoukas was to show that routines emerge 
from enactment geared towards reducing uncertainty – individuals start to act to 
produce material they can subsequently use for making sense of the situation (Weick, 
1979). In essence, the very first aim in interaction is to create meaning that enables 
further collective action. Only when the actions of others have meaning to me, is 
my action in the same situation meaningful. Otherwise all I perceive others doing is 
random, riddled with the type three uncertainty, and engaging in meaningful action 
is impossible, as in the realm of random actions, all my actions are rendered random 
for the lack of meaning providing structures to which my actions could be attached. 
Returning to the question posed at the end of the individual level discussion 
about the origins of the individual level mental representations, and asking the same 
question in the level of organizational action shows that the symbolic interactionism 
(Mead 1934, Blumer 1969) and its offspring of sensemaking approach (Weick 1979) 
55 Organizational routines are researched from two different perspectives (Parmigiani and How-
ard-Grenville, 2011): the capabilities view, with roots in economics and the evolutionary the-
ory of the firm (Nelson and Winter 1982, 2002, Winter 2003), is interested in answering what 
routines as entities do in and for the organization, whereas the process view, grounded in the 
more sociological turn-to-practise approach (Feldman and Pentland 2003), opens up the black 
box of routines to explore how they emerge and unfold.  In the latter stream the routines are 
conceptualized as dualities of ostensive and performative parts, the ostensive capturing the 
structure of what the routines are expected to accomplish (why they exist) and the performa-
tive reflecting the actual carrying out of the routines in specific circumstances by specific actors 
(how they are performed).
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are attempts to answer that question. The meaning in the level of an organization is 
constructed through reflecting my actions through the mirror of other’s actions, and 
in turn mirroring the actions of others in my subsequent reactions. The meaning 
making mechanism can thus be construed in the level of organizational action, even 
while the individual level, the microfoundational answer to the origins of individual 
level meaning is more difficult. But how about the macrolevel of institutions, dis-
cussed in the previous chapter?
On the macrolevel, the feat of providing standards of desirability is achieved 
notably by the existence of institutions. But how are those institutions formed and 
shaped? In his fascinating text, Wildavsky (1987) asks that if we perceive (political) 
institutions being shaped by negotiations between diverse interests, we should start 
by asking where do those interests come from? If the interests emerge from prefer-
ences, where do the preferences come from? Can preferences be merely reduced to 
individual tastes, quite randomly dispersed in a population of idiosyncratic individu-
als, or what are the mechanisms through which the preferences emerge, solidify into 
interests, which ultimately aggregate into institutions? 
Like Wildavsky points out in relation to the self-interest maximization assump-
tion of economic theorizing, “The least interesting behavior, instrumental actions, 
may be explained by preferences; but about the most interesting, preferences themselves, 
nothing at all can be said”(Wildavsky, 1987, p.5). Bowles (1998) discusses the same 
issue56 extensively in his call for opening up the “black box” of preference emergence 
and formation, ultimately concluding that while there may be some tastes emerging 
directly from the genetic inheritance, there are several mechanisms of learning, cul-
tural conditioning, and institutional impact that shape the preferences throughout 
the life of an individual. Thus the preferences are not merely exogenous (given) in 
the act of choosing between diverse ends, but also emerge endogenously from the 
interaction with and influence of the possible ends solidified as normative institu-
tions. We do not merely choose from a set of options based on some given standards 
of desirables, but the mere existence of those sets of options influences our standards 
of desirability in the first place.
This dilemma begins to highlight the third type of uncertainty, the lack of mean-
ing. Knowing that worldviews in the individual level (Cobern 1994), symbolic inter-
actionism driven sensemaking in the organizational level (Weick 1979, Dionysiou 
56 “We know surprisingly little about how we come to have the preferences we do; the theory of 
cultural evolution is thus similar to the theory of natural selection prior to its integration with 
Mendelian genetics. While it is comforting to recall that Darwin's contribution was possible even 
though he did not know how traits are passed on, this lacuna is nonetheless a major impediment 
to endogenizing preferences.” (Bowles, 1998, p.80)
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and Tsoukas 2013) and institutions in the macro level (Bowles 1998, Wildavsky 1987) 
reduce the uncertainty inherent in the need of choosing between diverse standards 
of desirability (scales of preferences), it is the shrouded and amorphous nature of the 
processes through which those constructs emerge that create the third type of uncer-
tainty. Not only are we uncertain about which preferences to choose, but also about 
how do those preferences become preferences, ie. gain the meaningfulness required 
for them to be preferences. 
This requires a practical example. For the clarity of argumentation next I will pres-
ent three, one on each level of analysis so far mentioned, individual, organizational 
and macro level. 
4.4.1 Three examples
Individual: Matthew’s choice
Matthew is somewhat unhappy in his current work. He dislikes the content of the 
work, however appreciates the possibility of a good work-life balance the current job 
offers: no extensive travelling, flexible work hours. Then Matthew is offered a new 
job, which would be far more interesting in the work content. On the downside, the 
new job would require sacrifices in the work-life balance as it would require more 
travelling and offer little opportunities to self-organize the working hours. The finan-
cial compensation is the same in both jobs.
The uncertainties involved in the decision Matthew needs to take emerge from 
all three dimensions of uncertainty. There is simply lack of knowledge, for example 
about the exact nature of the new work and about the potential changes in the cur-
rent work that may affect its likeability. Additionally there is the type two uncertainty 
emerging from the need to choose between two different standards of desirability: 
job satisfaction and work-life balance. This type of uncertainty is the most acute Mat-
thew consciously needs to deal with. 
The third type of uncertainty emerges if Matthew asks himself, why would he 
consider either job satisfaction or work-life balance more important? Why does the 
meaningfulness of life mean what it means for Matthew? When he begins tracing the 
idiosyncratic individual innate features and his learned normative notions of what 
constitutes a meaningful life, do either one of the options actually continue to provide 
meaning for Matthew? Why would job satisfaction or self-expression in work matter? 
Why is family important?
The third type of uncertainty becomes pronounced when Matthew realizes that 
these mechanisms constructing his notion of meaningfulness are not grounded on 
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any solid and given absolutes. As such, the meaningfulness of either choice can be 
deconstructed by questioning each part of it, ultimately ending in a lacunae of any-
thing onto which the meaning structure can be pinned. Fortunately for our Mat-
thew, however, he, like most of us, is equipped with the innate personal framework of 
meaning57 that most likely inoculates him against the need to begin deconstructing 
the meaningfulness he intuitively attaches to either choice, simplifying the question 
therefore to only the issue of choosing between two standards of desirables. 
Organizational: Gateway conundrum
In the process of digitalizing a global, heavy machinery firm, it is understood that in 
order to create a digital representation of the heavy steel equipment, it is not enough 
to build in intelligence to the new products, but the existing equipment need to be 
retrofitted with gateways that produce the data necessary for subsequent develop-
ment of more sophisticated service, eg. predictive maintenance. The purchasing of 
those gateways is therefore a key process, as the existing equipment is both numer-
ous (in hundreds of thousands) and diverse (ranging from huge harbor cranes to 
tiny forklifts). Ultimately the purchasing choice is reduced to two possible options: 
gateway A is a more sophisticated design, whereas the gateway B could be delivered 
sooner. Both the forecastable financial costs and benefits of either option are equal 
enough to be dismissed in the decision-making.
There is of course an ample amount of type one uncertainty – as the whole dig-
italization is a new avenue for the firm, the lack of knowledge pertains to not only 
the gateways and their retrofitting processes, but also to the subsequent utilizing of 
the data thus created.  The second type of uncertainty emerges from the need to 
choose between two standards of desirability: is it more important to have the gate-
ways ready as soon as possible to exploit the early mover advantages in the industry, 
or to make sure that the gateways installed are sophisticated enough to be on par with 
the future technological developments?
In the meeting58 where this decision needs to be made, both scales of preferences 
have their proponents. The marketing manager quips “who cares about the design of 
some black box – we’re not selling it, but what it enables, and the sooner we can start 
selling, the better!” to which the head of engineering replies “our key competitive ad-
vantage has always been the quality of our offerings – hastily installing a suboptimal 
57 Remember the discussion of conceptual change (Vosniadou), worldviews (Cobern) and mean-
ing making (Park) touched upon previously?
58 This example comes from another research project, through which I was present in this meet-
ing.
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piece throughout our product range would undermine all of that!”. In the ensuing 
debate, the third type of uncertainty rears its head.
The marketing manager was born with some personality traits subsequently im-
pacted by his upbringing and social spheres in a way that ultimately influenced his 
career choice of marketing. The professional expectations of the field in general, the 
needs of the specific firms he has been working in, and his professional successes 
have further shaped and solidified his worldview. Thus, his perception of business 
hinges on the elements that are most meaningful for him: the interaction between 
the seller and the buyer. Strengthened further by his KPIs, for him the most crucial 
aspect is the need to close deals, the more the better. The worldview of the head of 
engineering is equally a result of similar processes, however geared towards different 
aspirations and schemata. His KPIs reward quality, understood as lack of mistakes, 
and outperforming the competition in the technological design of the products. 
Deconstructing the diverse mechanisms through which the marketing manag-
er and the head of engineering give meaning and make sense of the actions of the 
firm highlights the endogenous aspect of the type three uncertainty. Should they 
so choose, both could take the introspective road, similar to Matthew’s option, and 
question why do the things they find meaningful have meaning to them. Were they 
to do this together, they would merely find a plethora of individual characteristics 
and social forces responsible for constructing the respective worldviews, and find 
themselves lacking any such underpinnings for either set of schemata as to enable 
creating an objectively real standard of desirables, a solid meaning structure. At best, 
they could end up in a sensemaking process, which would result in the emergence of 
a negotiated, shared understanding, shared schemata grounded on such choices both 
would be comfortable in constructing.  
However, in this case the type three uncertainty has also an exogenous facet, as 
ultimately the decision doesn’t come down to negotiating the chosen standards of 
desirability constructed by either two individuals, or resulting from their shared 
meaning construct. The exogenous type three uncertainty arises from the fact that all 
potential stakeholders, invisible and unheard in the decision-making table, each have 
their own meaning structures through which they evaluate the results of the decision. 
Limiting the potential meaning structures to the two already present at the deci-
sion-making table, there may well be customers whose meaning making mechanisms 
indeed make them value speed over technological excellence, and customers who 
require perfection even when it requires slower execution. Deconstructing the mean-
ing making mechanisms in both cases leaves us again without any solid underpin-
nings that would enable constructing an all-encompassing standard of desirability. 
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Put simply, the wider the ripple effects (as measured by the individuals involved, 
the monetary implications or the time scope), the more impossible it becomes to 
identify all the potential meaning giving structures having an impact on how the 
outcome is perceived. Even when a set of such structures could be identified and 
subsequently through immense efforts deconstructed to their constitutive parts of 
individual level features and diverse social forces, what would be revealed, would be 
the utter lack of any such foundations that would enable constructing an objectively 
real standard of desirability against which the original choice could be reflected. 
This problem would not go away even if the original decision-makers were in-
troduced to an omniscient artificial intelligence that could calculate all the potential 
outcomes of their choice. What the artificial intelligence could never capture are the 
idiosyncratic perception filters, meaning structures through which the diverse indi-
vidual stakeholders make sense of the subsequent sequence of events. This results 
in the ultimate unpredictability of human action, the type three uncertainty: as our 
actions and reactions are filtered through our individual meaning structures, what is 
good and rational for one through one set of meaning mechanisms, can be perceived 
as bad and incomprehensive through another set of lenses. Deconstructing the di-
verse meaning making mechanisms reveals – nothing that could be used to construct 
universal meaning mechanisms.
Macro: Triumphing Trump
In the last round of the USA presidential elections of 2016, two distinctly different 
candidates battled, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. Against the expectations of 
the so-called traditional media, most Europeans and a big segment of Americans, 
Donald Trump won. The question asked in the so-called traditional media and by the 
loosing segments was: how is it possible that someone with the appearance of such 
racist, chauvinistic buffoon59 appealed to such a big portion of the Americans?
Subsequent analysis have offered as explanation two themes: first, the ones vot-
ing for Trump voted for change in status quo, which was being perceived as rep-
resented by Clinton. Secondly, Trump’s promises, nationalism and the simplistic 
slogan (“Make America Great Again”) appealed to the portion of Americans who 
59 It should be emphasized here that the depictions are drawn from the media, as are the subse-
quent explanations about the demographic constitutions and tendencies of both the propo-
nents and opponents of Trump. I make no claims about the truth value of these statements, 
but use this example here as an adept, accessible and familiar example of macro level repre-
sentation of the third dimension of uncertainty. This said, my personal view to the Trump 
presidency is somewhat more systemic – I don’t, but would like to, understand the system that 
can produce and support so diverse representatives of a nation as Barack Obama and Donald 
Trump. 
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were at the losing end of the globalization, for example experiencing unemploy-
ment due to jobs being outsourced and striving for cleaner energy closing down 
the coal mines.
The surprise experienced by the losing segment (and most Europeans) exem-
plifies the impact of the type three uncertainty. The type one uncertainty, lack of 
knowledge about the candidates and the trajectories electing either existed, but was 
thoroughly analyzed and discussed before the elections. The type two uncertainty 
was represented by the nature of either candidate as representing a standard of de-
sirability: Clinton represented status quo, existing establishment and the prevailing 
institutions, however understood, whereas Trump represented change and rebellion 
against the prevailing institutions, whatever that was perceived to mean.
The type three uncertainty emerged from the diverse meaning making mecha-
nisms represented in the voters. Through the meaning making mechanisms of the 
Clinton supporters, she could be perceived to represent education as a good thing, 
women empowerment as a good thing, reason and diplomacy (as good things) – or 
to take a more cynical view, the possibility of upholding the established power struc-
tures in Washington, important to the ones in power under the current institutions. 
However through the meaning making mechanisms of the Trump followers, those 
same representations could be seen as not good things: education equaled elitism, 
powerful women equaled unnatural development and threat to the perceived role 
and necessity of men, lack of perceivably rational behavior was seen as signaling he-
roic swimming against the tide, and diplomatic skills were seen as wasting time when 
something needed changing right now. In addition, being socialized in the narra-
tive of the self-made man, the strong prevailing undercurrents of continuous doubt 
against anything governmental swayed against making a choice to uphold the current 
regime. 
In retrospect, deconstructing the meaning making mechanisms of the voters 
choosing Trump is a possible feat, though many construction blocks will most likely 
always remain unknown to anyone but the individuals in question. The surprise in 
the traditional media highlighted the inability of the individuals socialized to con-
struct different meaning making mechanisms to understand how differently similar 
representations of a phenomenon can be perceived through completely different set 
of socialization and life circumstances. 
With all the available knowledge making little difference, the choice between the 
two standards of desirability emerged from the fundamentally different meaning 
making mechanisms that cannot be negotiated through trying to identify any solid 
underpinnings constituting the building blocks for constructing meaning.
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4.4.2 Type three uncertainty in a nutshell
In order for us humans to live a life that makes sense, we endow our phenomenal 
experiences with meaning. First, on the individual level, we construct worldviews 
through both our biological traits and the diverse social influences we throughout 
our lives are bombarded with. On the level of organization, we engage in symbolic 
interactionism and shared sensemaking to construe such understandings that enable 
collective action (when successful). On the macro level, our actions are constrained 
and enabled by the institutions we shape within the specific setting in which the 
specific institutions emerge. These structures give rise to the values we adhere to, 
providing the standards of desirability necessary for purposeful action. 
Type three uncertainty emerges out of the impossibility to deconstruct these 
structures to such components that would be unanimously and objectively shared – 
or even unanimously and objectively real. When meeting other people, we will always 
be ignorant of the meaning structures through which that person, those people view 
the world. Therefore we are always subject to surprises, in other words uncertainty, 
when the actions of another individual or collective, emerging from their individual 
meaning structures appear, through our meaning structures, irrational or downright 
bad. No amount of knowledge can ever reduce that uncertainty. 
4.5 Dealing with the three types of uncertainty: insights from 
futures studies
Futures research is an interesting field. Not only because it deals with what is yet to 
happen, but also because based on the non-existence of any actual data from the 
future, the ontological and subsequently epistemological choices necessary for con-
ducting futures research need to be considered carefully. Amara’s (1981) seminal 
insight about futures as possible, probable or preferable captured some nuances of 
this discussion, paving the way for subsequent realization of futures additionally as 
makeable (Veenman and Leroy, 2016). 
Essentially the question is, are futures seen as ontologically real trajectories of 
past and present – in essence as something extant but for the happening, and as such, 
reachable through positivist methodologies grounded on past trajectories? Or are 
futures constructed through our actions, grounded on our thoughts, perceptions and 
imagination – as such malleable and understandable through interpretive epistemol-
ogies? Of course there is the third option of viewing futures as non-existing and fully 
opaque, something fundamentally surprising – something we just need to adapt and 
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react to. However this approach merits little in the futures research field, as it under-
mines the whole point of having the fundamentally normative field in the first place.
Reviewing the futures literature, Piirainen and Gonzalez (2015) discuss the dif-
ferent onto-epistemological underpinnings through Popper’s three worlds (Popper, 
1979), showing how the different choices about the world in which the futures re-
side create three paradigms: (post-)positivistic, interpretive/critical and pragmatist. 
However Kuosa (2011) takes a wider historical perspective and shows that mankind’s 
attempts to deal with the future began with the supernatural attempts to reach the 
spirits of capture the signs, essentially ontologically similar to the positivist method-
ologies but for the methods: where the ancients relied on “magic”, the contemporaries 
rely on science to reveal the extant futures. The next phase is the modern view, best 
captured by Jim Dator in his first law of futures studies “The future cannot be ‘‘pre-
dicted’’ but alternative futures can be ‘‘forecasted’’ and preferred futures ‘‘envisioned’’ 
and ‘‘invented’’ – continuously” (Dator, 1996). This approach fuses the interpretist/
critical and pragmatist approaches identified by Piirainen and Gonzalez (2015) and 
looks at how such knowledge can be created that would enable better decisions today 
to shape a better tomorrow, for example through creating diverse scenarios (Amer et 
al., 2013). 
It is the third paradigm60 identified by Kuosa (2011) that actually leads towards 
the discussion of the three types of uncertainty at hand. Emerging from the dia-
lectic and critical approaches, the narrative turn in futures research (Milojević and 
Inayatullah, 2015) differs from the other paradigms in seeking a more dialectic un-
derstanding of why and how past, present and future are perceived as they are and 
what do those perceptions imply. As such, this approach is grounded on post-mod-
ern underpinnings, however instead of merely pausing to deconstruct the underlying 
mechanisms, as futures oriented, also the reconstructing, transforming side is more 
extensively addressed than in for example critical management studies (Spicer et al., 
2009).
Anchored in this paradigm, the Causal Layered Analysis (hereafter CLA) is a 
method crafted by Sohail Inayatullah (1990, 1998b, 2004, Inayatullah and Milojevic, 
2015). Grounded on the science genealogical and archeological approaches of Fou-
cault, the method distinguishes between four different onto-epistemological levels, 
all perceived to exist simultaneously, each providing a set of lenses through which 
a phenomenon can be understood. As such, the method as an analytical tool can be 
60 Again, paradigm is not used in the Kuhnian sense of one surpassing another, but in the sense 
highlighted also by Ahonen (2001) that in social sciences, several different paradigms co-exist 
in any moment of time. 
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used in trying to understand such objects of enquiry, which can be perceived to con-
sist of several dimensions difficult to view through any one chosen set of onto-epis-
temological lenses. As the three types of uncertainty discussed in this thesis exist in 
more than one realm of reality, CLA enables positioning the uncertainty types into 
one framework. 
The simplest way to explain CLA is to analyze a familiar phenomenon with it, 
and as the Trump election is not only already discussed in this dissertation, but also 
something most readers are most likely familiar with, next that example is used to 
show the mechanisms of CLA. 
The top level of CLA is called litany, and it consists of the empirical observations 
of a phenomenon, the part that makes the headlines. In this case the litany is “Trump 
won the presidential elections”. This layer is something that be validated through pos-
itivist epistemologies, something that most observers can agree to perceive as onto-
logically real, something that allows even for the naïve version of reality.
The next level of CLA is social causes, and this is the level of most scholarly en-
deavors. In Trump’s election, the causes are seen as dissatisfaction of the losers of 
the globalization (remember the previous discussion in previous chapter), and the 
rebellion against the prevailing establishment doing nothing to remedy the situation. 
Untangling the social causes is a complex process and allows the wielding of several 
epistemological methodologies: through positivist approaches some hypotheses can 
be validated or disproved, through constructivist approaches the roles of individuals 
and social structures can be unveiled. Equally, for example the class theories of Marx 
or the institutional approaches can be used on this explanation level. 
The third level, named worldview, is when things get interesting (in my view), as it 
is the first level to invoke the deconstructive insights from Foucault. In this level the 
question is, what are the worldviews of the individuals involved in the phenomenon 
at hand, and how did those worldviews contribute to the emergence of the phenom-
enon. At this level of analysis we can zoom into the life of a disgruntled coal miner 
to understand the impacts of both his personal traits and his institutional biography 
to see how he views the world. Equally we must zoom in to the lives of the voters of 
Clinton, to understand their perceptions of reality61. What we gain as a result is an 
insight into how these different worldviews have interacted, interact and will in the 
future interact. It is not because of the different circumstances of the voters that they 
voted as they did, but it is because of the meaning structures constructed in those 
61 Vehemently attacked by Taleb, who named them “intellectual yet idiots”. (See https://medium.
com/incerto/the-intellectual-yet-idiot-13211e2d0577#.ntt8r6u7f ). I choose not to reference 
Taleb as I don’t personally like his tone, however this blog (snippet from his “Skin in the game” 
book is a good example of few sets of worldviews, Taleb’s and possibly some Clinton voters.
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circumstances, the worldviews through which they viewed the events that resulted 
in the voting.
The fourth level is named myth/metaphor62. Essentially the question asked on this 
level relates to the emergence and identification of such powerful myths that are par-
tially responsible for creating the worldviews in interaction with lived circumstances 
and personal features. For example, the “land of opportunity” and “self-made man” 
myths illustrate such metanarratives on which the American culture has in big part 
been founded. These myths appeal to emotions and as such are powerful contrib-
utors to the worldview. Trump’s campaign evoked several of these myths drawing 
their power from the emotions, the gut reactions63: the perception of Trump as the 
ultimate self-made man personifying the American dream, thus creating an idol to 
follow, the externalizing of the obstacles in the path to self-made happiness by con-
structing enemies (Mexicans, the government and “elite”), and the upholding and 
bolstering of such metanarratives as Americans as the “chosen people” (“America 
first!”) that appeal to the sense of self-worth of individuals. 
Now, remembering the three worlds of Popper, we can position the levels of anal-
ysis in the CLA into the following matrix.
Table 2: Ontology of CLA
Objective (w1) Subjective (w2) Intersubjective (w3)
Litany x
Social causes x x x
Worldview x x
Myth/Metaphor x
The level of litany deals with the empirically solid representations of phenome-
na, and as such is objectively real. The social causes have objectively real represen-
62 Both third and fourth levels of analysis follow deconstructive approach, however they differ in 
the unit of analysis: in the worldview level the unit of analysis is the individual, including both 
the personal (eg. cognitive) features and the social forces constructing the worldviews, where-
as in the myth/metaphor level the unit is the collective, more particularly the metanarratives 
contributing (as elements of social forces) to the shaping of the individual level worldviews. 
63 Interestingly, this often printed explanation found in traditional media in the wake of the elec-
tions was highlighted from a new angle with the revelations of the so called case Cambridge 
Analytica, which will be discussed more thoroughly later in this dissertation: in short, by har-
vesting Facebook data it was possible to personalize advertisements that played on the fears 
and anxieties of the individual voters. However, I emphasize again that I make no truth claims 
on the process or the outcome of the elections, the constitution of the voters, or the nature of 
Trump, but utilize these viewpoints ubiquitous in media to illustrate the phenomenon of the 
type three uncertainty.
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tations, but additionally emerge through subjective understandings, moderated by 
intersubjective constructs. The worldview is primarily subjective, however some of 
its building blocks emerge intersubjectively. The myth/metaphor is the represen-
tation of shared metanarratives, thus rendering them purely intersubjective cre-
ations. 
But how does this relate to the focal discussion of the three types of uncertainty? 
As suggested earlier, the three types of uncertainty reside in different ontological 
realms. As an outcome, the two first types of uncertainty have yielded to scrutiny 
through some sets of epistemological choices, whereas the third type of uncer-
tainty has remained unseen when viewed through such epistemologies. In essence, 
the type one and two uncertainties (lack of knowledge and lack or abundance of 
standards of preference) can be viewed when the level of analysis is either litany or 
social causes, as explicated in the CLA. What follows is that those types of uncer-
tainty are visible through such methodologies that explore events on those levels, 
namely such approaches that have not been influenced by the post-modern decon-
structionism.
However, the type three uncertainty, lack of meaning reigns in the levels of worl-
dview and myth/metaphor. To access events on that level, one needs to subscribe to 
some post-modern insights. The positive contribution of post-modern approaches 
grounded on skepticism and deconstruction has been the understanding of the im-
pact of assumptions – narratives and metanarratives, the meaning making mech-
anisms. The divide between the post-modern perspectives and the more prevalent 
traditions of eg. positivism and constructivism has however meant that not all in-
sights revealed through diverse sets of lenses have travelled well: this is the case with 
the type three uncertainty as seeing it requires an aptitude for deconstruction, an 
approach prominent only in the more post-modern spheres of science. 
However, where the post-modern perspectives have fallen short is the discussion 
of how to escape from the value relativism ultimately rendering any constructive col-
lective action impossible. The question is, if everything indeed is just artificial and 
imaginary, narratives on top of metanarratives, how can we know what is meaningful 
action? If all narratives are essentially “made up”, why would one be better than an-
other – aren’t we all dealing with “fake news” to a varying degree?
This is where the CLA makes its most welcome contribution. For its original de-
signer Inayatullah, the method is first and foremost a discursive tool to create trans-
formational spaces. This means that none of the levels has priority over another, but 
that the whole idea is to move down and up through the levels in order to create a 
fuller understanding of the phenomenon under scrutiny between the diverse partici-
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pants exploring the issue64. Understanding the causalities vertically and horizontally, 
within and in between each level gives rise to different future possibilities: an issue 
can be solved in different way on each level of analysis, the timeframe of changes 
becoming longer towards the bottom. 
One interesting thing is that when the issue is first analyzed through CLA, not 
only are the different potential solutions visible on every level, but also the choice of 
perspective becomes pronounced. What is the problem we are seeing, and according 
to who? Subsequently, when solutions are presented, the discussion of from whose 
perspective this would be a solution needs discussing. These discussions are at the 
core of the transformational spaces CLA aims at creating in the setting in which it is 
used (Inayatullah and Milojevic, 2015), and this is the way in which CLA surpasses 
the cynicism of post-modernism. Adding the question of “why do I see the issue the 
way I see it?” brings this approach very close to Bourdieu’s idea of reflective sociol-
ogy, his proposed way out from the impasse of deconstructionism (Ahonen, 2001, 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).
As an example, on the litany level, the problem could be that Trump is president 
or that his attempts are being thwarted. As such, the solutions would respectively 
be to either remove Trump of the ones stopping him. On the level of social causes, 
one exemplary solution could be to help the unemployed and marginalized back to 
the society by creating new jobs, however depending on the perspective, that would 
either lead to re-opening the coal mines and hindering globalization (pro-Trump 
strawman), or to coming up with new jobs and encouraging people to study so that 
they would be able to work in such fields that are not under the threat of being out-
sourced (anti-Trump strawman). These solutions are much slower to execute than 
just removing the undesired element.
On the level of worldview the problem changes to how can we make others under-
stand our point of view? The solutions shift the focus to increasing equality, develop-
ing and harmonizing basic education – essentially viewing the social institutions re-
sponsible for creating social fragmentation with the attempt to change those institu-
tions towards more cohesive directions. The discussion must also include a profound 
negotiating of the values, standards of desirability included in the cohesion building 
efforts – or the discussion of the desirability of such efforts in the first place. As such, 
the solutions are far more difficult and slower in unfolding than on the upper levels.
64 CLA is mostly used in workshop settings, where the diversity of participants helps in creating 
a more multifaceted understanding of the issue. However it is also used as an analytical tool by 
individual researchers, which essentially means that the researcher using it needs to be able to 
see the issue from multiple perspectives. 
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On the level of myth and metaphor, it is debatable whether the changes can be 
triggered intentionally, or whether the underlying metanarratives just evolve grad-
ually. Any solutions on this level would therefore require changes in the meaning of 
the emotion evoking national identity forming myths of “self-made man” and “land 
of opportunities”65. However, the potential changes would take decades, centuries 
to unfold66. This of course leads to questioning the benefits of understanding the 
problems emerging from this level of analysis: if we cannot influence it, what does it 
help to be aware of it? In my view, as these “gut reaction” triggering myths contribute 
immensely to the higher level causalities we can influence, understanding the very 
fundamental myths and metaphors is essential in drafting solutions that can through 
intentional action be shaped.
Returning again to the red thread of uncertainty we can see that the identified 
problems on each level emerge from diverse types of uncertainty, and as such the 
sketched solutions aim at reducing different types of uncertainty. On the level of lit-
any, the problem of Trump presidency emerges out of the lack of knowledge of how 
he will act and what will ensue. On the level of social causes, the problems arise from 
lack of knowledge and the choice of standards of desirability types of uncertainty. On 
the level of worldview, the problematic uncertainty emerges from the individual level 
meaning making mechanisms, whereas on the level of myth/metaphor, the problems 
emerge from the collective level meaning making mechanisms. This allows position-
ing the diverse types of uncertainty on the CLA framework, to facilitate the processes 
with which each type can be approached.
Table 3: CLA of the three types of uncertainty






Lack of  
meaning
Litany O x
Social Causes O, S, I x x
Worldview S, I x x (individual)
Myth/Metaphor I x (collective)
65 However, like we know from organizational identity research (Ravasi and Schultz, 2006), we 
can hold on to a label while changing the content: a similar identity shaping myth can be en-
dowed with different meanings without changing the narrative. For example, we can keep us-
ing the word “freedom” as a standard of desirability, however what we understand as freedom 
can change for example from freedom to own a gun to freedom from fear of being shot. 
66 Especially when dealing with something as elusive as national identity, from the recent events 
in Catalonia we see that while the structures have for decades pushed towards integration, the 
emotional structures upholding the group identity sentiments in Catalonia have not changed.
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The positioning of the different types of uncertainty is also reflective of the differ-
ent Popperian worlds, ontological realities, where their impact can be perceived. The 
issues on the level of litany have objective existence, and the accompanying type of 
uncertainty is the lack of knowledge in its various forms. On the social causes level, 
the issues exist in all three realms, which means that on that level of analysis the un-
certainties perceived emerge from lack of knowledge and the problem of choosing 
between different standards of desirability. The worldview level encompasses the in-
dividual level interpretation of the issue, thus existing in the realms of subjective and 
intersubjective. Subsequently the uncertainties experienced emerge from the choices 
between standards of desirability and the lack of meaning on the individual level, 
created by the different meaning making mechanisms within an individual (personal 
features and social forces). On the level of myth and metaphor, the focus is on the 
ontologically intersubjective, collective level meaning making mechanisms, which 
create the lack of meaning type of uncertainty a collective is subject to. 
To summarize the discussion in this chapter, uncertainty consists of three dimen-
sions, which reside in different ontological realms. Therefore few previous scholarly 
endeavors have viewed these three types together, as choosing a specific philosoph-
ical position sensitizes towards identifying one or two of the dimensions of the un-
certainty, not encouraging viewing all three together. However, due to the distinct 
philosophical requirements of futures research, the CLA was developed to facilitate 
viewing social phenomena through several so far acknowledged philosophical per-
spectives. Because of the empirical merits of adopting the CLA as an analytical tool 
enabling transformational spaces in which to understand a phenomenon as compre-
hensively as possible, the method was adopted in this dissertation to provide an ex-
isting framework, which logically allows for viewing the three, ontologically diverse 
dimensions of uncertainty in a same framework. 
Introducing CLA heeds also to the normative pragmatism adopted in this disser-
tation. As in my view the biggest failing of post-modern approaches has been to stop 
at deconstruction, the CLA enables utilizing the insights from the deconstructive 
methods in efforts that aim at inducing changes for the better – however that is then 
defined. After all, showing that all our actions are grounded on stories helps little in 
trying to figure out a way of co-existing on this planet. Indeed, if it seems that sharing 
the faith in stories is the most powerful way of enabling collective, non-destructive 
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“…the data from which the economic calculus starts are never... given to 
a single mind which could work out the implications, 
and can never be so given.”
(Friedrich von Hayek: The use of knowledge in society)
Humanity has always created technology in order to make life easier. For millennia, 
the main focus of technological innovation was on facilitating manual labor, from 
the pre-historical arrow heads and earliest agricultural ploughs to the revolutionary 
spinning jenny and the contemporary automated factories. However, with the emer-
gence of information and communication technologies, the scope of facilitation has 
widened to encompass not only the manual, but also the cognitive workload – pre-
viously lightened notably only by the development of writing and subsequently the 
innovation of printing few millennia later.
Dubbed information era by some, our contemporary age is characterized by the 
increasing creation, processing and dissemination of information. One of the buzz-
word-like concepts that attempt to capture this permeant yet evasive phenomenon is 
digitalization, endowed in this dissertation with the status of a key concept, because 
labelling67 an entity makes its exploration easier. 
The following chapter should not be mistaken as a literature review of the defi-
nition of the concept of digitalization. Instead, it is an analysis of the drivers of the 
changes emerging from technological advances, necessary for addressing the re-
search phenomenon and quandary of this dissertation. Acknowledging that there 
are myriad definitions of this concept, in this dissertation digitalization refers to the 
trinity of digitized technological systems, humans as subjects and objects of change, 
and the perceptions of the humans (likewise as subjects and objects of change), as 
introduced by Tilson, Lyytinen and Sörensen (2010a, 2010b).
67 Alternative labels could also have been possible: datafication would have captured some of 
the nuances, fourth industrial revolution or the sixth Kondratieff others – even information 
age might have been bent to a label. However the concept of digitalization, as perceived in the 
discussions of digital infrastructures seemed to provide the best foundations for capturing the 
essence of the object of enquiry, for reasons that will hopefully become clear with this chapter. 
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In the following discussions, the focus is not on the technological advances in 
themselves, but the adopted perspective is sociotechnical, kin to such research ap-
proaches as materiality, sociomateriality and sociotechnical systems (Leonardi, 
2012). In short, the chosen approach resonates with the worldviews positing that it 
is neither the technology in itself nor the humans (including their perceptions) in 
themselves that drive change, but an amalgam of both fused together in the course 
of everyday action (Latour, 1987, Leonardi and Barley, 2010, Orlikowski, 2010). No 
individual component of that amalgam carries by itself agentic powers of change, 
however in order to understand the microfoundational drivers of change, in the fol-
lowing discussions this amalgam is artificially taken apart into its constitutive parts 
of technological systems, humans and perceptions. 
5.1 Technological systems
5.1.1 Digital representation of reality
As Peters (2014) in his nigh poetic essay notes, tracing the etymology of digit re-
veals the dual use we humans have had for our fingers68: we have counted with 
them and we have pointed, indexed, with them. Both uses still define everything 
we name digital. 
In terms of counting, digital technologies are underpinned by the invention of 
binary systems, most notably based on the ideas of Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716), 
further developed into the Boolean algebra by George Boole in 1847, and used as the 
basis of the Morse code, introduced by Samuel Morse in 1835. The introduction of 
Morse alphabet coincided with the invention of the telegraph, and prevailed in the 
ensuing battle between diverse coding systems, becoming the standard (Brennen and 
Kreiss, 2014, Vogelsang, 2010). Morse code captures the essence of digitization even 
today: any information you can code (for example into a language), you can further 
represent with only two values, zero and one.
One pivotal moment in the ensuing digital development can be traced to the 
first Macy conference in cybernetics in 1946, when John von Neumann stated that 
it is possible to code all information directly into binary form (Peters, 2014): as-
68 Digit refers to the outmost parts of vertebrae limbs, such as fingers or toes. The concept started 
to refer to a numeric symbol through the emergence of decimal system: as we humans have ten 
fingers, the decimal system corresponds with the number of our fingers, digiti in latin. Interest-
ingly, the current usage of the term neglects the decimal origin, instead being mainly used in 
the context of a binary numerical system. 
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signing any information signal a threshold value enables endowing all values above 
that the value 1, and below that the value 0 (e.g. sun above horizon equals 1, below 
horizon 0). Independently, yet simultaneously, the advances in pulse-code modula-
tion (Wikipedia, 2018d) enabled the digital representation of analog audio signals, 
paving way for not only subsequent developments in digital audio, but also in the 
methods with which highly different analog signal types can be converted into dig-
ital data.
The importance of this insight results from freeing the process of digitization 
from the middle man of language, elemental in for example the Morse code (Peters, 
2014). The subsequent, exponentially accelerated development in digital technology 
is fundamentally underpinned by this notion: any form of information signal can be 
made digital. And because any form of information can thus be expressed in a similar 
format, in theory, any form of information can be processed with same technology 
(Tilson, Lyytinen and Sørensen, 2010b). 
This underlies the major promise (and threat) of digital technologies: analog in-
formation is coded in context specific ways and as such can be processed with only 
specific technology designed to process exactly that type of information69, whereas 
coding all types of information digitally, into bits, means that digitization decouples 
the type of information and the technologies used for handling it70 (Tilson et al., 
2010b, Tilson, Lyytinen and Sorensen, 2010a). So, in theory, any information coded 
into bits can be accessed and processed by any technology that can access and process 
digital information. This is a key point in the phenomenon of digital convergence 
soon discussed more, however first a few more notes on the act of digitizing are in 
order. 
69 “An analog signal maps changes in one continuously varying quantity (e.g. air pressure changes 
corresponding to sound) onto changes in another continuously varying quantity (e.g. an elec-
trical voltage). Thus, the electrical signal created by a microphone is an “analog” of the sound 
it captures. Analog information can be communicated along cables or through space using ra-
dio waves by encoding it in variations of electrical properties (e.g. amplitudes, frequencies or 
phases). Similarly, analog information can be stored using, for example, the physical properties 
of a groove in an lP or magnetic variations on a tape. As a result, most analog transmission 
and storage systems are dedicated to one type of information or another.” (Tilson, Lyytinen, 
Sorensen 2010a, p. 2)
70 “Digitizing refers to a process whereby analog signals come to be represented by numbers, and 
ultimately as bits (a contraction of binary digits). Any analog signal can be digitized including 
audio, video, and images of increasing resolution and quality. The flexibility of digitizing is that, in 
principle, the same storage, transmission, and processing technologies can store, transmit, or ma-
nipulate just about any type of digital information. Thus, various forms of digitized information 
no longer have to be tightly coupled to particular transmission and storage technologies.” (Tilson 
et al., 2010a, p. 3)
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In order to understand digitizing, we have to return to the second insight in Pe-
ters’s essay: digitizing is not only about counting (ie. endowing analog signals with 
binary numeric values), but also about pointing – the act of digitizing indexes a data-
fied element in the physical reality, creating a digital representation of the element 
expressed in binary digits. Bit by bit, the act of digitizing therefore creates a digital 
representation of our physical reality (Hermann, Pentek and Otto, 2016). This digital 
representation of physical reality is more than an immaterial way of storing informa-
tion about physical realm entities: the relationship between the physical reality and 
its digital representation is not unidirectional. 
Digitization does not end at creating a digital representation of physically exist-
ing entities, but also enables a feedback loop from the digital representation to the 
physical realm. Either through the same sensor technology harnessed to detect and 
convert physical events into digital information, or through another set of technolo-
gies connected to the emerging digital representation of a specific entity, the linkage 
between the digital realm entities and the physical realm entities can be also used to 
create changes in the physical reality. 
This results in the blurring of the boundaries between physical and digital real-
ity, the underlying driver of for example the Industry 4.0 scenarios (Brettel et al., 
2014, Kagermann et al., 2013, Kagermann, 2015, Gilchrist, 2016, Lasi et al., 2014). 
In essence, the underlying logic is the same in the so called Smart factories or a 
pizza ordering mobile app: in the highly automated factories each movement of 
a physical lump of metal is datafied and digitized and transmitted into the digital 
system, in which certain processes are carried out and further transmitted back to 
the physical realm triggering the next movement in the physical realm. The funda-
mental logic is the same when you use the app in your mobile device to order pizza: 
your hunger is through your interaction with your mobile touchscreen converted 
into digital data, transmitted to the digital platform where it is processed to be 
received by the pizza parlor triggering actions that result in baking and delivering 
the pizza to you.
Ultimately digitizing is linked to the “datafication” of everything (Harari, 2017, 
Van Dijck, 2014, Zuboff, 2015), a notion highlighted in the concept of information 
era. Entities, which in the physical realm exist as qualitatively different (eg. human 
thoughts and robots), can through datafication and subsequent digitizing gain a 
qualitatively same existence in the realm of digital representations. Taking into ac-
count the two-way interaction between the digital and physical realm, this ultimate-
ly means that in theory (and increasingly in practice), entities which previously re-
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quired diverse methods of processing, can now be processed together. Robots can be 
controlled by thoughts (Linturi et al., 2014, Risto Linturi, 2016, Starr, 2014)71.
So, digitizing is technology that in theory makes all data uniform. However, the 
creation of the digital representation requires also other things. First of all, a signal to 
be digitized is needed. Ultimately the building blocks of digital representations origi-
nate from five sources (Zuboff, 2015): from increasingly sophisticated and ubiquitous 
sensor technology (Abbas, Michael and Michael, 2014, Risto Linturi, 2016), from 
our interactions with digital devices, which always result in a trace (Brynjolfsson 
and McAfee, 2012, Hedman, Srinivasan and Lindgren, 2013), from highly diffused 
surveillance mechanisms (Lyon, 2001, 2003, 2015), from traces of digital autono-
mous transactions, and from the increasingly accessible existing databases created 
throughout the histories of economic and public organizations (firms and govern-
ments). 
The accumulation of data from all these sources progresses with astonishing 
speed. As an example, the advances in sensor technology are rapid and extensive: 
from brainwaves (Sundaresan, 2017) to monitoring the level of alcohol in the inner 
air of a car driving by (Hewitt, 2014), or from following the insulin levels of a diabetic 
to enabling autonomous trucks to drive across a continent (Kolodny, 2018), the phys-
ical world phenomena not detectable through the advances in sensor technologies 
seem verging extinction in very near future. These developments are coupled with 
digital traces resulting from the human interactions with the digital devices or from 
automated transactions, the data captured by surveillance methods, and the data ac-
cessible through digitizing databases, resulting in a reality where nigh every facet of 
human action can be datafied. 
To sum, we have the mechanisms through which the physical world phenomena 
are captured in data form, and the mechanism that makes that data uniform. The 
next requirements for creating a digital reality and utilizing that data are the mecha-
nisms that enable transferring, storing and processing that data, connectivity.
71 At the moment of writing this (Feb 2018), a second update of the report on radical future technol-
ogies (Linturi, Kuusi, Ahlqvist 2014) originally commissioned by the Committee for the Future 
of the Finnish parliament has just (18.2.2018) been finished, but not yet published. The report is 
based on crowdsourcing and validating signals of radical technologies, mainly gathered through 
a closed Facebook group (www.facebook.com/groups/TuVRadikaalit) of more than 2000 con-
tributors. I gained access to the second update prior to its publication through being a contribut-
ing member of the group. Several of the technological possibilities mentioned in this dissertation 
are grounded on the findings of the original report and its two updates. The update will be first 
published in Finnish, followed by an English version which will appear on the Finnish parliament 
website (www.eduskunta.fi/EN/lakiensaataminen/valiokunnat/tulevaisuusvaliokunta).
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Information technology refers to the hardware and software used to store and pro-
cess the data, and communications technology refers to the electric means of trans-
ferring that data between diverse actors (Huang et al., 2012), including network and 
data transfer technologies ranging from radio waves to the new applications utilizing 
light (Wang, 2017). The notable innovation of internet (Wikipedia, 2018b) vanguard-
ed the convergence of information and communication technologies by standardiz-
ing how the digital data should be packetized, addressed, transmitted, routed and 
received, resulting in the interconnectedness of previously disconnected computer 
networks. The internet protocol in short means that digital information is converted 
into a format where all actors in internet can store and process the same data. The 
concepts of Internet-of-Things or Internet-of-Everything essentially refer to the fact 
that not only does the data in the internet contain human generated data (resulting 
from the actions of human-terminal interaction), but also increasingly data directly 
created by machines (like industrial robots) and smart objects (like your fridge or 
toaster) (Miorandi et al., 2012).
The concept of convergence72 (Herzhoff, 2009), in itself a long established discus-
sion (Lind, 2004), while lacking a clear definition (Appelgren, 2004, Nyström, 2007), 
however refers to the possibility, embedded in the uniformness of digital data, of 
processing any data by any device underpinned by any digital technology (Lyytinen 
and Yoo, 2002). In essence, a full digital convergence would mean that the digital rep-
resentation of reality, created by datafying, digitizing and connecting diverse entities, 
could be accessed and processed through any digital device in its entirety. 
While the current reality is far from it, the already experienced phenomena of 
convergence have resulted in notable strategic impacts, evidenced in the blurring of 
the boundaries between industries and across diverse levels of back-end operations 
(infrastructural and applied technologies) and front-end offerings (Singh and Raja, 
2008). Information and communication technologies have become intermingled 
(Huang et al., 2012), and for example retail and media have changed dramatically 
(Bughin, LaBerge and Mellbye, 2017) through convergence on the levels of offer-
ings and technological solutions harnessed through changes in corporate structures, 
mergers and acquisitions73. 
However, while the essence of digital data is uniform, the technologies used in 
harnessing, storing, processing and transmitting it are currently far from standard-
ized, mutually compatible or interoperable. Tilson et al (2010a) discuss the current-
72 Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines convergence as: “The act of converging and especially 
moving towards union or uniformity”.
73 While there are ample examples of unsuccessful attempts at creating systemic convergence 
even within a company, however the control provided by ownership has its appeal.
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ly divergent reality through identifying three layers: physical infrastructure, logical 
infrastructure (code), and content74. Currently each layer is dominated by compet-
ing and incompatible solutions, driving in part the emergent phenomena of ecosys-
temization (Basole et al., 2015, Clarysse et al., 2014, Iansiti and Levien, 2004, Moore, 
1993, Mäkinen and Dedehayir, 2012) and platform economy. 
Ultimately the ecosystems of for example Apple, Alphabet (Google/Android) and 
Amazon thrive through their ability to create convergence within their ecosystems 
on all the three levels to the extent of being able to efficiently exploit all digital data in 
the ecosystem. The battle of ecosystems witnessed within the mobile phone industry 
is a good example: Nokia didn’t lose because of inferior technology, but because the 
ecosystem based business models of Apple and subsequently Android were better at 
delivering the convergence promise embedded in digital technology. The ecosystem 
of Apple, with its interconnected sets of devices, iTunes, App store, developer inter-
faces and data right management policies was the first digital ecosystem to fully reap 
the potential of creating convergent digital infrastructure appealing to both a wide 
mass of customers and offering producers (Tilson et al., 2010b).
To summarize this chapter before moving on, digitizing refers to the act of con-
verting signals into binary digits, thus uniforming all data – in theory. The increas-
ingly advanced sensor technology datafies the physical world entities, providing the 
signals to be digitized. Additionally, the interactions with the existing digital devices 
leave a trace, which merge with the sensor based digital data from the physical real-
ity to create a digital representation of reality. The interface between the digital and 
physical realities allows two-way interaction, which, through the malleability of the 
digital reality, increases the malleability of the physical environment. 
While in theory the uniform nature of digital data would enable convergence, the 
compatibility and interoperability of all digital data with any digital technology and 
device, in practice the complex infrastructural and applied solutions are still high-
ly technology specific. This triggers races of standardization, battles of ecosystems, 
74 “…the physical layer infrastructure includes the networks of cables, computing hardware, and ra-
dio frequency spectrum. Non-digital physical layer infrastructures include books and magazines, 
lPs and CDs, video tape and film stock. It can also refer to physical locations for performances 
(e.g. theatres, and speakers’ corner). The logical infrastructure (or code) layer is the logic that 
drives the physical infrastructure. In communications networks this corresponds to the software 
that makes the hardware run e.g. data protocols, the software that implements them, as well as 
services logics embedded in phone networks. For non-digital physical infrastructures the corre-
sponding logical infrastructure could be the social protocols for getting published, signed to a label, 
or other ways of persuading gatekeepers to distribute creative works. The content layer represents 
what is sent across the infrastructure e.g. images, text, speech, music, or movies. This layer also 
has its own infrastructures. For example, intellectual property laws define what content is owned 
and what is left to the commons.” (Tilson et al 2010a, p. 6-7)
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when diverse actors pursue dominance by creating internally convergent systems in 
ever-increasing scale and scope. Only future will tell the ultimate scale and scope of 
those convergent systems.
5.1.2 Big Data, little Data and algorithmic decision-making
The origins of the concept Big Data are usually traced to 2001, when Doug Laney at 
Gartner wrote a research note discussing the changes in the three V’s of data: vol-
ume, variety and velocity (Laney, 2001). Through the advances in datafying physical 
entities through developing sensor technology, and through the fact that any action 
and interaction in the digital realm creates more data, the amount of data keeps in-
creasing (volume), and data arises from different sources in different forms (variety). 
In addition, the advances in the processing capabilities harnessed to deal with digital 
data mean that data is both created and processed with increasing speed (velocity). 
(Chen, Chiang and Storey, 2012, Newell and Marabelli, 2015).
While the definitions of big data have since proliferated, in essence the concept 
refers to the massive amount of digital data that creates the digital representation of 
reality – in not only contouring diverse objects and entities or physical movements, 
but equally constituted of the actions and even intentions, interests, desires and tastes 
captured through the human interactions in digital realm. For example, when brows-
ing Facebook, its algorithm doesn’t only track your “likes”, but also the pauses in 
browsing when you stop to read a post before moving on (McNamee, 2018). Your 
pause becomes digital data, utilized to reap insights about how to deepen your en-
gagement with Facebook. 
The volume, variance and velocity of big data mean that the data is heterogeneous 
in both content and form (eg. from alphanumerical to sound or image), unstruc-
tured, changing and accumulating constantly (Constantiou and Kallinikos, 2015), 
which in turn means that human cognitive faculties are insufficient in processing 
it. Instead, the processing of big data relies on the increasing computing prowess 
driven algorithms designed to trace patterns, detect correlations, and subsequently 
churn out predictions. The most sophisticated algorithms operate based on the so 
called machine learning, which means that the algorithm is programmed to “learn” 
through processing vast amounts of data, resulting in the algorithm continuously 
developing its own algorithm (Wikipedia, 2018c). Essentially, the concept of artificial 
intelligence refers to these complex algorithms driven by machine learning (Urban, 
2015, Yampolskiy, 2013).
Currently the artificial intelligence is so called ANI, artificial narrow intelligence 
(Urban, 2015), specifically programmed with sets of algorithms to carry out specific 
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sets of actions, with the machine learning process being harnessed to reach a given 
outcome. The results have been quite astounding: facial recognition AI is currently 
more accurate than human, distinct entities of AI have been able to create their own 
language, and AI can identify the sexual orientation of individuals by looking at their 
photos (Coldewey, 2017, Eckersley and Nasser, 2017, Wang and Kosinski, 2017, Lin-
turi et al., 2014, Linturi, 2016). 
While I’m not quite the believer in Singularity (Harari, 2017, Kurzweil, 2016), the 
potential implications of developing general (AGI) or super (ASI) artificial intelli-
gence require a note. Singularity in this context refers to the point when the artificial 
intelligence meets and exceeds human intelligence, not only in carrying out a speci-
fied task, but in deciding what tasks require carrying out. 
As mentioned, currently the artificial intelligence is, while astonishingly intelli-
gent, narrow. While facial recognition AI can open your iPhone X even when you are 
wearing sunglasses (Galvie, 2017), the same AI cannot do your statistical regression 
modelling or drive your car; another AI is required. If we humans, or the AI them-
selves manage to create a general AI, that would mean that the same AI algorithm 
could not only process a specific given task, but could process any task, not only the 
ones given to it, but the ones it would itself recognize as in need of processing. Gen-
eral AI would therefore gain a sort of sentience (referred to as singularity), which it 
could further use in developing its intelligence to the level of super artificial intelli-
gence – rendering the difference between the intelligence of a mouse and a human 
minuscule compared to the difference between human, and sentient super artificial 
intelligence. 
So, the algorithmic processing of the big data produces knowledge about general 
trends and correlations (Van Dijck, 2014). Newell and Marabelli (2015) highlight the 
implications of big data driven deductions by an example of car insurance: through 
processing big data created from the correlations between the driver profile (in terms 
of age and gender) and accidents, the algorithm (or artificial intelligence, if one pre-
fers the concept) can predict that male drivers between 20 and 30 are more likely to 
be in accidents than other types of drivers. However, utilizing this data in assigning a 
risk premium for the car insurance risks discriminating, because not all male drivers 
of suitable age drive recklessly, and the big data driven analytics cannot accurately 
root out the risky drivers from the more sensible drivers. 
It is here that the concept of little (or small) data emerges. Little data is big 
data about an individual actor (Boncheck, 2013). For example, tracking the driv-
ing behavior of an individual creates individual specific data, which can then be 
reflected against the statistical insights gleaned from big data to assess the risk pro-
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file grounded on the driving behavior of the individual. This individual-specific 
driving behavior data can be then relatively fairly utilized in assigning (or not) a 
risk premium – or discounts, as for example an American insurance company does 
(Progressive, N/A). While this example of the use of little data feels benign enough, 
China is about to embark on a natural experiment on a national scale, utilizing the 
little data funneled from the big data sourced from the highly diffused mobile pay 
and social applications, and the existing infrastructure of for example surveillance 
monitors.
The Chinese internet developed on a trajectory quite distinct from its western 
counterpart, as lacking the access to such applications and sites popular in the west 
(Facebook, Google, Twitter to name a few), the Chinese filled the similar individual 
needs and desires through creating their own alternatives. Originally a versatile so-
cial media application, the popular WeChat by Tencent developed also into a mobile 
pay system, used by 700 million people in 2017 (Wikipedia, 2018e), rivaled closely 
by AliPay, the payment arm of Alibaba, and the proprietor of Sesame Credit (Hatton, 
2015). Both of these mobile pay systems are currently used in the initial design phase 
of the Chinese government Social Credit System (Botsman, 2017).
The big data accumulating from the popularity of digital payment methods pro-
vides the Chinese government with a solution to the institutional gap created by the 
previously mainly non-existing documentation of such information that could be 
used as grounds for granting financial credit (Huang, Lei and Shen, 2016). In realiz-
ing the Social Credit System (Backer, 2017), the actions of the Chinese will be mon-
itored utilizing digital technology, including the online activities (social interactions 
and financial transactions) and the physical movements detected by surveillance 
cameras equipped with sophisticated facial recognition AI (Aldama, 2017), and an 
according social credit rate will be endowed based on those actions. If the actions are 
deemed undesirable, it will impact the rate, which will further impact the job market, 
dating and educational opportunity status of the individual, and the credit rating of 
not only the individual but his/her kin and friends (Chin and Wong, 2016, Condliffe, 
2016, Hatton, 2015). The initiative was launched in June 2014 as “Planning Outline 
for the Construction of a Social Credit System 2014-2020”, with the aim to be realized 
in full by 2020 (Huang et al., 2016). 
Summarizing the discussion so far, big data is the voluminous and variant data 
created and processed with high velocity. Little data is the individual actor specific 
data trail funneled from and referenced against big data. Algorithmic decision-mak-
ing and artificial intelligence refer to processing the vast amounts of heterogeneous 
data in ways that render it usable. One of the key discussions in regards to algo-
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rithmic decision-making is its black boxed nature: as the algorithms are utilized es-
pecially in dealing with such data humans cannot process, decision-makers relying 
on the outcomes of these algorithmic processes cannot really understand the mech-
anisms through which the algorithms reach their conclusions (Clark and Newell, 
2013, Goodman and Flaxman, 2016).
This requires a few notes before continuing to view the human component of dig-
italization. First of all, the artificial intelligence (the complex algorithms processing 
big data) is dependent on the extant data sets accessed and processed: the AI cannot 
utilize such data that doesn’t exist, but it utilizes all data it has access to. This means 
that any potential bias or downright errors in the data sets travel to the outcomes, yet 
without the algorithmic processing capabilities, the errors or biases in those massive 
data sets are difficult to identify. Secondly, as the algorithms outperform us humans 
in processing the data, few or no humans can actually understand the steps taken in 
reaching the conclusions: therefore detecting a flaw in the algorithmic processes is 
extremely difficult – we will only get the outcome, not the grounds for it. (Weinberg-
er, 2018b)
Thirdly, an algorithm needs to be programmed with a goal, essentially by pre-pri-
oritizing a set of optimization outcomes in an order of importance. However as that 
prioritizing has to be done a priori being in the possession of everything potentially 
uncovered through the algorithmic processes (or through such new and surprising 
changes in the environment which change the problem setting), we can never be 
sure that the priorities formed based on the understanding of the now-moment will 
turn out as desirable at the time of reaching them when we are equipped by more 
knowledge. The algorithm doesn’t possess such skills of judgement that would enable 
it to change its pre-programmed priorities based on new information not original-
ly included in its task. (Goodman and Flaxman, 2016, Newell and Marabelli, 2015, 
Weinberger, 2018a, 2018b). The discussions of artificial intelligence ethics (Bostrom 
and Yudkowsky, 2014, F. Dignum, 1999, V. Dignum, 2018, Yampolskiy, 2013) pivot 
around these themes and require human choices.
The technological advances, consisting of sourcing and digitizing data, conver-
gence and the resulting digital representation of reality evidenced in big and little 
data processed by algorithms constitute only the technical component of the so-
cio-technical entity of digitalization. Before diving deeper into the human dimension 
in digitalization, the following subchapter makes an attempt of further clarifying the 
relationships of the diverse discussions pivoting around the themes of digitizing, dig-
ital technologies, digital transformation and digitalization.
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5.1.3 Some layers of discussion
Seeing the bigger picture of the phenomenon of digitalization from the technologi-
cal perspective is somewhat complicated, because the diverse and plural discussions 
view the overarching phenomenon from several vantages and levels of analysis. 
Therefore I find it necessary for the sake and purpose of this dissertation to try to 
identify the diverse levels and the roles in the myriad discussions. The following table 
is a huge simplification of complex issues, but will hopefully serve as a foundation for 
identifying the distinct levels and perspectives of different scholar and practitioner 
discussions accumulating around the theme of digitalization.
Table 4: Some perspectives and levels of digitalization discussion
Perspectives Contents Discussion examples
6. Implications Impacts on industry boundaries, 
on firm practices and offering 
types, on society and individuals, 
on economy
Schwab, 2016, Hermann et al., 
2015, Newell and Marabelli, 2015, 
Geels, 2004, Wilenius and Casti, 
2015, Zuboff, 2015
5. Applications Individual technologies and 
solutions
Linturi et al., 2014, 2016, 2018
4. Logic Convergence, servitization, role of 
technology
Tilson et al., 2010ab, Vargo and 
Lusch (several), Bharadwaj et al., 
2013, Herzhoff, 2009 
3. Processing Standardizing, categorizing, 
analyzing
Eckersley and Nasser, 2017
2. Infrastructural Generation, Storage, Transfer Edwards et al., 2007, Newell and 
Marabelli, 2015, Tilson et al., 
2010ab
1. Enablers Datafication, digitizing, 
connectivity
Harari, 2017, Tilson et al., 2010ab
To begin with the bottom level of analysis, the ultimate enablers and drivers of 
digitalization are the datafication of physical realm entities (Harari, 2017) in increas-
ingly minutiae detail through developments in sensor technology, the act of convert-
ing that data into the uniform of binary digits, digital data (Tilson et al., 2010a), and 
the developments in connectivity enabling the widening combining and access to 
digital data (Zuboff, 2015). The enablers are not in themselves not technology, just 
like electricity in itself is not, however they are coupled with technological entities 
that enable harnessing them. 
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The second level consists of the infrastructural technologies that make it possible 
to generate, store and transfer digital data (Edwards et al., 2007). The level of infra-
structure doesn’t refer only to the physical cables, computers and data warehouses 
that enable utilizing the transformative power of the enablers, but also to the idea of 
internet as a network of networks and the developments of the telecommunications 
technologies – the advances in cloud computing, in connectivity (in terms of land-
lines, radio waves or optical solutions), and in data centers to name a few.
The third level refers to the advances in processing the data: the standardization 
of technologies that enable convergence, the categorizing and analyzing of the data, 
exceedingly the realm of the artificial intelligence (Eckersley and Nasser, 2017). This 
level entails not only the technological advances pertaining to the processing of the 
data, but also the requisite changes in regulations, rules, norms and codes that drive 
the developments of such standards that enable connections between diverse entities 
– the TCP/IP protocol of internet being a notable example. 
The fourth level is more abstract. A tangible example of the changing logic un-
derpinned by changes on the more fundamental level is the servitization of products 
(Vargo and Lusch, 2004): based on digital data about for example the operation of an 
elevator (KONE) or a ship engine (Wärtsilä), instead of selling an elevator or an en-
gine, the producers can sell lifts of kilometers. Additional examples include changes 
in the role of technology in strategy (Bharadwaj et al., 2013), or the convergence of 
information and communications technology offerings (Herzhoff, 2009, Huang et 
al., 2012). The economic logic underpinning business operations changes from the 
economies of scale to for example economies of singularity or networks. 
 The fifth level is by far the most familiar, as it explores the individual techno-
logical advances based on datafication and digital technology. From mobile devices 
to applications, breakthroughs in material scanning, monitoring biometric infor-
mation, or the developments resulting in autonomous transportation by land, sea 
and air, this is the dominant level of discussion. It should also be noted that not all 
radical technological advances (Linturi et al., 2014) are immediately digital or data 
(advances in solar energy or solutions tackling the pollution of oceans to name few 
examples), but require additional linkages to be connected to digitalization (solar 
energy as a power source of diverse solutions or operated and harnessed through 
diverse digital applications, datafying the substances in the sea water and monitoring 
the cleaning processes). 
The sixth level covers the discussions of the impacts of digital technologies – on 
individuals, firms, industries, economy and society on many levels. The discussions 
range from tangible outcomes, such as industry transformations (Bughin et al., 2017), 
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to the intangible changes in perceptions (Yoo, 2010), and the wider societal implica-
tions (Arthur, 2017, Casti, 2012, Newell and Marabelli, 2015, Zuboff, 2015).
In perusing the vast amount of scholarly, professional and lay literature of the 
topic of digitalization, it becomes obvious that grasping the phenomenon as an en-
tity is difficult – if not impossible – due to the complexity of issues on each level of 
discussion, and the fact that many of the discussions include some of the levels while 
neglecting others. I am not claiming that my layered understanding of the phenom-
enon is by any means conclusive, however as it is through this understanding that I 
view it, I deemed it necessary to escort the reader to the same vantage from which I 
continue with the following chapters.
5.2 Humans
To begin the dissection of the interplay of humans and technological systems, a very 
macro level approach serves the purpose well. A Russian economist, Nikolai Kon-
dratieff proposed in the 1930’s that the human society progresses in waves, driven 
first by technological paradigm changes, resulting in economic, social and political 
transformations (Kondratieff, 1979). The subsequent K-wavers propose that we are 
currently entering a sixth Kondratieff wave, driven by the digital technology (Wile-










































































































































Figure 11: Kondratieff waves in Wilenius and Casti 2015, p. 339
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In the figure above, the percentage relates to the Standard&Poor equity index, with 
the Kondratieff waves following both the technological innovations driving econ-
omy, and diverse economic shocks weakening the hold of current dominant tech-
nologies, making way for new technological paradigms (Wilenius and Casti, 2015). 
The message of the figure is that at any given point in time, the economic capital is 
intertwined with the dominant technological infrastructure, supported by the social 
and political systems. Either through the dwindling of the potential of the current 
technology to create more financial benefits, or through a shock, the new innovations 
gain a foothold (the creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934)), gradually becoming 
the next dominant technological paradigms, followed and further strengthened by 
the economy and socio-political systems. The current transformation would there-
fore be grounded on the shock of the financial crisis in 2008-2010 creating space 
for new economic players relying on novel technological avenues, most notably the 
digitization referred to in this figure as intelligent technology.
While the mechanism is generally accepted, there is however no unanimous 
agreement about the number or break-off points of Kondratieff waves among schol-
ars (Barnett, 2016, Korotayev and Tsirel, 2010), or of the mechanism through which 
the waves emerge (Ayres, 1990a, Ayres, 1990b), or for example of the impact of glo-
balization on the potential of a uniform impact of any given technological paradigm 
change (Ayres, 2006, Dator, 2006). However, the discussion is in principle grounded 
on similar thinking as the rapidly diffusing concept of Industry 4.0. The difference 
between the discussions arise from the chosen perspectives: where the K-wavers view 
the economic developments, as the concept suggests, the Industry 4.0 discussions 
focus on the operational changes.
The origins of the notion of fourth industrial revolution emerged from the German 
car manufacturing industry (Gilchrist, 2016, Kagermann et al., 2013, Kagermann, 
2015), almost simultaneously diffused globally as a concept capturing the anticipated 
changes in industrial production (Brettel et al., 2014, Hermann et al., 2016, Lasi et al., 
2014, Schwab, 2016). The first industrial revolution refers to the mechanization in the 
mid 18th century (“Spinning jenny”), the second to the coinciding introductions of 
electricity and distribution of labor in the change of the 19th and 20th century (Taylor, 
1914), and the third to the adoption of personal computers from 1970’s onwards75. 
75 Albeit it should be noted that there are also other cut-off points recognized as revolutions un-
der the buzzword of Fourth Industrial revolution. Some begin with the agricultural revolution, 
whereas others begin only with the diffusion of electricity, however the cut-off points here 
explicated seem to be the most dominant version of the concept. For the sake of this discussion 
pinning down the revolutions “correctly” is not important, as regardless of the cut-off points, 
the notion is the same. 
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The current era, characterized by what in this dissertation is loosely defined as 
digitalization, is in this stream of research ex ante identified as driving a fourth, “rev-
olutionary” change in the organizing of production. Essentially the fourth industrial 
revolution discussion highlights the automatization, autonomization and robotiza-
tion of manufacturing, facilitated by the industrial Internet-of-Things, and the servi-
tization (Vargo and Lusch, 2004) of the offerings. 
While the approaches of Kondratieff waves and fourth industrial revolution are 
grounded on a very macro level analysis, the Multi Level Perspective (MLP) introduced 
by Geels (Geels, 2002, 2004, 2010, Geels and Schot, 2007) focuses more deeply on the 
actual process of socio-technical transformation. The MLP views the phenomenon on 
three different levels: wider environment, socio-technical regime (current dominant 
technology infrastructure, its users, diverse stakeholders and beneficiaries in terms of 
power coalescence), and emerging innovations, depicted in the following figure.
Increasing structuration 
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Figure 12: Multi Level Perspective on socio-technical transition in Geels&Schot 2007, p. 401
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Building on the notion of technological regime by Nelson and Winter (1982), 
the core idea is that at any given point in time, the overarching socio-technological 
landscape is given stability by the dominant socio-technical regime constituting of 
engineers, scientists, policy-makers, users and other stakeholder groups and the em-
bedded formal (regulative) and informal (normative, cognitive) institutions shaping 
the development and usage trajectories. This socio-technical regime is influenced by 
niche innovations, some of which get diffused enough to gain such momentum as 
to replace or transform the established socio-technical regime, resulting in changes 
in the overarching socio-technological landscape. This approach underpins also the 
discussions in Linturi et al (2014), Linturi (2016) and the oncoming Linturi 201876, 
which track the potential of radical technologies to create notable changes in the di-
verse value networks – in other words looking at how the niche innovations and the 
socio-technical regime interact. 
Moving in towards viewing the diffusion of technology on the individual level, 
the rich research stream of technology adoption in the field of information systems 
provides ample insights of the more or less deliberate and witting acceptance of tech-
nology. One of the earliest models explaining the differences in the adoption of tech-
nology dates to the early 1960’s (Rogers, 2010), when Rogers identified five differ-
ent types of innovation adopters and positioned them onto a Gaussian scale ranging 
from innovators and early adopters to early and late majority, tailed by the laggards. 
Moore (1991) discussed the notion further and introduced the concept of “chasm” 
in between the early adopters and majority, highlighting how difficult it is to diffuse 
an innovation, to reach the critical mass constituted of the early and late majorities 
required for realizing the main benefits of a given technology.
Subsequent research about the individual and organizational level of sociotechni-
cal systems (Leonardi and Barley, 2010) abounds from several perspectives: how in-
dividuals within an organization adopt new technology (Oliveira and Martins, 2011, 
Venkatesh and Davis, 2000), how consumers adopt new technology (Curran and 
Meuter, 2005, Taylor and Todd, 1995), or how the individual perceptions and features 
impact the adoption (Agarwal and Prasad, 1998, 1999, Davis, 1989). In addition, the 
more constructivist approaches of sociomateriality view the interplay of humans and 
technology as amalgams where the affordances of technology shape and are shaped 
by the human enactment (Orlikowski, 2010). Reviewing all these insights falls out of 
the scope of this discussion (for a concise and comprehensive overview of technology 
acceptance and adoption see for example Mäntymäki (2011), and for a review of the 
sociotechnical literature Leonardi and Barley (2010)) as the focal point of this sub-
76 See footnote 71 for explanation.
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chapter is not to explore why does an individual use a specific technology. Instead, 
next we turn towards the question of the level of the changes digitalization creates. 
Viewing these four perspectives together highlights the nested nature of diverse 
approaches to how technological novelties impact humans. The following figure 

















Figure 13: Nested approaches to technology driven changes
In the technology adoption and sociomateriality literature (Davis, 1989, Leonardi 
and Barley, 2010, Venkatesh and Davis, 2000), the units of analysis cover the individ-
ual technologies, the individual humans and the individual organizations. The dis-
cussions highlight the interaction of humans and technology, how and why individu-
al humans engage with technology, and what are the implications of this engagement 
for the firms and organizations, including their operations, emerging sociotechnical 
systems and the financial outcomes. The scale of impact is therefore on the level of 
individual agents and the time scope spans years. 
The multilevel perspective (MLP) (Geels, 2004) has a wider scope as it explores 
the change processes within societies: the relationships of existing socio-technical 
regimes and the niche innovations. The units of analysis are the socio-technical land-
scape, the socio-technical regimes and the diffusion of niche innovations, which 
means that the changes are traced through decades, and the scale of impact covers 
the existing societies, for example on the level of nations, regions or bounded through 
the criteria grounded on the definitions of the socio-technical landscape or regimes. 
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The literature on the Kondratieff waves (Wilenius and Casti, 2015) in turn doesn’t 
focus on the boundaries of the societies as defined through socio-technical land-
scapes of regimes, but instead views the fundamental drivers and principles of the 
economic organizing. While the discussions include the impact of technological in-
novations, the time span of the changes is longer, covering centuries. The scale of im-
pact is also even more profound, as the economic structures cut through and shape 
the different socio-technical entities – while naturally also being shaped by them. 
While the discussions under the label of the fourth industrial revolution (Kager-
mann et al., 2013) pivot primarily on the current era and the anticipated changes in 
the organization of production, work, economy and societies, viewing the impact 
and timing of the identified revolutionary drivers positions this approach on the wid-
est macro level. The three revolutionary drivers of mechanization, electricity and di-
vision of labor, and computerization can however be complemented with additional, 
equally fundamental changes going back millennia: the initiation of agriculture, the 
development of writing and calculus, and the introduction of money to list at least a 
few equally fundamental development stages (Diamond, 1999, Freeman and Louça, 
2001, Fremantle, 1992, Harari, 2014).
The concept of revolution in these contexts needs some explicating: if revolution 
is considered a sudden phenomenon, the notion doesn’t apply, as it took time for 
these drivers to evolve and impact the overarching organizing of human existence. 
However, if we view humanity before and after the unfolding of these “revolutions”, 
the impacts each has left in their wake are truly revolutionary. The human civiliza-
tion before and after agriculture, writing, electricity or computers looks profoundly 
different. 
The relevant question for the overarching discussion of this dissertation then 
emerges: at what level of transformation could and should the digitalization be 
viewed? If we define it through the changes it as sets of technological advances has 
on the humans, at what level do those changes in humans occur? Individual, within 
set social boundaries, within economy or on the very macro level of societal trans-
formation? 
The discussion of the infrastructural nature of digitalization highlights this ques-
tion, claiming that the digitalization isn’t driven by merely the deliberate adoption 
of specific technologies, innovations or applications (Tilson et al., 2010a, 2010b). In-
stead, the digital technology is creating a society, where becoming a user is no longer 
a choice (Yoo, 2010). The same can be said about electricity or sanitation, long ago 
established as the taken-for-granted essentials of western life. The focal point is that 
like in the history of electricity, no electric technology per se was responsible for the 
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fact that we now run on electricity – equally, no digital technology per se is necessary 
for the future developments theoretically culminating in full digital convergence.
To understand the potential scale and scope of the impacts of digital technologies 
on humans, I again evoke the Causal Layered Analysis (Inayatullah, 1998). In the 
following table I will try to identify the layers of changes created by some previous 
revolutionary developments, in order to see if similar layers can thus be identified 
from the ongoing phenomenon of digitalization. This requires reconceptualizing the 
layers to encompass not only the endogenous dimensions captured in the original 
version, but to list also the exogenous drivers evidenced across layers, explained next.
As the reader might remember from the previous chapter, causal layered analy-
sis is a tool developed in the field of futures research that enables analyzing a phe-
nomenon through diverse perspectives – including diverse different philosophical 
approaches. The top level of litany includes the immediate appearances of a given 
phenomenon and the social causes are the causes that can be traced to create the 
appearances of the phenomena as effects. The layer of world view captures the under-
lying assumptions and perspectives that enable seeing and enacting those causes, and 
the fundamental level of myth/metaphor explores the metanarratives responsible for 
creating those worldviews. 
As such, the causal layered analysis is primarily focused on endogenous themes, 
meaning the assumption, perceptions, standards of desirability and meaning making 
mechanisms – the internal drivers of agentic action. However, in order to utilize it in 
viewing these revolutionary changes in the organizing of human production and econ-
omy, the impact of the more exogenous drivers – the structural drivers of developments 
– on the very bottom level, and on the level of the causes is required. There are exogenous 
changes that have an impact on the endogenous changes, which in turn drive and shape 
the endogenous perceptions further impacting the evolution of the exogenous drivers.
In the following table, the layers are therefore named as follows: litany, the top 
layer covers in itself already the exogenously detected appearances of the phenomena 
under scrutiny, in addition to entailing also the immediate interpretations given en-
dogenously. Social causes capture the endogenous divers of human actions, but they 
are complemented with structures, exogenous elements which shape and are shaped 
by the endogenous elements (in short, capturing the essence of the structuration the-
ory (Giddens, 1984)). The worldview, by definition deals with the underpinning as-
sumptions, being purely endogenous, whereas it is not only the endogenous myths 
and metaphors that drive fundamental change, but also the exogenous enablers that 
become woven into the endogenous myths and metaphors, again following the inter-
twining of structuration theory.
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The following table captures two established moments of change in the human 
history, the agricultural, or neolithic revolution, and the second industrial revolution. 
Both eras can be defined as revolutionary based on the subsequent impacts, while 
neither of the eras are revolutionary in the sense of being clearly definable events. The 
roots and sprouts of these eras span backwards and forwards, however with a cluster-
ing in a definable period, creating some semblance of time boundaries.  





Second industrial  
revolution
Litany (endo&exo) Civilization as we know it Business as we know it
Social causes (endo)
Structures (exo)










From hunting to harvesting
Agriculture (taming wheat)
Might of scientific approach
Electricity
The agricultural revolution spans millennia in its unfolding (appr. 12 500 – 5 500 
B.C.), however compared to the preceding millions of years spent hunting and gather-
ing, the transformation was rapid. On the level of the litany, the outcomes of the agri-
cultural revolution are the farms and cities that restructured the social hierarchies and 
organizing, and created what we currently refer to as civilization (Weisdorf, 2005). On 
the level of social causes and structures, we see the growing size of human collectives, 
enabled by farming and organized into the new structures of villages and subsequently 
cities. The increasing size of growing collectives was underpinned by the changes in the 
worldviews, the shift from viewing the nomadic lifestyle as the norm, to seeing the lo-
cation-bound, sedentary lifestyle as the norm. The fundamental enablers driving these 
changes were the taming of the wild plants and animals, and the idea of agriculture: 
instead of pursuing, food could be grown. (Diamond, 1999, Harari, 2014).
The second industrial revolution in turn spanned decades (early-to-mid 19th to early 
20th century), if not a century – again a lengthy period in itself, yet a mere blink of an 
eye compared to the rate of the preceding industrial developments. On the level of the 
litany, the era saw the emergence of the factories, industries and firms of contemporary 
form, the outlines of the economic realm as we currently know it. The social causes 
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underpinning these developments were the introduction of the scientific management, 
Taylorism, and the emergence of mass production, facilitated by the technological 
advances of the era. These changes were underpinned by changing worldviews: soci-
ety began to be seen as a machine, where the individuals of the era where required as 
the clogs to spin the wheel, and the societies reformed in ways (eg. by initiating mass 
schooling to create the necessary factory work force) to enable that. The fundamental 
enablers of this revolution were the developments in the scientific mechanisms77 and 
the technological advances that enabled for example harnessing the power of electricity. 
(Freeman and Louça, 2001, Freeman, 1997, Mokyr, 1998, 2000).
Now, viewing these fundamentally transformative eras in human history through 
the four levels of the causal layered analysis, how do the changes created by digitaliza-
tion look like if positioned into the same table? While we cannot yet know the future 
consequences of the currently unfolding events, is it possible to identify such layers 
of digitalization that would enable anticipating whether the impact of digitalization 
on the humanity should be viewed through its impacts on the individual, within so-
cieties, on the economy, or on the societal structures themselves?
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cation bound lifestyle















77 Like Mokyr put it “The first Industrial Revolution – and most technological developments preced-
ing it – had little or no scientific base. It created a chemical industry with no chemistry, an iron 
industry without metallurgy, power machinery without thermodynamics.”(Mokyr 1998, p. 1)
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Beginning again at the level of litany, it entails the contemporary discussions and 
representations of diverse digital technologies, applications and advances. The dis-
cussions are myriad and range from the developments in the specific technologies to 
the applications and implications, such as the emergence of the platform economy 
or the digital business ecosystems. As the technological advances, applications and 
implications are numerous and complex, this corner of the matrix is richly populated 
in both scholarly and practitioner-oriented literature.
On the second level of causes, the exogenous structures consist of the exponen-
tially increasing computing power, standardization of data and technologies, and in-
ternet, supported by the advances in the connectivity. These structures shape and 
drive the individual developments evident in the level of the litany. On this level, 
the social causes include the emergence of what Yoo (2010) names experiental com-
puting, discussed more in the following subchapter: people no longer think of using 
technology as an independent act, instead people go about their daily lives facilitated 
by ubiquitous technology as part of mundane routines. 
A focal social cause is the two-way interaction between humans and digital in-
frastructures, best explained by comparison: there is a major difference between the 
digital infrastructure and for example electricity. We only utilize electricity and do 
not constitute an integral part in creating the electricity infrastructure. In contrast, in 
intertwining our life with the digital infrastructures, we don’t only use the technolo-
gy, but are used by it and contribute to creating it (Newell and Marabelli, 2015). It is 
our individual data, resulting from our interactions with and in the digital realm, that 
through digitization ultimately powers Facebook, Google or Amazon, contributing 
to the creation of the digital infrastructure and the litany level applications. 
On the level of the worldview, the most distinctive shift in perceptions can be cap-
tured through the concept of convergence. Entities previously considered separate 
are now seen as the same. The blurring of the boundary between digital and physical 
realities is maybe easiest to explain through the phenomenon of social media. Social 
life used to exist in the physical realm, in between the human encounters. However, 
following the emergence of the social media platforms, social networking sites, the 
digital interactions within them are not only representations of social relationships 
and hierarchies in the physical world, but instead constitute a realm of social life 
by its own right. The positive and negative dimensions of human interaction within 
social networking sites are equally powerful and “real”, as their counterparts in the 
physical realm (Mäntymäki and Islam, 2016). 
However, the perception shift of convergence isn’t limited to the phenomenon 
of social media. We find nothing unusual in our ability to monitor the temperature 
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of our house from afar through our mobile devices, to fulfill our transportation, ac-
commodation or music listening needs with the aid of the same device, or to operate 
a full scale manufacturing facility through a few taps on a monitor. All of these ac-
tions used to consist of dealing with entities of different qualities, therefore in need of 
processing in different ways, whereas through digitalization the different qualities of 
physical realm entities have converged in ways that enable processing them through 
few multipurpose interfaces. 
On the fundamental level of myth/metaphor, the endogenous force is the idea of 
datafication – everything is, creates and can be expressed as data. The fundamental ex-
ogenous enabler of this notion of mythic proportions is the act of digitizing, the trans-
formation of any substance and event into binary digits. Fueled by the advances in con-
nectivity, perceiving everything as data and representing it in binary digits drives the 
convergent worldview, creates digital infrastructures and seeds individual innovations 
and applications. In digitization, the core driver of these changes is not any specific tech-
nological innovation, but the possibility of full convergence inbuilt into the act of dig-
itizing and connecting all types of data. The resulting social changes are actually not 
dependent on the choices of the individual to adopt or accept any digital technology, but 
ride on the historical waves that have led towards perceiving everything as data, coding 
all data in an ultimately uniform way, and connecting all that uniform data together.
Now, when we compare the fundamental level of these three phenomena here 
discussed, how do the potential implications of the changes in the myth/metaphor/
enabler level compare? Will the impact of datafication and digitization equal the im-
pacts of adopting the scientific mechanism and harnessing electricity, and the adop-
tion of agriculture? 
We don’t know. Your guess is as good as mine. However, whatever level of impact 
we are dealing with, it ultimate hinges on the endogenous changes in the perceptions 
and assumptions of the humans – what are the worldviews and meaning making 
mechanisms we adopt and ground our next actions on? Therefore the next subchap-
ter digs deeper into these elements. 
5.3 Perceptions
5.3.1 experiental computing
In his profound article, Yoo (2010) zooms into three alternative ways of conceptual-
izing human-computer interaction. The first, most historical approach he names rep-
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resentational computing, in which computers (and all they entail, including online 
access) are viewed as mere technology. The second Yoo names imagined computing, 
and it refers to the creation and inhabiting of the virtual realities. The third approach, 
experiental computing, highlights the disappearing notion of specifically using tech-
nology – one no longer perceives using the phone but just talking to a friend.
In the first approach of representational computing, a computer in its various de-
vice forms (from table tops to mobile phones and tablets) represents fundamentally 
a tool, more versatile than a hammer, but ultimately the same. The computer is per-
ceived as an interface through which extant resources can be accessed, developed 
and deployed. In this worldview, digital technology is perceived as a mere part in 
the continuum constituting of diverse technological tools (geared towards both work 
and leisure) such as wheel, spinning jenny, telegraph or television. Technology, in-
cluding digital, is considered as a passive, separate entity from its users, with the 
main emphasis of research on the organizational theory side being the users, and 
on the information systems side being the technology as either consisting of distinct 
entities or technological systems. This line of division between the rich, yet diverse 
research streams (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008) highlights in itself the division within 
this perspective: humans and technology are two distinct entities habiting different 
hierarchical positions in regards to each other, human as the master and technology 
as the slave.
The approach Yoo calls imagined computing refers to a specific type of usage the 
computers allow: an individual may create a virtual alias and enhance his/her physi-
cal existence by entering the virtual world as another version of him/herself (Wasko 
et al., 2011). This pertains to both the diverse game worlds and equally to the social 
networking sites, in which the individual may playact diverse roles, unrestricted by 
the social norms which (s)he as a physical individual is expected to follow. The reality 
enhancing nature of digital technology is in a major role in this perception, however 
that cyber reality remains detached from the physical reality, providing an escapist 
experience or an outlet for expressing such parts of oneself not given freedom in the 
physical realm. 
While this perspective highlights the immersion of the individual in the digital 
reality, the “otherness” of that cyber reality still exists: the games, digital worlds or so-
cial media exist out there, intertwined with, yet outside the daily life of the individual, 
ultimately offering little more than has been throughout human history been sought 
by diving into a novel, taking drugs or watching a film or a play. The difference being 
the role of agency provided by the historical means of escape and the contemporary 
possibilities embedded in digital immersion – instead of being a passive reader, ob-
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server or mind-enhancer, the individual as an avatar is an active participant in the 
unfolding of the imagined reality78. 
The third perspective, experiental computing in the vocabulary of Yoo, is also the 
approach adopted in the studies of sociomateriality (Leonardi and Barley, 2010, Yoo, 
2010, Orlikowski and Scott, 2008), actually preceded already by Latour (1987, 2005) 
who stated that the technology and its use can be decoupled only artificially (Gaskin 
et al., 2014) as ultimately technology becomes only in the process of its use. Within 
the organizational studies, the practice oriented research stream of sociomateriality 
(Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011) is supplemented also by the discussions of materi-
ality (the time-specific constellation of the intrinsic properties of the scrutinized en-
tities that enables theorizing about how the diverse properties shape and are shaped 
by the human perceptions and interactions (Paula Jarzabkowski, Spee and Smets, 
2013)), and the discussions of the socio-technical systems scoped as an organization 
where the technological and social systems intertwine and shape one another (Leon-
ardi, 2012, Trist and Bamforth, 1951).
In addition, the notion of experiental computing is reflected, albeit implicitly, also 
in the literature of information systems strategy. In their overview of the informa-
tion systems strategy research, Peppard, Galliers and Thorogood (2014) show how 
the development of the field has followed the increasing diffusion of information 
technology. In the early research, the focus was on IS planning, meaning a specific 
activity involving the IT personnel and the technology design and implementation. 
Subsequently, the importance of the information technology was acknowledged in 
widening the sphere of study to involve the whole organization: IT was no longer a 
bracketed entity dealt by a specific staff, but an organization-wide phenomenon im-
pacting the widely the organizational action.
As the importance of IT grew, it was reflected also in the calls for aligning the IS 
strategy with the business strategy. However, until recently, digital technology was 
deemed a mere development in the diverse technological systems utilized in busi-
ness. As such, a digital strategy, or the ICT strategy has been considered a function-
78 It can be of course argued whether the increased role of agency provided by virtual realities is a 
minor or major difference. In my view it’s not a question of a qualitative difference but merely 
a question of the level of addictiveness: the mechanism driving individuals into seeking a visit 
to a different reality is as old as humanity, however with the advances in psychology and neu-
rosciences, mediated through digital possibilities we are increasingly better at providing means 
to satisfying that need. Research on addictions shows that the mechanism of addiction is the 
same irrespective of the nature of the entity being addicted to (Armstrong, Phillips and Saling, 
2000, Hirschman, 1992, Sellman, 2010), which leads me to the viewpoint that adding agency 
into the means of escape is on a scale of impact similar to switching beer to heroin. Yes, big, 
however the mechanism prevails. 
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al level strategy, a separate lower level strategy aligned with, but subordinate to the 
business strategy (Bharadwaj et al., 2013, Peppard et al., 2014). This perspective was 
challenged in the special issue in the MIS Quarterly in 2013, aimed at initiating dis-
cussion about the need to fuse the business strategy and the IS strategy into digital 
business strategy. This development ultimately underpins the disappearance of the 
notion of the representational use of technology: technology is not an independent 
entity specifically used, but merely one of the elements to account for when focusing 
on the actual practices and desired outcomes of everyday activities. 
Experiental computing is underpinned by the increasing ubiquity of computers 
in various forms, used as mundane parts of daily activities. A computer is no longer 
a distinct entity bracketed out for moments of specific use, but an integral part of 
daily life: we glance at our fitness bands to see our daily step accumulation, hail for a 
taxi using diverse applications, communicate our thoughts and experiences through 
snapshots and one-liners in social media updates, compare the availability and prices 
of our purchases online – and indeed, increasingly carry out our shopping through 
our ever-present mobile phones. In short, we are continuously engaged in comput-
ing. Yoo (2010) talks about “embodied computing”79: the focus is not on the technol-
ogy nor is the use of it distinguished from the normal daily activity – the impact of 
technology is in the shaping of what we perceive as normal daily activity. 
The research about the intertwined nature of technology, its users and usage, and 
their perceptions and assumptions is rich within the context of organizational stud-
ies. However the notion highlighted by Yoo (2010) and Tilson et al (2010b) pivots on 
the understanding that with digitalization, the intertwining of technology, humans 
and perceptions is not limited to organizational reality, but spans the whole of human 
life, in part also contributing to the blurring of the divide between organizational re-
ality (work) and the overarching daily reality of individuals. Tweeting is a way of life 
where the professional and lay roles of individuals are firmly fused. Twitter doesn’t 
represent technology, but an integral part of identity and self-expression covering 
both work-related and personal facets of the individual’s daily existence. 
The most fundamental change wrought by digitalization is the paradox (Lewis, 
2000, Smith and Lewis, 2011) in how we perceive technology: as the digital tech-
nology becomes more and more pervasive in our lives, it simultaneously becomes 
more and more invisible to us. It metaphorically becomes the air we breathe: a tak-
79 “Therefore, an embodiment relationship refers to a relationship between technology and users in 
which the technology mediates lived experiences of the users. As a contact lens wearer sees the 
world through contact lenses, technology in the embodiment relationship comes between the user 
and the world. Technology is not being interpreted, nor is it being experienced as an end in itself. 
Instead, it directly shapes and occasionally transforms our lived experiences.” (Yoo, 2010, p. 218)
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en-for-granted presence without which we cannot function, yet one we hardly per-
ceive. The fragmented nature of contemporary science contributes partially to the 
increasing invisibility of digital technology: while the individual parts are scrutinized 
in exceeding detail, the overarching embeddedness of our existence in the digitally 
manipulated reality evades attention. The more we zoom into the trees, the less we 
see the forest.
5.3.2 Changing worldviews and values
In addition to changing how we perceive technology, digitalization impacts the way we 
view and interpret the external world, and our internal preferences and values. Internet 
is increasingly the interface between the individual and the external reality – in seeking 
information we turn to Google or Wikipedia, browse our favorite sites and interact 
with others through digital forums. In this subchapter the focus is first on how this 
digitally mediated information flow about external reality influences our perceptions. 
In his notable book “The Filter Bubble: What Internet is Hiding from You” Eli 
Pariser (2011) pinpoints the decision of Google in 2009 to initialize personalized 
search as the beacon of the new era of Internet. Personalized search means that the 
search engine uses the digital traces accumulated from the previous online activities 
of the user to choose the presented outcomes of a given search. In essence this means 
that as the online activities of the individuals differ, the search outcome of a given 
keyword are different for each individual. The same approach underpins also the so-
cial networking systems (Bakshy, Messing and Adamic, 2015, McNamee, 2018). The 
algorithms of social networks aim at maximizing the time spent within the networks, 
which means that they analyze the user behavior in order to present the user with 
material that increases the engagement. (Lazer, 2015).
The result of personalized search and engagement driving algorithms is the cre-
ation of the so called echo chambers (Sunstein, 2009, 2018): like Sunstein notes, what 
Nicholas Negroponte in 1995 dubbed as the Daily Me (Negroponte, 1995), has in the 
few decades transformed from futurist utopia to everyday reality. As all our digital 
activities leave a trace, and those traces are used to present us with content we are 
assumed to want to see, the information we access online is tailor-made to suit our 
assumed opinions and preferences, echoing the opinions and preferences deduced 
from our previous online behavior. In the 1990’s this idea, expressed by Negroponte, 
was fiction, however in 2010’s the filter bubbles (Bozdag and van den Hoven, 2015) 
and the resulting echo chambers (Flaxman, Goel and Rao, 2016) constitute the pri-
mary modus operandi of the digital infrastructure of Internet and the diversity of 
applications based on that infrastructure.
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Furthermore, like Newell and Marabelli (2015) point out, our opinions and pref-
erences are not only sourced from our deliberate online actions, but also from the 
in-built sensors in the devices (Abbas et al., 2014) we use to access the digital realm. 
For example the location-based services in my personal device make it possible to 
track not only my physical location, but also to combine that information with the 
location of other individuals’ personal devices and the location specific data (eg. the 
shops or events at any given location), and use these connections in profiling me in 
even more detail. A diffused utilization of these technological possibilities is exem-
plified in Facebook advertisements. If I accompany my tractor aficionado friend at an 
agricultural fair, it may well be that soon after, my Facebook feed presents me with an 
advertisement of the newest model of John Deere (Peterson, 2017). Another example 
of the technology converting our physical realm activities into digital data comes 
from Hitachi that offers firms the possibility of monitoring the exact location, the 
conversation partners and the length and enthusiasm of conversations of the employ-
ees through specific name badges equipped with sensors and coupled with artificial 
intelligence (Greene, 2014).
So, the reality we encounter through our interactions with our ubiquitous digital 
devices is filtered based on our past digital behavior, including our social interac-
tions online, and increasingly also on such traces of our offline activities that can 
be sourced and digitized through advancing sensor technology (Brynjolfsson and 
McAfee, 2012, Zuboff, 2015). While the porousness or solidity of the boundaries of 
these filter bubbles and echo chambers are debated (Bakshy et al., 2015, Flaxman et 
al., 2016), we are increasingly grounding our perceptions of the world on curated 
material already influenced by what we consider true, relevant or interesting. 
This means that each one of us is presented with a unique representation of reality. 
However, some of the unique representations are further apart than others, which 
means that the human tendency of seeking tribes, the desire to belong in a group 
(Deci and Ryan, 2000) plays an equally big role in constructing the representation of 
reality we through the digital media perceive, and build our respective worldviews 
on. In addition to being responsible for the fragmentation of our perceptions of the 
reality, digitalization equally creates new modes and methods of constructing social 
groups and collectives. These new groups and collectives are not formed following 
the traditional boundaries created by geography, ethnicity, age or socio-economic 
status, but emerge through other mechanisms.
Drawing from the discussion of epistemic objects (Cetina, 2001), emerging in the 
practice oriented theorizing, Jyri Engeström wrote a popular blog posting in 2005 to 
understand why some of the then relatively new social networks succeeded where 
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the others did not (Engeström, 2005). An epistemic, or knowledge object refers to an 
object of attention, which doesn’t need to be a thing or a clear entity, but something 
that the subjects perceiving the object recognize as existing in a more or less defined 
form. In his discussion of the early social networking sites, Engeström pointed out 
that it is not actually enough to enable social networking, if there are no reasons for 
the individuals to connect. What draws people in and together are the social objects 
around which they want to cluster. 
Social objects (in Engeström’s terminology, adopted also in this dissertation) are 
epistemic objects that create the nodes in the social networks, providing the indi-
viduals the reason to join the networks and engage in interaction with select others. 
What is new in these drivers of group-forming is the fact that they do not arise from 
within the traditional boundaries (e.g. geography, ethnicity), but instead they form 
around something that gives the collective a reason to talk to each other, instead 
of to someone else. An illustrative example of a social object is a Facebook group 
called “I’ll park on the bicycle lane”, in which cyclists post pictures of cars parked on, 
yes, bicycle lanes. The social object is more than the photos of wrongly parked cars, 
but encompasses the shared sentiments of cyclists about the perceived relationships 
between the cyclists and drivers. This social object has pulled together a collective 
of likeminded individuals, created normative institutions, which flow out from the 
social media group, impacting not only the actions and perceptions of the participat-
ing individuals, but also their interactions in the outside world. This in turn kindles 
the ongoing friction between cyclists and drivers witnessed further in the traditional 
media, which feeds the social media group with an increasing number of likeminded 
individuals, resulting in the growing size of that specific “tribe” of otherwise highly 
diverse individuals. 
Social objects take many forms, from hobbies to pro- or anti-Trump, from profes-
sions to animal rights, from events, sites and locations to specific preferences in con-
sumption behavior. Interacting within or about the cluster around a specific social 
object creates digital traces, which are subsequently further processed by algorithms 
responsible for creating the personalized view encountered in internet searches and 
social network feeds. So, while the view of the world through the lenses provided by 
internet is unique to each individual, the social objects create clusters, within which 
the worldviews homogenize to an extent (Lazer, 2015). This in turn shapes the per-
ceptions, assumptions and worldview, which influence subsequent actions leaving 
digital traces, further processed in curating even more detailed perspectives. 
In short, the more we rely on digital sources, namely internet, in pursuing knowl-
edge about the world around us, the more the algorithms learn about us, and the 
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more curated worldview they present us. In addition, the algorithms learn about us 
also through such means of monitoring that are not dependent on our deliberate 
actions – through the location based sensors embedded in our mobile devices, or 
through the increasingly ubiquitous surveillance mechanisms to name few notable 
examples (Zuboff, 2015). These mechanisms have an impact on us not only through 
the perspective we thus view the external reality, but also through ensuing tradeoffs 
that impact our internal values and preferences. Newell and Marabelli (2015) identify 
three of these resulting tradeoffs influencing, and being grounded on our percep-
tions, emerging from the accumulation of personal digital data and its algorithmic 
processing: privacy vs security, freedom vs control and independence vs dependence. 
The first tradeoff pivots on the choice between privacy and security, being increas-
ingly decoupled as a result of digitalization. The concept of privacy is highly elusive, 
as are the meaning making mechanisms endowing the concept with value (Smith, 
Dinev and Xu, 2011): is privacy a state (of being private or of being in control of 
matters concerning one) or a value (as an inherent human right or a commodity to 
be bargained with)? In their review of discussions of information privacy, Smith et 
al (2011) further identify what privacy is not: it’s not synonymous with anonymity, 
confidentiality, security, secrecy or general ethics, while all of these separate concepts 
have connections to the concept of privacy80. 
One example of the unfolding shift in the perception of privacy has been docu-
mented among teenagers who, according to a study acknowledge the tradeoff and 
value their privacy, however are still willing to share their private information in 
online networks (Marwick and Boyd, 2014). Interestingly, what Marwick and Boyd 
found was that the seemingly contradictive behavior of valuing privacy yet sharing 
huge amounts of personal information online emerged from the complex practices 
the teenagers used in order to control who saw and understood what from their di-
verse postings. In short, the teenagers took the privacy infringing mechanisms of so-
cial networks for granted, but fashioned strategies that enabled them to feel in control 
while engaging in social interactions through digital media. This underlines a shift in 
perception from privacy as a general state of being private to privacy as referring to 
being in control (Smith et al., 2011).
80 To illustrate the bundling of the concepts through a perception change, in olden times, if you 
wanted your treasure to be safe, you were sure to bury it in a hidden location and keep the 
knowledge of its location very private: privacy and security were coupled. Digital data in turn 
is never private, but it can be secure – the logic being that it shouldn’t matter if the sums on 
my bank account are public, as long as no-one but me can access it. Security and privacy are 
decoupled.
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However, to highlight the tradeoff of privacy and security instead of merely view-
ing the changes in the perception of privacy, the focus should be on the exchange of 
individual level privacy and the collective level security (Dinev, Hart and Mullen, 
2008). Sensor technology and algorithmic processing enable surveillance of an un-
foreseen scale and scope: we are rapidly entering the era of panopticon, the prison 
conceptualized by Jeremy Bentham in the late 18th century (Foucault, 2012). Through 
surveillance (Lyon, 2001, 2003, 2015), we can increase the collective security within 
an organization, within a city, or on a national level; combining the monitoring of the 
physical actions of the individuals with their online behavior could enable predicting 
and preventing malicious acts81. The technology sets little limits, which means that 
the discussion of the balance – or the tradeoff – of between collective security and 
individual privacy is a political82, and ultimately an ethical one. These discussions are 
underpinned by the worldviews and assumptions of the individuals and collectives, 
the meaning making mechanisms creating the standards of desirability: in short the 
individual and collective doxa through which we analyze these implications. 
The second tradeoff recognized by Newell and Marabelli (2015), freedom vs con-
trol, is closely intertwined with the discussions of privacy and security, however the 
undertones are more somber. While privacy and freedom are not synonymous, the 
loss of one may lead to the loss of other. Equally, when pursuing collective secu-
rity becomes the norm, it imposes control, either informed or uninformed on the 
individuals. Control however encompasses far more than the realm of security. To 
control means to use power over someone, a parent over a child, an employer over 
an employee, a government over a citizen. The mechanisms of control provided by 
digitalization rely not on the physical cracking of the whip witnessed in previous era, 
but on the increasing monitoring of the individuals (Botsman, 2017, Greene, 2014, 
Lyon, 2015, Leonard, 2008). And like we know at least since the early Hawthorn 
studies of Elton Mayo, people behave differently observed and un-observed (Mayo, 
1949) – even when not deliberately nudged to change their behavior (Leonard, 2008).
The third tradeoff, independence vs dependence, is also firmly entwined in the 
mechanisms of control, arguments of security and the notions of privacy and free-
dom. The more we use technology to facilitate our daily life, the more dependent on 
81 “This is exemplified by the lee Rigby case (the British soldier killed on a street in london), where 
Facebook was accused of not helping to protect security because it did not use its analytical capa-
bility to detect and report the fact that the killer was posting that he was intending to commit just 
such a murder (http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/live/2014/nov/25/lee-rigby-woolwich-in-
quiry-report-published-live-coverage).” (Newell and Marabelli 2015, p.6)
82 The recently enforced European General Data Protection Regulation (GPDR) is a timely exam-
ple of the political actions emerging from these technological development driven discussions 
surrounding these themes. (European Union, 2016a, European Union, 2016b) 
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that technology we become. The dependency emerges through many processes: first 
of all through habituation, the development of routines that shape (and are shaped 
by) our daily activities. Research on routine formation (Pentland et al., 2011) and on 
the other hand sociomateriality (Jarzabkowski et al., 2013) highlight the impact of 
the nature of the technological affordances (Volkoff and Strong, 2013) in shaping and 
enforcing our daily actions. 
Newell and Marabelli (2015) illustrate another mechanism, based on the process-
es of learning: the more we become used to relying on technology (e.g. in navigating 
with GPS, parking the car with sensors, or saving phone numbers in a phone), the less 
we practice those skills, and subsequently, the less we have those skills. To sum, learn-
ing and upholding a skill, becoming competent, needs practice (Argote, 2012, Brown 
and Duguid, 1991, Burke, 2002, Dall’Alba and Sandberg, 2010, Levitt and March, 
1988), and externalizing the practice to technology means that no learning happens 
and the skills, competences deteriorate. This subsequently drives dependence: as the 
skills to park a car without sensor technology disappear, the sensors become essen-
tial, and the driver dependent on them.
A third mechanism of dependence is infrastructural: the environment changes in 
ways that make it impossible to perform certain actions without relying on (digital) 
technology. A good example are the banking services (Montazemi and Qahri-Saremi, 
2015): as more and more people pay their bills online utilizing the online banking, 
the more the banks concentrate their customer service in internet and close down 
the physical service points to the extent that even if you wanted to pay your bill by 
interacting with a real person at a physical, offline event, you no longer have the op-
portunity for doing it. 
These three drivers of dependence converge in creating the experienced conve-
nience offered by digitalization. We follow habits and routines, because they save 
cognitive energy, making life more convenient. We use technology in assisting us 
with performing arduous tasks, because we can save ourselves from the hard work 
of practicing, making life more convenient. We shape our actions based on the eas-
iest available environmental structures, because swimming against the tide is tiring 
and would make our lives less convenient. Convenience is the mediating element: 
the more the digital technologies provide convenience, the more dependency they 
create.
Drawing together the previous discussions of the identified tradeoffs by Newell 
and Marabelli (2015), on the other side we have privacy, freedom and independence, 
and on the other side security, control, convenience and dependency. However, un-
like Newell and Marabelli, I don’t see these tradeoffs as separate, but highly entwined 
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– especially when viewed through the changes in the perceptions, the standards of 
desirability and meaning making mechanisms. 
The first change was already touched upon: how do we perceive privacy and how 
do we value it? Privacy as a state of being private is facing extinction with the increas-
ing traceability of our actions and even thoughts (Hutson, 2017). However, privacy 
as a state of being in control of matters that concern oneself is faring better – as 
exemplified by the practices of the teenagers on the one hand, and the changes in 
legislation (the GDPR) on the other. Privacy as a state of being in control also comes 
close to privacy as a value of commodity: by being in control of matters pertaining 
us, we can choose to exchange our privacy for offerings that have more value (than 
privacy) for us at any given moment. For example, by joining a bonus program of 
a retailer, the currency we use is our personal data (privacy as commodity), and in 
exchange we gain benefits in terms of discounts, prizes and increasing convenience 
in being offered what we are known to want instead of us needing to look for what it 
is we think we want.
When we perceive privacy as a value in terms of being a human right, the tradeoffs 
of security and control become more pronounced. Which weighs more on the scales 
of human values, my human right of privacy, or the collective human right of societal 
security (as reflected in my perception of my own security as a part of a collective)? 
Following the discussions of terrorism or the autonomous driving, it would seem that 
in this issue, the security weighs more: people tend to, albeit grudgingly, approve of 
the intrusions on their individual privacy in exchange of feeling more secure in their 
collectives (Dinev et al., 2008). However, what should be noted here, is that privacy 
and collective security are not linked directly – mere knowledge about the private 
actions, thoughts or intentions does not yet increase security. The knowledge needs 
acting upon.
This is the step where privacy and freedom become firmly bundled – and security 
and control equally so. Mere knowledge gleaned from breaching privacy doesn’t in-
crease security83: it needs to be coupled with actions that aim at control, that diminish 
the freedom of the individual to pursue actions deemed undesirable by the surveilling 
actors (exemplified maybe most acutely in the imminent Chinese Social Credit Rating 
System). What this means is that the discussion of the perceived importance of privacy 
is in itself merely conceptual, whereas the practical implications of the perception shift 
arise through the impacts of the mechanisms of control, the influences on freedom.
The mechanisms of control embedded in digital technology encompass not only 
the governmental actions or explicit surveillance, but run deeper in the mechanisms 
83 Remember the Lee Rigby case discussed by Newell and Marabelli in footnote 81?
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of personalized search and social network algorithms tailoring our worldview. This 
theme is illustrated in the recent revelations of the influence of the Russian actors 
on the US presidential campaign in 2016 (Apuzzo and LaFraniere, 2018). While we 
are lacking the counter-factual evidence (ie. how the elections would have turned 
out without the external, orchestrated influence endeavors) of the election outcomes, 
the activities of the Russians however illustrate how the ingrained features of our 
contemporary internet can be exploited in reducing individual freedom and creating 
insidious means of control (Cadwallar, 2016). While the case of US presidential elec-
tions has elicited a lot of discussion due to the element of a foreign national power 
infringing on the elections of another sovereignty, the very same mechanisms can be 
exploited by commercial actors or governments on their own citizens – however ex-
amples of such behavior are harder to come by84, unless we count the Chinese Social 
Credit Rating System discussions as such. 
But, coming back to the overarching theme of this subchapter, the dimension of 
perception change in digitalization, it is time to weave these discussions into a co-
herent entity. First of all, both the external and internal perception changes are de-
pendent on the amount of interaction with digital technologies, either through the 
deliberate online activities leaving a digital trace, or through the increasingly diffused 
sensor and surveillance technologies tracing our activities. Secondly, both the delib-
erate online behavior and the diffusion of digital technology embedded with sensors 
reflect our willingness to become dependent on the convenience of life provided by 
digital solutions. 
Thirdly, the vista of external reality through digital media is the more curated the 
more digital traces one leaves. This applies both to the individual level personaliza-
tion of the internet searches and social network feeds, and to the collective clusters 
forming around social objects, unbound by the distances of space or time. Fourthly, 
the currencies with which we pay for the increased dependency-driving convenience 
are privacy on the abstract level, and freedom on the practical level. We become more 
controlled, while rationalizing the exchange through the need for feeling collectively 
secure. The sentiments of threat and security further impact our willingness to suc-
cumb to the promise of convenience: not only is using digital technology convenient, 
but it makes our life safer through increasing traffic safety, through facilitating the 
tracking of the undesirables (quite literally in the case of convicts monitored at home 
through ankle bracelets), and through monitoring our health (by fitness bands or the 
84 One of these examples emerged just at the time of finalizing this dissertation. The Cambridge 
Analytica case, the utilization of Facebook data on behalf of the Trump presidential campaign, 
is discussed further in the chapter 7.
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solutions designed to assess the insulin levels on the diabetics) to name a few notable 
examples. 
In sum, concepts such as privacy, freedom or independence are highly abstract 
(especially in the Western societies, where these values have long been taken for 
granted – at least to an extent), whereas the promises of convenience and security 
are quite tangible. Digitalization on the level of perceptions requires reassessing the 
respective values of these values: what are the standards of desirability and the subse-
quent tradeoffs our meaning making mechanisms underpin? Put simply, are security 
and convenience superior to privacy, freedom and independence? If so, why? If not, 
why not? 
5.4 Summarizing: so what is digitalization?
In this dissertation, digitalization is perceived as a trinity of digital technological sys-
tems, their impact on humans and the subsequent influences on perceptions. The 
technological systems are a layered phenomenon, underpinned by the fundamental 
notion of transforming the objects of all three worlds of Popper (physical entities, 
subjective entities like sentiments, and intersubjective entities like stories and cul-
tures) into data, despite their originally different ontological foundations. Digitizing 
and connecting these data form objects subsequently and theoretically enables con-
vergence, meaning that all of these objects can be processed through similar means 
– if not yet through same technologies. 
The data form entities are highly malleable, and have a strong feedback connec-
tion to the entities they represent in the Popperian realities. This means that the 
physical, subjective and intersubjective realities subsequently become more mallea-
ble. This malleability impacts the social structures, on the level of the individual, the 
organization, the economy, and the social collectives of diverse scale and scope. 
One of the implications of this malleability is the ability of digital technology to 
curate an individual perspective of the external world for each individual user. This 
happens through the processing capabilities of algorithmic intelligence that learns 
to know us from the digital traces we leave either through our deliberate actions or 
through the increasingly ubiquitous sensors. The malleability simultaneously enables 
the formation of new collectives, gathered around a social object instead of being 
formed within the traditional boundaries of time and space.
This malleability offers us convenience and security, in exchange for privacy, free-
dom and independence. The appeal of convenience is equally evidenced in the in-
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creasing invisibility of technology, as we no longer distinguish between using it and 
just living our lives. 
However, there are myriad obstacles still on the way to full convergence and the 
ensuing level of malleability of everything. Currently the primary obstacles still arise 
from the technological imperfections, but in the future, the obstacles will be ethical, 
political and social. The humanity will decide – wittingly or not – the scope and 
scale of convergence, and the standards of desirability dictating the value preferences 
guiding the future developments. Only time will tell, if Hayek was wrong in his pre-
diction quoted at the onset of this chapter: will there at some point in the future be 
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“What is life, if not the first-ever carbon-based nanotechnology?”
(Dima Zales: The Last Humans)
In essence, the following chapter outlines the answers to the first subquestion of this 
research: how does digitalization change the constitution of uncertainty? The fol-
lowing discussions takes a deeper look at how each of the dimensions of uncertainty 
identified in this book are influenced by digitalization. The following figure maps out 
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Doxa: Sphere of taken-for-granted, unwitting decision-making
Figure 14: The impact areas of digitalization
To outline concisely, digitalization reduces the relevance of one type of lack of 
knowledge uncertainty, changes the mechanisms by which we choose between di-
verse standards of desirability, and enforces the uncertainty arising from the un-
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fathomability of meaning making mechanisms. Before discussing the answers to the 
main research question, these claims need to be argued for next.
6.1 Impact on the lack of knowledge
In the early days of compact discs (CD), there were music aficionados vehement-
ly against rendering music digital, claiming that the digital music was “dead”, not 
quite capturing the rich nuances included in the analog recordings on LP’s. While I 
still have a few friends of that opinion, most of the world has gleefully accepted the 
tradeoff: by making recordings digital, access to music has soared, and music has be-
come an everyday commodity85. Most people are happy to stream anything they want 
to listen, anywhere they want to listen, anytime they want to listen, even if it means 
that what is listened is a somewhat pale representation of the richer, analog version – 
not to mention the even more nuanced version of a live music concert.
What has happened to the music is happening to everything. We are becoming 
increasingly better at capturing and digitizing any form of signals, be they sound, 
light, movement, material (as gas, fluid or solid). Even our thoughts and dreams as 
brainwaves can be captured and digitized. 
On the one hand this means that everything becomes data. It is by no means 
misleading to call this emerging period in the human history the Information age. 
Capturing the signals through increasingly sophisticated sensor technology is the 
first building block, followed by the developments in the data emission, connectiv-
ity, storage and processing capabilities. We are well on our way of creating digital 
representations of not only our physical world but of all our activities, thoughts and 
dreams – subsequently followed by convergence of an unforeseeable scale and scope. 
In the realm of business, this means that any decisions previously made based on 
data scarcity can now be made based on data abundance. The limits to the data avail-
ability are drawn by the resources and capabilities of the firm to gather and process 
the available Big Data – and subsequent Little Data. Customer data, process data, 
product data, market data – everything can be collected in minutiae detail. While 
the human processing power isn’t enough in handling all that data, the sophisticat-
ed algorithms, the artificial intelligence can sort through immense amounts of data, 
looking for patterns we don’t even know exist. In addition, AI is not subject to any 
85 This has of course also the impact on music as a livelihood: as the costs of copying and dif-
fusion have become minimal, fewer people are willing to compensate the musicians for their 
original input. Enter the ongoing IPR battles, the results of which will emerge in few years.
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of the human decision-making biases or heuristics, instead carrying out logically the 
very task it is asked to perform. 
There are some caveats to this: while abundant data is available to anyone with 
an online access, the processing capability, access or the ability to create sorting al-
gorithms is more difficult to come by. This means that the sheer amount of data be-
comes a problem for some, while providing competitive advantage to others. Within 
the business sphere, the winners are the players who can not only access Big and 
Little Data, but who have the means and acumen to harness the data through having 
a developed enough AI at their disposal, and through being able to ask the AI to find 
out answers to the right questions86. So far, we humans are still needed in figuring out 
the right problems that the narrow AI can help solve through the access to abundant 
data. 
Without the help in processing the data, the amount of data becomes a prob-
lem. This is at its most evident in the sphere of mundane activities: everyone with an 
online access has at his/her fingertips essentially all the knowledge accumulated by 
the humanity. However, equipped with only human intellect, highly variant in qual-
ity and disposition, riddled with bias and heuristics, pestered by fatigue and stress, 
swayed by emotions and colored by judgement, the amount of data befuddles more 
than enlightens the average individual. 
This is evident in the so called filter bubbles and echo chambers: as we as individ-
uals lack the adequate processing capabilities to sort the available information into 
gems and gunk, we do what we have as humans always done. We choose someone to 
believe in, and rely on him of her to sort out the information for us. That someone 
can be our friend, a cult leader or the president we chose to elect because he told us 
what we wanted to hear. 
On the other hand, while we are well on our way to creating a digital represen-
tation of all three worlds of reality, they are still merely just that: digital, binary ren-
ditions of the three world entities (Popper, 1979). This means that the digital realm 
leaves out a lot of what constitutes the whole of our life. Even in terms of the physical 
world one, even in terms of us being able to binarify continuously smaller and small-
er entities, there will always be something in between the zero and the one. To what 
86 The importance of judgement doesn’t go away as illustrated by the recent United Airlines fiasco 
ending in guards dragging a doctor violently from an airplane. This series of events resulted 
from a series of logical decisions made by diverse AI, without the filtering of human judgement, 
see the story here: https://medium.com/intuitionmachine/how-algorithms-and-authoritarian-
ism-created-a-corporate-nightmare-at-united-92d9bbdf1144 or here: http://globalguerrillas.
typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2017/04/algorithmic-dystopia.html
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extent this matters, I don’t know. However, few are the times in human history when 
seeing something as black and white has been purely beneficial. 
In turning to the worlds two and three, we can digitally identify and represent 
the brainwaves evidenced when we feel sad, but there is no representing how that 
world two phenomenon actually feels – so far we humans still do the feeling itself. 
The impact of digitalization seeps into our perceptions, self-awareness and deeper in-
teraction: when we are feeling sad, we communicate that by a crying emoji and hope 
that the recipient understands the exact shade of blue we are feeling, and respons-
es fittingly. In receiving a mere thumbs up emoji, we feel left down. The quickness 
of communication and expression provided by digital simplification trades off the 
depth and nuances of genuine human interaction. 
The impact of digitalization on the world three constructs is interesting. The whole 
digital realm is a human construct, a world three artefact made physical. But in pin-
ning down the human creativity into binary codes, a lot is left out. Anyone who has 
ever written or read a novel understands how much there is in between the lines, how 
much implicit information is conveyed – either to be understood or misunderstood. 
These implicit parts, like our intuitive understanding of the act of picking up a 
hammer, cannot be digitally represented, and as such, they cannot by algorithmic 
intelligence be processed – unless the algorithm is first fed with all the possible impli-
cations any act may in diverse contexts mean. This is a vast feat, which would require 
us being cognizant of all of those potential implications, however in our increasing 
reliance on the binarified information, even we are losing sight of these nuances (as 
is evidenced by the fierce battles fought on internet over diverse misunderstandings 
about the unsaid in-between lines). 
So, lack of knowledge as a source of uncertainty is eradicated if we equate binary 
data with knowledge. The benefits are most prominent when the entity being digitally 
represented can be adequately captured in binary form, and be processed through 
algorithmic intelligence, meaning that the problem to be solved can be written into a 
code (necessary at the outset even when dealing with machine learning, i.e. an algo-
rithm programmed to teach itself). The feats include major achievements in medical 
diagnostics, with AI having been able to diagnose rare illnesses through access to vast 
databases. 
The abundance of data could be a force for equality, as information has tradition-
ally been a source of power. However, the sheer amount of data, without the accom-
panying processing abilities (be they computational, present in algorithmic form, or 
organic, gained through education) is also a source of inequality – both within the 
business sphere or within the sphere of mundane life. The actors with access to the 
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full digital representation of reality, equipped with adequate data processing resourc-
es and abilities wield power beyond the might of the most ambitious emperors in 
the past. However the actors left to sort out the tsunami of data on their own simply 
drown, be they firms, individuals, organizations, coalitions or nations. 
Discussed in more abstract terms, the impact of digitalization on the lack of 
knowledge facet of uncertainty consisting of open and closed sets of options and 
outcomes is the annihilation of uncertainty of the type of closed options and closed 
outcomes. When we are dealing with finite sets, as long as the variables are known, 
no matter how complex and volatile, the algorithmic intelligence will be capable of 
processing the data to deliver answers to the chosen questions. 
For example, if choosing the entry mode in internationalization is indeed about 
calculating the costs and benefits of various green or brown field options based on 
identifiable measures, there is no need to waste the expensive time of the CEO in 
making that decision, as the AI can deliver the right choice in matter of seconds. 
AI can even assist in coming up with the right measures, by sorting through a mass 
of information about the target market, about previous choices made by different 
players, seeking patterns in the levels of performance of other players and comparing 
those with the capabilities of the focal firm. In short, anyone dealing with risk87 will 
become obsolete, as AI is vastly better than human in anything that can be given 
numeric representations.
Digitalization has also an impact on the two middle types of this lack of knowl-
edge uncertainty, open options and closed outcomes, or closed options and open 
outcomes. In the case of creative uncertainty (Packard et al., 2017), in human hands 
realized as diverse pieces of art resulting from the closed outcome definition of “com-
pose a piece of music” and the open set of options enabling the composition of ex-
quisite uniqueness still meeting the demands of the closed set of outcomes, digitali-
zation can mimic the process, however a composing AI is by its algorithmic nature 
bound by the closed set of options initially programmed into it. The end result may 
be pleasing to the ear, however ultimately AI didn’t engage in creative uncertainty, 
but functioned under the limits of closed sets. 
In addition, through the pleasant outcomes created by the AI mimicking the pro-
cess of human creativity the value of human creativity becomes blurred: if an AI can 
put together a piece of music nice enough to listen, why would we need the com-
posers, producing contemporary classical music no-one wants to hear and asking 
us to support their work in doing so? Substituting enough of the human creatives 
87 Risk = closed set of options and outcomes, known distribution of variables, see previous dis-
cussion or Knight, 1921 or Packard et al, 2017. 
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with mimicked AI creativity leads towards a society, where nothing genuinely new 
or creative is no longer valued in itself, as anything a priori found preferential can be 
produced by means of AI.  
The process is the same in the closed options, open outcomes setting: program-
ming AI with a set of preferences allows it to pursue outcomes it by some mechanism 
deems more preferable. What possible outcomes fall out of the scope of the pro-
grammed perception, will remain out. As such, also in this type of uncertainty, AI 
serves to artificially limit the open set into a closed set. And what the AI doesn’t take 
into account, fewer and fewer humans will either.
Full uncertainty, meaning open sets of options and outcomes, will remain un-
touched, however digitalization impacts the scope of options and outcomes perceived 
open or closed. Only recently we thought that our sexual preferences were private, 
something known only to us and those we chose to reveal them to. However with the 
advances in facial recognition AI, coupled with large enough databases has allowed 
researchers to create AI that can with astonishing accuracy tell the sexual orientation 
of an individual through only looking at the image of that individual (Coldewey, 
2017). This example serves as illustration of the changing boundary between what we 
consider unknowable, the shifting line between the open and closed sets. 
To summarize the impact of digitalization on the lack of knowledge dimension 
of uncertainty, the outcomes are threefold. First of all, with adequate resources the 
closed-closed type of lack of knowledge is obliterated: with advanced enough datafi-
cation, convergence and processing power, any sets of knowledge consisting of closed 
set of options and closed set of outcomes will be available. 
Secondly, the boundary between open and closed sets of options and outcomes 
shifts and blurs: what has been considered beyond datafying becomes data, closing 
previously open sets, and on the other hand, the open sets can be masked as closed 
due to the expansion of the closed sets. 
Thirdly, the closedness and openness of sets of options and outcomes are tightly 
dependent on the level of resources at hand: while knowledge and information have 
never been equally distributed within societies, the superhuman powers of massive 
data harvesting and processing systems will increase this inequality to unpredictable 
levels. 
6.2 Impact on the standards of desirability
So, in order to reap the benefits of ubiquitous data, we need to know what we want 
to find out. Additionally we need to know how those answers relate to the ends we’re 
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pursuing, which means that we need to have those ends. Underpinning those ends 
is a standard of desirability, delineating why one potential end would be better than 
another. 
In the economic sphere, the contributions to the economic growth have tradition-
ally provided the standard of desirability and the end. On the level of an individual 
and a firm, it may well be about the money itself, however the engine of economic 
growth is grounded on a more fundamental notion than mere money as credit or 
commodity. Economic growth represents faith in the future. 
The fundamental paradigm shift of renaissance was to refocus the target of hu-
man activity from the life beyond death to life before death (Ahonen, 2001, Freeman, 
2002, Fremantle, 1992, Harari, 2014). While there has always been kings, pharaohs 
and emperors focusing on accumulating wealth and power beyond what a mere mor-
tal can in his lifetime consume, most of the humanity was more or less satisfied in 
toiling for the everyday sustenance and shelter, in the promise of being rewarded for 
a life well lived in the life after. Sure, there were the few entrepreneurial spirits who, 
if born in right circumstances, could improve their lot in this life, but they were the 
exceptions, not the norm. 
When the rewards of the daily life were conceived to be realized in the afterlife, 
there was little incentive to embark on tasking initiatives promising years of hard-
ship with potential benefits emerging only years later – it was easier to focus on the 
immediate task of feeding one and kin. However, accompanied by the diffusion of 
money, as both a means to ease exchange, and as an enabler of credit (Ali, 2014), this 
perception began to change. My neighbor might not promise to feed my family (as 
he doesn’t know how much they eat and how should he therefore define the compen-
sation he wants from me) while I toiled to invent a better plough, but he might well 
lend me money to do that if he believed in my abilities, in return for receiving back 
that money with a surplus after I managed to increase my productivity through the 
adoption of that new plough.  
Put simply, this is the idea of economic growth. We collectively believe that if we 
put effort into improving our lives before death, we come up with things that increase 
our productivity. We borrow from our future selves to finance these activities of im-
proving our productivity because we believe in our ability to do so: we believe in the 
manifold returning of these investments. The few past centuries have indeed proven 
this faith in human innovativeness right so far. In other words, stopping the turning 
of the wheel of economic growth would signal loss of faith in the future: it would be 
tantamount to saying that we humans have now reached the end of our abilities, with 
nothing left to improve.
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However, as by now is evident, the churning of this wheel has yielded not only 
major improvements in the average existence of human life, but dire negative exter-
nalities, most notably the ones threatening the whole livability of our planet. One of 
the problems contributing to these problems is the decoupling of money from the 
underpinning real life phenomena it was created to represent. The monetary econo-
my and the real economy have become exceedingly detached, which means that the 
pursuit of money no longer reflects the developments in the real economy (amply 
illustrated in the financial crisis of the 2008-2010). Therefore using money as the 
standard of desirability, without understanding the connections that pursuit of mon-
ey has to the unfolding of events in the real life, is dangerous. 
I don’t know how money or monetary system could be transformed to assist in 
pursuing ends positioned on the standard of desirability of sustainability. However, 
the emergence of social enterprises88 (Lee and Jones, 2015, Mair and Marti, 2006, 
Zahra et al., 2009) shows that it is possible to engage in economic activity without 
aligning the undertakings on mere monetary scale. Equally, supported by digitaliza-
tion in the form of diverse platforms and general connectivity, sharing economy89 is 
a rising trend. These signals, while still drops in the ocean of corporations, however 
highlight the fact that through digitalization, economic activity can be more firmly 
rooted in the real life events and activities, than in the monetary economics, spinning 
in a reality of its own.
To summarize, the impact of digitalization on the standards of desirability may 
be experienced in the positive development of aligning the economic activities better 
with the underlying real life phenomena, than can currently be done by using the 
monetary scale as the standard of desirability. However, this has a caveat: the bril-
liance of money was in decoupling the discussion of valuing from the representation 
of that value. The sellers of oranges no longer needed to engage in lengthy debates 
about the respective value of oranges against apples: a fixed price speeded up the 
exchange. 
88 While the concept of social entrepreneurship or social enterprises are plural and somewhat 
fuzzy, essentially they refer to such economic activities that are primarily motivated by the 
need to “catalyze social change and/or address social needs” (Mair and Marti, 2004, p.3), ei-
ther through channeling the profits (of not necessary social business) to that end or through 
grounding the economic actions in pursuing those aims.
89 Sharing economy refers to the emerging phenomenon, where collectives of individuals engage 
in barter of skills and goods, mainly through a digital platform (Hamari, Sjöklint and Uk-
konen, 2016). An example could be a part of a town, with its own Facebook group, exchanging 
haircuts for moving the lawn, baby sitting to web design, or the like, without money being 
used.
 HOW D OeS DIgITAlIZ ATION IMPACT UNCeRTAINT Y? 181
So, in weakening the power of money as the standard of desirability, we will again 
need to find other ways of measuring the value of diverse needs and offerings. How-
ever, the connectivity and flexibility created by digitalization means that an entity 
doesn’t need to have one single value for all possible stakeholders, but that value can 
be tailor-made in each interaction. In the scholarly realm, this notion is captured in 
the increasing adoption of service-dominant logic (Vargo and Lusch, 2004, 2009). 
Mainly focused on the value negotiations between customers and producers, the 
overarching notion however applies also to the realm of the mundane. If I don’t need 
or want a swing in my backyard, it has no value to me. However if I had kids who had 
been pestering me for a swing, I would gladly value highly the swing in exchange for 
making my kids happy.
Digitalization creates connectivity and platforms on which we can engage in val-
ue negotiations, both in our everyday life, and within business. As such it can serve 
to increase the awareness of diverse standards of desirables – or it can ossify our 
taken-for-granted standards by amplifying the voices of the likeminded. The latter 
phenomenon, the filter bubbles and echo chambers already mentioned, are in them-
selves not new. All human collectives have ended up in creating formal and informal 
institutions that serve to enable and restrict collective action, in addition to drawing 
the boundaries of us and them (Opotow, 1990). 
What is new in these digitally created institution forming collectives is the fact 
that they do not follow the traditional boundaries of geography, socio-economic 
group, age or ethnicity, to name a few. Instead, they form around specific social ob-
jects that give the collective a reason to talk to each other, instead of to someone else. 
The previously mentioned the Facebook group called “I’ll park on the bicycle lane”, 
is a harmless example, however the social object of Donald Trump may prove out to 
be something else. 
In addition to providing alternative measures of value in situations of exchange, 
the impact of digitalization on the uncertainty emerging from the diversity of stan-
dards of desirability is the fragmentation and multiplication of institutional forces 
that need taking into account. Few actions of the individuals can be predicted by 
their national culture, but by knowing their participation in the bicycle activist group, 
they become far more predictable. In short, digitalization breeds a plethora of in-
formal institutions, which shape the standards of desirability guiding the individual 
level actions aggregating onto collective level outcomes. 
Our current understandings of institutions are simply not fine-grained enough 
to account for the new digital reality that shapes the individual level judgements. 
Therefore the uncertainty emerging from the difficulty of choosing between stan-
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dards of desirability – either in business or mundane life – increases in the advance 
of digitalization.
To summarize the impact of digitalization on the uncertainty dimension of choos-
ing between diverse standards of desirability, there are three main outcomes. Firstly, 
in the economic sphere the digitalization provides means for direct value negoti-
ations between small entities (even individuals), without the need for relying only 
on intermediate institutions, or the mechanism of price. This means increase in the 
barter type negotiations of standards of desirability where the mechanism of price is 
disconnected from the value-in-use of the object of negotiations. 
Secondly, digitalization creates a plethora of new types of collectives that develop 
(normative) institutions. These microinstitutions subsequently shape the standards 
of desirability within those collectives, further influencing the shape of the standards 
of desirability of the individuals constituting those collectives, with ripple effects to 
the other collectives those individuals are a part of. This means that the diversity of 
standards multiply and their sources become more difficult to trace, making it dif-
ficult to predict the behavior of individuals based on the understanding of the old 
institutional mechanisms. 
Thirdly, counteracting the fragmenting impact of the multiplying microinstitu-
tions, the Little Data based tracking of individual behavior enables unprecedented 
level of predictive accuracy on the level of the individual. So, while the behavior of 
an individual cannot be anticipated through his/her institutional biography, the be-
havior of an individual as a Meadian “me” can be extrapolated from his/her previous 
actions. This enables artificial manipulation of the standards of desirability: by per-
sonalizing the worldview presented by the internet, the standards of desirability can 
be nudged. 
6.3 Impact on the meaning making mechanisms
By rendering both routines and institutions into strawmen, both can be conceived 
as constraints and enablers of specific kind of action – bracketing the doxic behavior 
from the reflective behavior. As ample evidence from the behavioral sciences shows, 
most of our activities are undertaken in this realm of the “fast brain” (Kahneman, 
2011). We are exceptionally good at saving cognitive energy – and as Alfread White-
head noted90: “It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by 
eminent people when they are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of 
90 As quoted in Hayek, 1945, p. 528.
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thinking about what we are doing. The precise opposite is the case. Civilization advanc-
es by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without 
thinking about them.” Ultimately this means that the more we can rely on the tak-
en-for-granted, the more energy we have for thinking and doing something beyond 
the obvious – advancing ourselves or the society.
The area where this, in itself valence-less tendency is most hazardous is the area 
of values, morality and ethics, especially considering the self-image upholding biases 
responsible for our beliefs of ourselves as more moral than our actions would suggest 
(Drumwright, Prentice and Biasucci, 2015). Questions of right and wrong are notori-
ously difficult, especially considering that the answers are mainly just written in dif-
ferent shades of grey (Cairns and As-Saber, 2017). As a solution, we leave the moral 
discussions to the philosophers in their ivory towers, and get on with our lives and 
mundane worries, guided by our institutional biographies and idiosyncratic personal 
features, preferences and tastes. We willingly embrace the uncertainty inherent in the 
construction of the meaning making mechanisms shaping our lives. 
Before digitalization the need for each individual to engage in deep philosophical 
ponderings of the credibility and righteousness of these meaning making mecha-
nisms was indeed scant: the institutions of the society, responsible for the churning 
of the wheel, did indeed emerge, stabilize, change and disappear without the input of 
any singular individual. However, digitalization changes this through three different 
mechanisms.
The first mechanism was already scratched in the previous chapters: through dig-
italization and connectivity, we have access to more information, however lacking 
the means to process it meaningfully, we cluster around certain social objects that 
profess sorting it out for us, either in full or in regards to a specific area of life. These 
collectives create their own institutions, standards of desirability and underpinning 
meaning structures. This results in a plethora of diverse institutions each individual 
adopts as part of their institutional biography constituting the contact lenses through 
which that individual views and interprets the world. We are recreating the founda-
tions based on which we deem some as “us” and some as “them” (Opotow, 1990).
The second mechanism underpins the first. Since the shift in the target of hu-
man activity from the afterlife to our lived life, the grand narratives based on the 
faith on some omniscient entity owning the ultimate truth about right and wrong, 
have gradually eroded. What happened to God is happening now to Market (albeit 
in both cases, it takes the deceased a while to acknowledge the fact). Digitalization, 
as a representative of man’s power over nature, further contributes to the unveiling of 
such secrets previously considered as proof of the existence of something beyond our 
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physical reality. When a machine can read minds (Hutson, 2017), who needs god? In 
short, humanity is no longer guided by any metanarrative, only by myriad individual 
narratives, nurtured in smaller and smaller collectives. 
However, it is the third mechanism that has the most notable impact. Like before 
discussed, even the most sophisticated artificial intelligence isn’t capable of creating 
anything new (yes, it can process the extant material in ways that result in unfore-
seen constellations, but it cannot introduce new elements into the melee – or detect 
the underlying value mechanisms that for example make something art or not (Frey 
and Osborne, 2017)). This means that an artificial intelligence has no inherent goals, 
ethical guidelines or preferences. All of those need feeding into it by humans (Wein-
berger, 2018b), a theme well discussed in the research stream of ethics of artificial 
intelligence (Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2014, Yampolskiy, 2013). This is also a rich 
source of dystopian fantasies resulting in the doom of humanity by for example an 
AI programmed to write the most beautiful signature possible ending up causing 
the destruction of the humanity in its desire to increase the resources for doing so 
(Urban, 2015).
These discussions are, and rightly should be, a focal theme in the artificial intelli-
gence research. However the implications do not end with the initial programmers. 
Machine learning is defined as an algorithm programmed to source relevant data 
and to continue developing its own algorithms through pattern identification in that 
data. When these kinds of algorithms are given access to internet, the data they use 
to develop themselves further is ultimately everything we have ever written online. 
Additionally, what is known about us online is not limited to our deliberate actions91, 
but to the diverse sensors identifying our offline activities and emitting that data to 
further contribute to the full digital convergence (Newell and Marabelli, 2015). 
What this means for the individual is that whatever we do, deem right or wrong 
will be the material that an AI uses in developing itself. Unlike humans, AI doesn’t 
(yet?) possess the abilities to distinguish the diverse nuances of our utterances, jokes, 
sarcasm, cynicism, dramatization, but takes everything at face value. Facial recogni-
tion AI can detect that we are sad, but cannot know how that feels, or deduce why 
we are feeling it, is it good sadness of nostalgia or bad sadness of loss. It can identify 
us smiling, but doesn’t know if that is because we are being mischievous, happy for 
getting a puppy or maybe successful in plotting a heist. 
91 Currently Netflix is working on two-way transmission and facial recognition AI that would 
enable it to monitor our emotions while we are watching a streamed movie. This was heard 
in a key note speech by Thimon De Jong, however was not sourced, so I cannot vouch for the 
reliability of this piece of information. 
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Lacking the understanding of these nuances and the accompanying ethical va-
lences means that whatever the machine learning AI learns is a direct outcome of our 
identifiable actions, deliberately posted online, traceable through our use of our de-
vices or gleaned through the increasingly ubiquitous sensors. This means that the less 
we consider the ethical nuances of our actions, the less ethical (defined in any which 
way) artificial intelligence we end up with. When we then, in business or in mundane 
life, give this AI a task, it will do it very efficiently according to the guidelines it has 
learned from us. And remembering the brief discussion about behavioral ethics, we 
are aware of only a minor portion of ethical issues (those in our immediate vicinity 
(T. M. Jones, 1991)), but have knee-jerk judgements (Haidt, 2001), and primarily 
reflect only issues regarding the “us” (Opotow, 1990), and even those mainly through 
their immediate impacts on ourselves, not through principles (Rest et al., 1999).
To summarize the impact of digitalization on the uncertainty dimension of the 
meaning making mechanisms, a main outcome emerges. First of all, while we may 
explicitly ponder between choosing diverse goals, we relatively seldom reflect on why 
those goals have meaning, value; instead the meaning making mechanisms mainly 
reside in the realm of doxa, and as such are primarily based on our assumptions, on 
what we take for granted. This means that our doxa is invisible to us, yet visible in our 
resulting actions (the choices of goals and the means we pursue them), and as such, 
detectable by the pattern recognition algorithms. Also, the more the technology be-
comes invisible, taken for granted in shaping our lives, the more traces we leave, and 
the more accurate the patterns of our standards of desirability and goals become for 
an algorithm.
If all of our activities result from such meaning making mechanisms with which 
we can fully as individuals and collectives agree when subjected to reflective analysis, 
this is not a problem: with algorithmic aid we can reach our outspoken goals more 
efficiently. However, as we human beings tend to be conflicted in underpinning our 
actions with an invisible doxa, it may well be that our pursuits based on reflective 
thinking would be quite different than the pursuits based on doxic behavior. The 
imperfection of human processes may be a blessing in these cases: if we realize in 
midstream the undesirability of our initial target, the slow human processes can be 
halted, slowed down, and the direction can be changed. Not so with the algorithms, 
which take all our actions at face value even when we act in ways we would not prefer 
were we to just stop and reflect on our choices. 
The impact of digitalization on our meaning making mechanism is that our implic-
it, unreflected, vague assumptions ossify into explicit guidelines. So far, we humans 
have primarily been progressing by fumbling forwards, rationalizing afterwards, and 
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incrementally changing our trajectories whenever the fumbling has become stum-
bling. Now (or soon enough) we wield technology that can take us anywhere we 
ask, however the fundamental questions of where we want to go and why are still as 
fuzzy as ever. The uncertainty inherent in our meaning making mechanisms will not 
vanish through digitalization, but becomes a critical reflection point – in dire need 
of discussing before we end up wherever we unwittingly assume wanting to go. This 
third type of uncertainty can be reduced only by us humans. Otherwise we may well 
end up getting what we wish for. 
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7 MY THREE THESES
DIGITALIZATION UNCERTAINTY STRATEGIZING
IMPLICATIONS?
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE MEDIATOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE
p.177
 “Territorial sovereignty is not historically privileged. There have been 
other bases for the organization of political and economic authority in 
the past. There may well be in the future.”
(Stephen Kobrin: Back to the Future)
In the following subchapters I will outline the three main theses of this dissertation, 
and discuss both their theoretical and practical implications. However, before diving 
in to the discussions, a caveat for the scholarly reader is in order.
It is customary that a research concludes with the theoretical contributions and 
managerial implications – and thus will also this book be finished, but only in the 
ultimate chapter. In this penultimate chapter, the concept of implications should 
be taken more verbatim, without the scholarly connotations: the implications here 
should be understood more as reverberations, echoes, ripple effects. Writing in met-
aphor, the following discussions can be perceived to follow the shape of casting a 
stone into water, stones being the theses, and the ripple effects the implications. The 
stones consist of the ossified representations of the insights and discussions in the 
preceding chapters, and the ripple effect implications are both the realized and po-
tential outcomes and experiences ensuing from the currently perceivable trajectories 
of the stones.
Put simply, the discussions in this chapter provide some answers to the research 
questions of this dissertation. The validity and worth of these answers will be dis-
cussed in the final chapter.
7.1 Thesis 1: Digitalization obliterates one type of uncertainty, 
the risk
The first thesis of this dissertation is that the digitalization obliterates a speficic kind 
of uncertainty: the one typically defined as risk (Knight, 1921), meaning the quanti-
fiable uncertainty under circumstances where both options and outcomes consist of 
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closed sets (Packard et al., 2017). This weak uncertainty (Dequech, 2011) can be both 
substantive and procedural (Dosi and Egidi, 1991), also experienced as Ellsbergian 
ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961).
This type of uncertainty refers to the lack of knowledge of such entities that do 
exist and as such could be quantified, yet because of the complexity or volatility of 
that knowledge, or the inability to access and process that knowledge, circumstancial 
uncertainty, risk or Ellsbergian ambiguity exists. This is the type of uncertainty most 
impacted by digitalization. 
First of all, the acts of datafying and digitizing widen the scope of quantifiable 
knowledge. The advances in the data storage and transfer capabilities enable a wide 
diffusion of that knowledge. Together these drivers reduce the substantive uncer-
tainty, ie. the lack of extant knowledge. Furthermore, the developments in the algo-
rithmic processing capabilities, the artificial intelligence, facilitates processing even 
highly voluminous, variant and volatile (ie. data that accumulates and changes with 
high velocity), reducing the procedural uncertainty.
The disappearance of this one type of uncertainty is however strongly dependent 
on the availability of resources to source, harness and process the theoretically exist-
ing knowledge. As long as the sensor technology is imperfect (in the sense of it not 
being possible to datafy and digitize all entities from the all three realms of reality), 
as long as the data storage and transfer technologies are insufficient (in the sense of 
it being possible to store indefinitely all digital data, and it being possible to transfer 
that data seamlessly between diverse storages), and as long as the technologies are not 
fully converged (in the sense of it truly being possible to process any type of digital 
data with any type of digital technology), this type of uncertainty as risk and Ellsber-
gian ambiguity exists. 
However, even now this type of uncertainty can, within certain boundaries, be re-
duced to irrelevancy. In well-defined problem settings, where there can be a reason-
able amount of certainty of the closedness of both the sets of options and outcomes, 
this type of uncertainty doesn’t need consideration, as its impact is negligible. The 
examples of such settings emerge from the success stories of algorithmic prowess in 
games like chess or go, and in the successful automatization and autonomization of 
certain operational processes, evidenced in Smart Factories or to an extent in auton-
omous transportation advances. 
To summarize, currently digitalization can obliterate this type of uncertainty in 
clearly defined settings. However, the trajectory of contemporary technological ad-
vances points towards a future, where these diverse pockets void of this type of un-
certainty may become fused together, gradually growing to encompass most if not all 
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elements of the physical, world one entities, and enough of the world two and three 
entities to obliterate this type of uncertainty.
7.1.1 Practical implications of thesis one
The increasing irrelevance of this one type of uncertainty, risk, has notable implica-
tions for the types of capabilities and rationalities required in the organizations. The 
roles of explorative, exploitative and ambidextrous capabilities require reassessing, as 
do the underpinning choices of problem-solving logic.  
To outline concisely, exploitation drives efficiency, incremental improvements 
and profitable utilization of the existing assets and capabilities, in short, ensures the 
current profitability of the firm. The problems within the realm of exploitation are 
somewhat defined, requiring process improvements and incremental developments 
of efficiency: most of the uncertainty dealt with in this dimension consists of closed 
sets of both options and outcomes. This means that they are dealt with causal ratio-
nality, the human version of the algorithmic processing. However, with the acceler-
ating developments in the computerized algorithmic decision-making, many of the 
problems heretofore focused on in the pursuit of exploitative excellence can be solved 
by artificial intelligence – provided that the required resources and capabilities exist. 
Exploration in turn has an impact on the survival of the firm in the long run, 
under changed circumstances. It consists of innovation, entrepreneurial skills (as 
discussed already by Penrose in 1959 or later by Sarasvathy in 2001), of planting sev-
eral seeds without knowing which will bear fruit. Therefore, exploratory excellence 
hinges on human creativity, the ability of the human to introduce new elements, by 
envisioning completely novel entities, uncovering previously unidentified entities or 
by transforming extant entities into novelties beyond the sums of their components. 
This is an area where the algorithmic decision-making cannot assist, because the re-
quired rationality is of a completely different nature than the causal, computational 
rationality. 
Digitalization impacts the way that firms need to deal with this paradox tension 
of exploitation and exploration. In creating the digital enablers, the technological sys-
tems, firms need exploitative engineering excellence, whereas in figuring out how to 
monetize those enablers, explorative entrepreneurial excellence is required. In addi-
tion, the firm level benefits of digitalization are realized through the exploitative ben-
efits gained from increasing efficiency, and the explorative benefits reached through 
coming up with new offerings and business models. 
The impact of digitalization on this paradox is the shift of balance between ex-
ploitative and explorative capabilities. Like already March noted, firms typically em-
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phasize the exploitative excellence – necessary even in highly digitalized settings. The 
execution of digital transformation within for example a multinational enterprise is 
by no means a simple feat, consisting of the dimensions of developing (or sourcing) 
and implementing the technological systems, tackling legacy issues, teaching and 
encouraging the personnel in adopting the digital technology and in changing the 
processes and routines accordingly. 
However, due to the complexities involved on the exploitative side, it is easy to 
focus on the problems of creating the digital enablers and lose the sight of what they 
enable – or to not even pay attention to envisioning the possibilities. The stories of 
Nokia (Bouwman et al., 2014) and Kodak (Lucas and Goh, 2009) are often used as 
warning examples of how even the mightiest may fall if they fail to see the new busi-
ness models emerging from the technological changes. Essentially the stories pivot 
on how the excellence in the exploitative capabilities blinded the organization from 
such needs best addressed with explorative approaches. And as the stories show, 
merely excelling in exploitation is not enough – nor is it enough to try to maintain a 
balance between the two types of capabilities with increasing digitalization: the em-
phasis needs to shift to primarily supporting the explorative capabilities. 
Ultimately what is needed is a change in the mainstream rationality in organi-
zations. Causal, managerial rationality excels in delivering exploitative targets, but 
effectual, entrepreneurial or creative rationality is required in figuring out those tar-
gets – and more importantly, in figuring out why those targets should be pursued in 
the first place. 
It is not enough to allocate entrepreneurial rationality into a specific function, like 
R&D or IT, but the role of top management needs reconfiguring. Digitalization im-
pacts the scope of top management decision making as many of the current top man-
agement decisions based on analyzing the costs and benefits of diverse trajectories 
can be made based on big data, processed through algorithms (naturally provided 
that the digital systems are implemented): in short, the activities grounded on dealing 
with the specific type of lack of knowledge uncertainty. This means that the focus of 
top management should be on the explorative side, on exploring the new opportu-
nities created by digital technology. To sum, the uncertainty with which the mana-
gerial regime should be preoccupied with, should shift from computational analyses 
of the closed sets of options and outcomes to dealing with the open sets of lack of 
knowledge – and more importantly towards assessing the goals and the mechanisms 
that make them valuable, worth pursuing, addressing the two other dimensions of 
uncertainty.
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To summarize, digitalization contributes to both the exploitative ends of efficiency 
seek and the explorative ends of new business models and offerings – and the requi-
site rationalities in reaching either end are different. A big challenge of organizational 
ambidextrousness is in identifying which of the dimensions of digitalization require 
processing with causal rationality, and which ones need to be tackled with effectual 
rationality – and nurturing both types of rationalities throughout the organization. 
However, the even bigger challenge goes beyond ambidexterity: the role of the 
top management should move away from dealing with such types of uncertainty that 
the algorithms render irrelevant, and towards dealing with such types of uncertainty 
only humans can reduce. In short, the top management must excel in exploration, 
underpinned by such creative and ethical rationalities that enable reducing the types 
of uncertainty increasingly relevant in the digitalizing world.
7.1.2 Theoretical implications of thesis one
In this dissertation, uncertainty has been used as an umbrella concept that captures 
six different issues: the first four types are subtypes to the dimension here named lack 
of knowledge, consisting of closed and open sets of options and outcomes, and the 
two remaining types refer to the difficulties in choosing the standards of desirability 
along which a goal could be positioned, and to the difficulties in trying to understand 
how those standards emerge in the first place, the meaning making mechanisms un-
derpinning them. Of these six types, one is rendered relatively irrelevant due to the 
advances in datafying, digitizing, connecting and algorithmic processing.
As has become painstakingly obvious, these themes captured here under the con-
cept of uncertainty are in the literature discussed through several concepts (risk, am-
biguity, Knightian uncertainty, equivocality, complexity, isotropy, volatility, unpre-
dictability to name but few) and perspectives. While this conceptual unclarity cannot 
by a mere dissertation be clarified, the implications of the potential disappearance of 
the type of uncertainty most often referred to as risk merit further exploring.
Risk in this context refers to such uncertainty that results from the lack of knowl-
edge of all the knowable options and outcomes in a specific setting (as such it can 
also be named as Ellsbergian ambiguity, meaning that the knowledge exists but isn’t 
known to the decision-maker), in short the closed sets of options and outcomes ren-
dered unknown through the complexity and volatility of that information. Its disap-
pearance is a theoretical possibility, grounded on datafication of everything (and the 
subsequent data processing capabilities), however defining the boundaries of those 
closed sets would need further theoretical exploring.
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What are the contexts in which the sets of options and outcomes can ultimately 
be defined as closed, without any vagueness about the potential of opening either set? 
For example, if we believe in the equilibrium seeking tendencies of the market, does 
that mean that the market is a closed system, and as such, could theoretically be a 
system within which this type of uncertainty, risk could theoretically be eliminated? 
Defining in more detail the circumstances in which the decision-maker is dealing 
with closed sets of options and outcomes would enable theorizing in more depth 
about such types of uncertainty not rendered irrelevant through digitalization. 
It should be noted that when algorithmic processing is utilized in delivering little 
data oriented predictions of the behavior of an individual (as based on the extrapo-
lations of the past behavior of the individual and the analytical comparisons against 
the accumulated big data based insights), the predictions are ultimately made based 
on the behavior of the Meadian me. This means that any set of options and outcomes 
anticipating the human behavior are by definition open, because of the surprising 
potential of the behavior of the Meadian I. 
So, while the datafying, digitizing and data processing capabilities reduce the rel-
evance of a specific type of uncertainty, the boundary conditions within which this 
may happen warrant specific focus. The literature within the uncertainty umbrella 
would benefit from perusing through these lenses, focused on explicating when it is 
genuinely possible to rely on the closedness of both sets. Identifying the boundary 
conditions and eliminating the type of uncertainty that may become irrelevant from 
the analyses of uncertainty, would enable deeper theorizing about such dimensions 
of uncertainty that are here to stay.
7.2 Thesis 2: Digitalization erodes the boundaries of old entities 
and creates new entities
The second thesis of this dissertation is that the digitalization erodes the boundaries 
of previously envisioned entities, while simultaneously creating mechanisms that en-
able forming new entities. These entities may be goals, standards, collectives (such as 
groups, firms or nations), variables or even the definition of what constitutes reality. 
As mentioned several times, the focal aspects of digitalization are the datafying 
of everything, the act of digitizing that data, rendering it uniform, and the connect-
edness of that digital data. Additionally, the mechanisms of datafying enable also 
feedback: we are not merely creating a digital representation of the three Popperi-
an realities, but also creating mechanisms through which the digital representation 
shapes the other ontological realities. As a result, based on the malleability of the dig-
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ital representation, the malleability of the entities of the other realities increases. This 
happens, because in a non-data form, the entities are of diverse ontological qualities, 
which means that processing them, changing them requires diverse technologies to 
do that, whereas when the main processing is done on the entities in data form, the 
changes on the other realities are easier to execute – through the connection points 
between the digital representation and the entity in another reality.
This requires two examples. First of all, consider a lump of metal that needs to be 
fashioned into a part of a vessel. Before digitalization the requirements for realizing 
that transformation were first to have a set of suitable tools that enable bending and 
molding of that lump of metal, secondly to have the acumen to beforehand envision 
the exact shape that lump of metal should be changed to, and thirdly the skills to 
mold the metal accordingly – and all of these requirements were necessary for each 
individual piece of metal. If the tools malfunctioned, the envisioning was flawed, or 
the skills lacking, nothing more than beginning anew was possible.
With digitalization one still needs the tools to actually bend the metal. However, 
the envisioning can be done and redone in the realm of digital representations, so 
that any potential flaws can be speedily corrected before any metal is wasted. Ad-
ditionally, also the skills needed in the molding of the metal can be practiced in the 
digital realm – or automatized, again based on the existence of the lump of metal in 
the digital realm. As a result, the malleability of the lump of metal is increased and 
the processing speeded up. 
Another example pertains to opinions. Before digitalization, if you wanted to 
change the opinion of a group of people, first you needed to gather those people 
together, requiring effort and pre-existing power – a bit later an access to television. 
Then you needed to deliver your message in a persuading way, with exquisite ora-
torical prowess in order to trigger a desired reaction in the cognitive processes of an 
individual. If you wanted your message to truly stick, you would afterwards dispatch 
a set of messengers (or buy more television time) with a task to continue repeating 
your message to the targeted individuals. 
Digitalization, and especially the emergence of social media has created a digital 
representation of social presence of multitudes. No longer are oratorical skills neces-
sary, as in the digital reality, you can convey your message in a personalized way to 
each targeted individual, based on the digital representation of their preferences and 
idiosyncratic features captured through their interactions with digital technology or 
sourced through sensors. The actual changes in the opinions still hinge on the cogni-
tive processes of the individual (just like when giving a speech on the podium), how-
ever through the ease of reaching the individuals, the potential of infinite number of 
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repetitions of the message, and the ease of personalizing the message simultaneously 
to the individuals of the mass, the malleability of the opinions increases.
This increase in the malleability92 of the entities in the three Popperian realities 
influences the entity boundaries previously formed based on the limitations of space, 
time, power – or based on the ontologically distinct nature of those original entities. 
Of these boundary creating elements, only power remains relevant – and exceedingly 
so. The impact of physical space decreases, as everything resides in the spatially un-
limited digital reality. The changes in time are evident in the exceeding speed with 
which the previously disconnected entities become connected, and in the continuous 
activity of the digital reality – whatever is there exists whenever it is accessed. In ad-
dition, when the physical, subjective and intersubjective entities are given a dataform 
representation through digital indexing, the indexed entities become ontologically 
convergent, even when the entities being indexed remain distinct.
To summarize, datafying and digitizing the entities from the three ontological 
realms of Popper makes the digital representations of those entities uniform. The 
dataform entities are malleable, and through the feedback channels from the digital 
reality to the other realities, also the entities in other realities increase in malleability. 
This erodes the boundaries based on space, time, power or ontological qualities. Sub-
sequently, the boundaries of the entities can be formed based on novel mechanisms 
– and the old mechanism of power, coalesced and wielded through new mechanisms. 
7.2.1 Practical implications of thesis two
The practical implications of the second thesis are best explained through examples. 
One notable boundary being in the process of blurring, is the boundary between 
physical and virtual reality, in itself responsible for the increasing malleability of 
physical reality. Research on social media shows that the digital persona inhabiting 
the social media sphere is no less “real” than the persona inhabiting the physical real-
ity (Mäntymäki and Islam, 2016); the Internet-of-Things based industrial operations 
cannot be divided into separate digital and physical components, as the entity of an 
IoT is different than the sum of its components (Hermann et al., 2016); money is but 
an amalgam of trust (entities of Popperian worlds two and three) and binary digits, 
residing in the digital realm. 
92 With advances in the augmented reality (Azuma, 2017), the malleability increases further: the 
idea of augmented reality is that the entities augmenting the experienced reality are not mere 
digital representations of physically extant entities, but originate in the digital realm, being 
projected into the physical realm in ways that enable our senses to experience them as real. 
While the current applications are still in their early form, the future possibilities seem quite 
remarkable in their potential effects on what we perceive real (Ewalt, 2016). 
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This blurring is interestingly exemplified in the increasing servitization, ie. shift-
ing the focus from selling objects to selling what the objects do (Akaka, Vargo and 
Lusch, 2013). This has resulted from the possibility of datafying the services of a spe-
cific physical entity, and the subsequent possibility of utilizing that data as grounds 
for the business models. The product and the service it offers have entwined into 
data, which means that the offerings exist as hybrids. 
Another interesting boundary being eroded is that of a nation – and all it has tra-
ditionally encompassed. A nation is a geography-bound entity, based on the notion 
that the power of sovereignty can be tied into physical location (Kobrin, 1998, 2009). 
The Popperian world three entity of national identity is a construct, enforcing this 
geography based sovereignty and the accompanying power over the inhabitants of 
that specific area. National identity in turn is supported by constructs such as cul-
ture, ethnicity (and in some cases also religion), which emerge from the human need 
to create shared understandings within a collectivity, to have a notion of “us” and 
“them” (Opotow, 1990). When physical distances mattered (more), the collectives 
formed based on the geographical boundaries, thus giving birth to the institutions 
(of e.g. culture) supporting the national identity and subsequently the notion of sov-
ereignty and accompanying power. 
With digitalization, the physical location of an individual and the self-identifica-
tion with a collective become decoupled. An individual does no longer need to reside 
in same space and time with such other individuals, with whom he/she identifies 
as belonging in a same collective. Instead, the collectives are formed around social 
objects, residing and accessed in the digital realm. While culture, as a Scheinian pyra-
mid of representive artefacts, explicitly espoused values, and underlying shared basic 
assumptions (Schein, 1985), is by no means of diminishing importance as a social, 
collective level phenomenon, the cultures need no longer be coupled with geography 
– the nationality. This means that the cultural habits, values and assumptions of two 
neighbors may be completely different, based on the collectives they connect and 
identify with in the digital reality93. In short, the boundaries between moral inclusion 
and moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990) shift.
This means that as the microfoundational pillars of the sovereignty of a nation, the 
nationality with its supportive normative institutions (like the notion of national cul-
ture), is eroded, it may well be that in the future, the political power grounded on the 
93 To additionally complicate the issue, the social forces impacting an individual rarely result 
from the interactions within a single collective, but instead emerge as an amalgam of the in-
stitutional biography (Vaara and Whittington, 2012) of the individual, being shaped simul-
taneously by both online collectives and offline collectives, such as the neighborhood or the 
physical work place. 
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notion of geography-bound national sovereignty vanishes. This in turn means that 
the power is relocated, grounded on new mechanisms, potentially underpinned by 
the data access, ownership and processing capabilities. To exemplify through spec-
ulation, envision a world where the global geopolitical forces were China, Facebook 
and Alphabet: if data (access to it, ownership of it and its processing capabilities) 
will increasingly drive the coalescence of power, we may end up in a world where 
the power is wielded by entities of different quality (in this example a nation and 
two firms) instead of entities of similar quality (e.g. the USA and USSR of select past 
decades). 
Another relevant example is the firm. The boundaries of the firm are traditionally 
considered to form along the divide between whether it is more cost-efficient to uti-
lize the control mechanism of hierarchy or the control mechanism of price (Buckley, 
2016). Additionally it has been suggested that instead of the control mechanism of 
hierarchy, the entity of the firm is shaped according to the boundaries within which 
knowledge can be diffused to create capabilities (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996) that 
can then provide advantages in market interactions. Both of these approaches rely 
on the notion of firm specific advantages (created either through the mechanism of 
hierarchy and subsequent capabilities, or through the mechanisms of learning and 
subsequent capabilities), embedded in the organizational resources and capabilities, 
both explicit and tacit (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).
Digitalization blurs these boundaries through two mechanisms: first of all, 
through converged digital systems, such as digital platforms, the firm can access and 
exploit external resources, without needing to control or own them (Shivakumar, 
2014) – in short the firm can leverage available resources without committing to 
ownership liabilities. The stories of Rovio Entertainment (most notably known for 
Angry Birds) and subsequently Supercell (with the game hits HayDay, Clash of Clans 
and Clash Royale) highlight the phenomenon well: founded in 2005, in 2009 Rovio 
decided to focus on leveraging the relatively recently established Apple ecosystem by 
developing games for iPhone. Five months after the release of Angry Birds, the game 
was the most downloaded application in the App store. Three years later Supercell 
repeated the feat with its game HayDay.
While the subsequent trajectories of the firms have been different94, the initial 
success of both firms resulted from their ability to leverage the Apple ecosystem in 
two ways: first of all the application development interface provided production re-
94 Supercell has become a privately owned unicorn (Chinese Tencent acquired 72,2% of the firm 
in 2016 with 6,45 billion euros), whereas Rovio has undergone some struggles, finally becom-
ing a listed company in 2017 with a turnover of 266 million euros.
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lated resources, and secondly, the App Store, pre-installed in each iPhone and iPad, 
provided a vast distribution channel, impossible for a start-up to gain in other means. 
In short, both Rovio and Supercell had access to external resources and competences 
that were integral in their success without needing to own or develop them internal-
ly. What this means is that it becomes more difficult to assess the boundary of the 
firm through its available resources and control over them, or distinct capabilities, as 
digitalization enables essentially outsourcing almost any activities traditionally kept 
in-house. 
The second mechanism is related to the first and blurs the boundaries of the firms 
even more. While inter-firm organizations (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990) and business 
networks (Möller and Halinen, 2017) are not a new phenomenon, the increasing 
race of creating such ecosystems (Basole et al., 2015, Iansiti and Levien, 2004) within 
which all the possibilities of digital convergence emerge, the network strategy has be-
come a critical issue (Aarikka-Stenroos and Ritala, 2017, Vesalainen, Valkokari and 
Hellström, 2017). It may well be that in the near future the competitive advantages 
(Barney, 1991) rely on choosing the right ecosystem to participate and the might of 
that chosen ecosystem, and the best the firms can achieve independently is competi-
tive parity, the chance of staying in the game as a useful component of the ecosystem. 
What this means is that as the boundaries of the firm become porous, strategizing 
needs to be underpinned by an understanding of the relevant scope of strategizing, 
both in terms of what can be controlled by any strategizing agent, and what are the in-
terdependencies subsequently subjected to. Each firm needs to define for themselves 
what constitutes their “firm-ness”. 
Yet another implication pertains to the notions of work and leisure, entities previ-
ously envisioned as distinct. While traditional employment still exists, digitalization 
has enabled increasing flexibility to both individuals and employees through several 
mechanisms. The advanced communication technologies have decoupled work from 
a specific time and place even in traditionally contracted employment (Jarvenpaa and 
Leidner, 1999). 
But more profoundly, digitalization enables parceling work to microtasks95, in-
dividual actions that fulfill a specific need without contractual obligations reaching 
beyond that specific task (Lehdonvirta, 2016). This microwork is most often not the 
primary source of livelihood, but is carried out by individuals who wish to transform 
95 One of the most known digital microwork platforms is the Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.
mturk.com). It is an online “marketplace for work that needs human intelligence” (Amazon Me-
chanical Turk Inc, 2015-2018), where the customers of the marketplace can have specific tasks, 
such as transcriptions, photo tagging, or categorizing done by individuals with time to fill in 
exchange for carrying out such tasks for (minor) compensation. 
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their extra time into added income. In a way, the business logic of Über is similar: 
the idea of the digital platform is to connect the individuals in need of a ride with 
individuals who have a car and time to fulfill the transportation need in exchange for 
a compensation.
While this microwork through digital platforms (such as the Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk or Über) is compensated, all crowdsourcing (Wikipedia, 2018a) activities 
exploitable by firms are necessarily not. Crowdsourcing means utilizing a mass of 
individuals reachable through internet in sourcing an idea, solution, or even fund-
ing (known as crowdfunding) (Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-De-Guevara, 
2012).
This has implications for both the definition of a firm through the changes in the 
available resource bases of the firm, and for the definition of work itself. Not only is 
work something carried out for a specific employer at a specific time and place, or 
something conducted entrepreneurially, but also the self-employment (in itself not a 
new phenomenon) realized in increasingly fluid ways, and in diminishing individu-
al quantities. Furthermore, the existence of non-compensated crowdsourcing addles 
the definition even more: while the crowdsources may end up with such material it 
then uses in pursuing monetary aims, the providers of the crowdsourced material are 
not necessarily financially compensated for their efforts. However, the individual ef-
forts of the crowd may well take such forms that in other contexts could be perceived 
as work. 
The examples of this subchapter by no means cover all of the entities having their 
boundaries eroded due to digitalization. However, by using as example the blurring 
divide between cyber and physical realities, the distinction of product and service, 
the concept of a nation, the definition of the firm, and the understanding of work, I 
have hopefully argued for my case from sufficiently several perspectives. What these 
practical implications further highlight are the theoretical implications, relevant for 
us scholars in pursuing knowledge about such entities we no longer can (if we ever 
could) neatly delineate. This is discussed in the next subchapter. 
7.2.2 Theoretical implications of thesis two
The eroding boundaries of old entities and the emerging shapes of new entities mean 
that as scholars, we must reconsider our units of analysis. The difficulties experienced 
in trying to agree on the definitions of business networks, business ecosystems, clus-
ters or even industries highlight the increasingly complexity of the economic realm 
no longer inhabited by mere firms and markets. 
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Revising the old discussion underpinning the distinction of firm and market in 
the transaction cost economics and the internalization theory, Hayek’s point about 
the importance of knowledge is helpful. The underpinning idea of markets is that 
the relative prices of the offerings of any vendor reflect the overarching supply and 
demand of those offerings in a system where no entity possesses full knowledge of 
all the elements contributing to the supply and demand. Instead, a firm relies on the 
control mechanism of hierarchy, essentially based on the availability of all relevant 
pieces of knowledge within a closed system. 
Hayek, and subsequent scholars discussing the dichotomy of firm and market 
(Williamson, 1975, 1999, 2003, Buckley and Casson, 1976, Buckley, 2016) ground 
their argumentation on the assumption that there will never be a single entity in 
possession of all knowledge relevant to economic activity, ranging from the person-
al level preferences to the political situations, resource quantity and quality, process 
intelligence, organizational dynamics and the power dynamics between diverse eco-
nomic agents. Instead, within a closed context, a hierarchy, with adequate knowledge 
concentrated at the top, constitutes a controllable entity of the firm. But how does the 
firm control, and what does it control, when its utilization of resources is no longer 
coupled with ownership or even personnel: networks and ecosystems provide re-
sources and access to customers, and the workforce ranges from individuals enjoying 
the full scope of traditional employment, to subcontracted entrepreneurs or to the 
“mechanical turks”, providing services through microwork or crowdsourcing?
The control mechanism of hierarchy (Buckley, 2016) or the boundary mechanism 
of learning (Kogut and Zander, 1996) are both insufficient in drawing the bound-
aries of the firm in the digitalizing reality. First of all, control suffers from three de-
couplings: the firms may utilize and exploit resources and capabilities they can only 
access and leverage, not control (like the game producers within the mobile eco-
systems); secondly, the firms may control such resources they don’t directly utilize 
themselves but exploit through the firms utilizing those provided resources (the dig-
ital platform companies like Amazon, Facebook, Alphabet); and thirdly, control is 
no longer coupled with the power over physical realm entities (like salaries or the 
proverbial whips), but becomes increasingly tied to the access to (personalized) data. 
Additionally, a firm is no longer bound by its ability to diffuse knowledge internally: 
the possibility of diversifying the workforce to encompass not only stable personnel 
(costly, however necessary in some tasks), but also to include the external resources 
of microworkers increases the resource-base of the firm beyond its capability to dif-
fuse knowledge. 
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So, the boundaries of the concept firm are elusive. Maybe even more dramatic 
is the potential transformation in the notion of markets. As we remember, markets 
reign when no actor possesses all knowledge pertinent to a transaction. But what if 
we are entering an era, where such omniscience was possible? What if the increasing 
digitalization, with the accompanying data sourcing, storing and processing abilities 
will develop into a full digital representation of all our resources, activities and pref-
erences, traceable and analyzable with the aid of sophisticated artificial intelligence? 
This type of all-encompassing knowledge would not be available to all, but it 
could well be available to a few notable entities. That would mean that instead of the 
disappearance of the hierarchy and the reign of markets, the market would dissolve 
into a planned economy in the hands of few – either explicitly acknowledged by all, 
or implicitly built in to our everyday actions. The requisite technology is almost here, 
and the Chinese Social Credit Rating experiment will yield interesting insights about 
its impacts on the Chinese market. 
Considering the huge amount of data already in possession of Facebook and Al-
phabet (the mother company of Google), further enriched by the available satellite 
monitoring data and the data feeds of the already omnipresent surveillance cameras, 
it is not science fiction to envision an entity that could not only acquire all that data 
but also develop such levels of artificial intelligence that would allow it to process all 
of that data into individualized little data, which would ultimately destroy the whole 
notion of markets – at least from the perspective of that actor. This actor would not 
be a hierarchy, as the control would not be explicit, but nor would it be a market unto 
itself, as it would possess all relevant information and could thus design its economic 
actions accordingly. 
This actually leads to the discussion of the sovereignty of the nations (Kobrin, 
2009), which needs revisiting: as the current economy and social influences are in-
creasingly taking place and forming in the digital reality, what are the new mecha-
nisms of power thus emerging? The increasing difficulty of the nations to tax the dig-
ital economy through the increasing decoupling of the economy from physical space 
and time and the simultaneously increasing integration of global financial economy 
(Kobrin, 2015, 2017b) erode the economic power of the nations. Simultaneously, the 
increasing decoupling of the individual identity and social collectives from the geo-
graphic boundaries erode the socio-political influence of the nations. The institutions 
no longer emerge from within collectives delineated through geography, ethnicity, 
religion or something as elusive as a national culture, but coalesce within the digital 
reality around the social objects individuals find valuable, meaningful and identi-
ty-enforcing. 
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While the economic realm is in flux due to the complex restructuring of the eco-
nomic agents and their relationships, the socio-political realm is undergoing simi-
lar turbulence due to the new ways of forming collectives or creating self-identity. 
The theoretical constructs such as culture and institutions continue being valid as 
labels, however what are the entities to which they refer to, and how do they emerge 
need new understandings. The Hofstedean dimensions (Hofstede, 1984, Hofstede, 
Pedersen and Hofstede, 2002) may yet be relevant, but those dimensions no longer 
define a culture primarily bound by geography – instead a certain cluster of individ-
uals bound together by their appreciation of cycling may well be found to have more 
feminist than masculine features, or to have less power distance, no matter their geo-
graphic origins.
Summarizing, we need new conceptual definitions of the constructs we use as 
units of analysis as digitalization erodes also the existing connections between the 
signified and the signifier. Additionally, we need more nuanced methods of account-
ing for the new types of social collectives – and more insights into the mechanisms 
responsible for creating them.
7.3 Digitalization changes the shape and impact of doxa
The third thesis of this dissertation is that the digitalization will change the shape 
and impact of doxa, what we take for granted and consider normal. It is through 
these changes in what is taken for granted that the most profound impact of digita-
lization occurs. As we know from the research on decision-making, we make most 
of our decisions unwittingly, engaging in reflective thinking only after countless of 
decisions made in the sphere of doxa. This means that no decision escapes being 
filtered through doxa, and subsequently, all changes in doxa have an impact on all 
the decisions.
To begin with the changes in the shape of doxa, digitalization changes our per-
ception of normal through three mechanisms. First of all, the ubiquitous presence of 
digital technology normalizes that technology to the extent that it becomes invisible: 
we no longer perceive using technology, only living our lives (Yoo, 2010). Secondly, 
as we rely increasingly on internet to provide us a view to the external world, what 
we see through the internet shapes our perception of what is happening. However, as 
what we see through the internet is personalized for us, based on our previous digital 
interactions and embedded sensor technologies, each one of us is granted a highly 
specific visibility to the external world, responsible for endowing us with an idiosyn-
cratic worldview (McNamee, 2018, Newell and Marabelli, 2015). 
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Thirdly, as the digital social networks enable social interactions decoupled from 
space and time, yet relying on the very human features of wanting to belong, have 
a tribe, relate and interact, cluster around something perceived meaningful, digital 
collectives emerge. Within these digital collectives, the personalized views to the 
external reality converge, creating shared understandings further looped back to 
strengthen the collective specific worldviews of the individuals within the collective 
(Engeström, 2005, Flaxman et al., 2016, Pariser, 2011, Sunstein, 2009, 2018).
Taken together, what we consider normal and take for granted changes. The im-
pact of these changes is profound, as we cannot escape making our decisions based 
on them – even the wisest among us have a doxa through which they first must wade 
before engaging in reflective thinking (Eagleton and Bourdieu, 1992, Kahneman, 
2011, Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). This saves valuable cognitive energy, as, in theory, 
we can focus on reflectively pondering such issues that are notable, instead of wasting 
our moments in choosing which foot to put forward first. 
However, not all of the decisions undertaken within the realm of doxa are as un-
important as the choice of left or right foot first. Many of the decisions we make in 
the realm of doxa are realized in for example organizational routines, coalesced into 
organizational capabilities, further aggregated into organizational outcomes (Diony-
siou and Tsoukas, 2013, Feldman and Pentland, 2003, Nelson and Winter, 1982, 2002, 
Rerup and Feldman, 2011). The way that we deal with this dominance of doxa is that 
we primarily act first and rationalize our actions later – as captured in the sensemak-
ing approach introduced by Weick (1979, 2005).
Weick’s analysis of a crisis situation in a power plant highlights the profoundness 
of this mechanism: even when the urgency of the situation would have needed gen-
uine prospective reflection, the actions were entrenched in doxa and retrospectively 
rationalized in ways that actually allowed the situation to escalate into even worse 
(Weick, 1988). 
However, the sensemaking mechanism is not only a negative force, but quite 
quintessential to human action. At any given moment we are not only dealing with 
the inherent uncertainty of tomorrow, but also with equivocality, the retrospective 
lack of knowledge of open set of options and closed set of outcomes: meaning that 
given an outcome we cannot deduce the options that led to it. Sensemaking enables 
moving forward incrementally, benefitting from the knowledge emerging through 
actions, through the time-bound unfolding, gradually revealing some aspects of 
the future uncertainty that may additionally reduce equivocality. In contrast, if we 
needed to have reduced all uncertainty before engaging in action, we would never 
move. 
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The relative slowness of this process is a blessing. First of all, it enables integrating 
new, emerging knowledge (resulting either from the actions or the unveiling of the 
future as it becomes present) to the ongoing process. This new knowledge has the 
potential of incrementally changing the trajectory of the action, either through grad-
ually changing the doxa or through reflection. Secondly, it enables creating shared 
understandings, essential in the alignment of collective action. Individuals enter a 
shared situation with their idiosyncratic features, assumptions and expectations, 
which are through the process of collective sensemaking negotiated into shared un-
derstandings of the situation – the individual doxa converge in regards to the specific 
circumstances through the mechanism of symbolic interactionism, the mirroring of 
oneself in the mirrors of the others mirroring themselves on the mirror of oneself. 
In programmed action, these processes are obliterated. An algorithm acts based 
on its programming, which is grounded on what is known, and neglects the uncer-
tainties of tomorrow and the equivocality of past: it functions under the assumption 
of full rationality and full knowledge, in an artificial environment where all but one 
type of uncertainty are ignored and the remaining one rendered irrelevant through 
the increase in knowledge. This means that the insights revealed through the un-
folding action cannot be integrated into the action – unless a priori specifically pro-
grammed, however the unknown unknowns cannot be programmed, as the surprises 
that can be pre-programmed need to be known. Furthermore, algorithmic action 
does not enable creating shared understandings during a process, as the program-
ming depends on the understandings of the programmer; it is not the same as having 
two algorithms pursue a same outcome from diverse perspectives with a command 
to negotiate the optimal solution. 
So, the algorithms excel in achieving the goals given to them, but on the other 
hand, eliminate the beneficial slowness of human processes that enable changing the 
goals in midstream and creating shared understandings that allow for aligning col-
lective action towards a mutually acceptable outcome. This is one of the two main 
reasons why the impact of doxa becomes exceedingly important: the machines take 
us wherever we think we want to go, based on our doxic and reflective understanding 
of a given, specific moment, even when that is not where we should (by some assess-
ment) be going. 
The other reason is embedded in the mechanism of machine learning, increasing-
ly used in developing artificial intelligence. The algorithms cannot create new, only 
process extant material by identifying patterns. The original material their learning 
is based on is created by us humans, and one of the patterns to be recognized pertain 
to our doxic understandings of standards of desirability and the meaning making 
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mechanisms underpinning them. This means that even if we ourselves do not engage 
in ethical discussions of right and wrong, or acknowledge our standards or the un-
derpinning meaning making mechanisms, they are fed into the learning processes of 
the machines. 
Currently this discussion pivots around the closed data sets used in machine 
learning, as some of the inherent biases within those data sets have had explicit and 
identifiable outcomes96. Controlling for biases in specific, closed data sets is however 
but one example, paling in comparison of what the algorithms can learn when the 
whole digital reality, or even only the internet, is used as the learning data set. 
We are shaping the algorithms in our image, and if we do not reflect on the image 
we are currently leaving, that image reflects the internet as it now exists – full of not 
only such activities we humans can be proud of, but also the very murky depths of 
humanity, the racism, bigotry, selfishness, greed to name but few. Unfortunately, as 
we humans tend to react stronger to negative news and sentiments of horror or dis-
gust than to good news, and through reacting stronger more likely to engage in inter-
action based on those reactions (Hornik et al., 2015), the mechanisms of current in-
ternet geared towards maximizing the engagement through personalized and filtered 
feeds support disseminating the negative more than the positive. What is notable, is 
that this dissemination of the negative, while supported by the technological mech-
anisms, is ultimately more dependent on the behavior of us humans. You are more 
likely to read and pass on posts from your acquaintances than the posts automatically 
shown to you (Flaxman et al., 2016), and a hundred times more likely to pass on false 
news97 than truths (Vosoughi, Roy and Aral, 2018).
So, if we are to teach the algorithms based on the representation of humanity 
as it currently exists online, the educational material would consist primarily of the 
outcomes of the baser instincts of us humans, as filtered through our doxic behavior 
supporting the dissemination of the bad over the good. The more we accept and take 
for granted the current constitution and mechanisms of the internet, the more em-
phatically we allow the formation of such standards of desirability and meaning mak-
ing mechanisms that a) are extrapolations based on our past digital behavior, and 
96 For example, black people are more likely to be turned down when applying for a loan when 
there is an AI making the decisions: as the data sets these AI use consist of criminal records 
among others, and as due to historical and social reasons the black people are overrepresented 
in those records, the AI has deduced that the black people are inherently less trustworthy and 
thus are endowed with a lower credit reliability rating merely based on skin color (Weinberger, 
2018a)
97 In an 11 year study of almost 3 million Twitter users, Vosoughi, Roy and Aral (2018) found 
that the top false news diffused between 1000-100 000 people, whereas the truth rarely reached 
1000. 
 MY THRee THeSeS 205
b) can through algorithmic pattern detection mechanisms be identified, and used 
as grounds for further algorithmic decision-making, as the standards of desirability.
As the history of humanity shows, we are capable of marvelous feats and inex-
plicable goodness, and equally capable of horrendous acts and limitless evil. While 
few of our actions come close to either end of the spectrum, it is our doxic accep-
tance of what we take for granted and consider normal that provides the soil for the 
seeds of any type of action in either end to flourish. Interestingly, the most notable 
achievements of humanity consist of such technologies that have the potential to 
even expand either end of the spectrum – to deliver dreams or nightmares. With 
datafication, digitizing, connectivity and algorithmic processing we have taken an 
additional step in strengthening the linkage between what we doxicly accept and are 
tangibly delivered. 
To summarize the third thesis, digitalization shapes our doxa in three ways, and 
increases its impact in two ways. The changes result from the increasing invisibili-
ty of technology in shaping our daily activities, from the personalized worldview it 
provides, and from the new forms of collectives that contribute to our institutional 
biographies. The increasing impact arises from the elimination of the slow human 
sensemaking processes that enable gradual changes in our trajectories and the cre-
ation of shared understandings, which means that the future outcomes of algorithmic 
actions are grounded on the past doxa even when that doxa is outdated, and from the 
fact that the outcomes of algorithmic learning processes are grounded on the digi-
tal representation of our collective doxa evidenced in the data sets used in machine 
learning. 
7.3.1 Practical implications of thesis three
The so called “Cambridge Analytica” case (Guardian, 2018) revealed in March 2018 
highlights the practical implications of this thesis from several vantages. In 2014, a 
firm harvested legally Facebook data through an app used by 320 000 consenting in-
dividuals who ended up giving an access to the public Facebook data of their friends, 
ultimately aggregating to a dataset of 50 million US voters. Combined with psycho-
logical research findings (Kosinski, Stillwell and Graepel, 2013) that could identify 
the political preferences of an individual through behavioral patterns expressed in 
random Facebook “likes” (by default public at the time of data harvesting), this data 
was used in creating such algorithms that enabled so called microtargeting of adver-
tisements (Cadwallar and Graham-Harrison, 2018).
This microtargeting was subsequently used in the US presidential elections of 
2016 by a set of proponents of Donald Trump. The advertisements were tailor made 
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to trigger such reactions of the target voters that would make them more susceptible 
to the Trump campaign message by triggering sentiments of hate and revulsion, or 
feeding the fears of the targeted individuals, initially identified (through the psycho-
logical profiling algorithm) as eg. harboring negative sentiments towards foreigners 
(Cadwallar, 2018). Again, lacking counter-factual evidence (ie. there is no knowledge 
of the election outcome had the algorithms not been used), and pending further in-
vestigation, the genuine impact of this type of campaigning remains debated, howev-
er for illustrating my third thesis, this example is fearfully appropriate. 
On the level of the individual, the implications of the third thesis highlight the im-
portance of being aware of a) the fact that through the internet, one is presented with 
a personalized worldview, b) of the fact that each digital action creates a trace, which 
converge into an image of one as the digital representation of one, both enabling 
even deeper personalization and becoming a constitutive part of the humanity as 
understood by the algorithms, and c) the tradeoffs embedded in digital technology: 
privacy vs convenience and collective security, freedom vs control and independence 
vs dependence. 
In the Cambridge Analytica case, the seemingly innocuous online activities (like 
“liking” Kitkat chocolate) created digital traces that when amassed in big data quan-
tities, could be used in not only creating algorithms that could identify patterns be-
tween those “likes” and the political leanings of the individual, but also in tailoring 
such advertisements, personalizing such worldviews that would prey on the fears 
and hopes of those same individuals, having (most likely) an impact on their offline 
election behavior. The case also exemplifies the tradeoff between freedom and con-
trol: while no overt coercion happened, the ability of digital technology to control the 
individuals’ offline behavior is quite serious. 
On the level of the collectives, in the firm context, the implications are twofold: 
firstly, the goals of the firm require reflection more urgently than ever (including 
but not limited to the ethical perspective). With the increasing speed of execution 
enabled by digital technology, the “wrong” goals become costly, as they are reached 
effectively – the slowness accompanying human processes disappears, and with it the 
ability to change the trajectory midstream. Additionally, with the increasing com-
plexity of the digital economy, the ripple effects of the “wrong” goals diffuse fast and 
wide – in terms of economic, environmental, social and ethical effects. 
The ripple effects of the Cambridge Analytica case entail for example a) (poten-
tially) Trump as a president, with its accompanying impacts, b) the visibility and 
diffusion of the increasing capability to manipulate individuals through their online 
presence and activities, c) the increasing criticism towards Facebook and other social 
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media with its potential implications, d) the possible legal convictions and penalties, 
and e) the impacts on the brand equity of all firms involved (this may play out as ei-
ther financially lucrative or destructive). While the valence of these outcomes again 
depends on the perspective of the viewer, it is likely that while drafting the initial 
goals of the core activity of the firm (microtargeted political advertising), the ensuing 
ripple effects were not all intended or even conceived98.
Secondly, when the goals are agreed upon, the execution of their pursuit is firmly 
coupled with the ability of the firm to shape such firm specific doxa that accounts 
for the datafication of everything – the eroding and changing boundaries of the en-
tities discussed in the second thesis. If the doxa of a firm is shaped to perceive phys-
ical products and humans as the focal components of the firm activities, enabling 
and bounding its operations, the firm may well face disruptive competition from a 
firm that perceives all primarily as malleable data, which only subsequently takes the 
physical form of products and human actions. The Cambridge Analytica perceived 
humans as data of their digital traces, and through exploiting the malleability of the 
data shaped the subsequent physical realm actions. In contrast, creating an advertise-
ment based on the product features arises from the perception of the product having 
an ontological precedence over its data form representation.
On the level of collectives, in the political setting, the tradeoffs accompanying 
digitalization are highly dependent on the standards of desirability of the represented 
collective. The problem is that while the political decisions and regulations are re-
gional, the digital reality and the technological advances are not. For example, with 
the realization of the GDPR, the EU will value individual privacy more than techno-
logical supremacy, as the data protection regulation has an impact on the ability of 
the developers of the artificial intelligence to access and use the internet data bases 
(Weinberger, 2018a). China has a different set of underpinning values, which means 
that it in turn chooses differently in regards to this tradeoff: this in turn may lead to 
such developments that lead to China being the dominant actor in the artificial intel-
ligence technology, with impacts reaching also the citizens of the EU (Macaes, 2018).
To return to the case of example, it is notable that the actions of the Cambridge 
Analytica were legal as individual steps; it is only the aggregated results of those ac-
tions that have roused legal and ethical questions. This implies that with the advances 
98 I encountered a good nutshell of consequences of technology a while ago somewhere online, 
but cannot unfortunately recall the source. I will however mention it here, because it captures 
this issue well: all technological advances (and widely thinking, actually any actions) can have 
four types of potential outcomes. First, the intended consequences of benevolent use/action; 
secondly, the unintended consequences of benevolent use/action; thirdly, the intended conse-
quences of malevolent use/action; and fourthly, the unintended consequences of malevolent 
use/action. My thanks go to the unremembered source for coining this typology!
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of technology, it is very hard for the legislation to address such developmental stages 
that are at the moment of legislating unforeseeable – especially as any regulations or 
laws are fashioned under the doxa of the moment, underpinned by elements taken 
for granted, also in terms of their ethical valences. 
This means that ultimately the collective level legislative mechanisms are somewhat 
impotent in trying to create such overarching regulations that would tangibly protect 
the individuals from the negative implications of digitalization, the datafication of ev-
erything – especially as what are the negative, and what are the positive implications 
is also a point of debate. In turn, the only actors with the power to influence the future 
evolution of our algorithmic future, are the individuals. It is through our individual ac-
tions, choices, “likes” and interactions in the digital realm that the digital representation 
of reality, underpinned by our individual and collective doxa, forms. 
That is why the main message of my third thesis can also be translated to an ap-
peal: the ethical discussions about our meaning making mechanisms and standards 
of desirables should become mundane, routine – not something only discussed in the 
ivory towers of the philosophers, but something any lay individual could exchange a 
few words about when having a leisurely cup of coffee with friends. 
7.3.2 Theoretical implications of thesis three
The idea of the third thesis is ultimately very simple: we should pay attention to why 
it is that we want whatever it is that we think we want. However, in practice this is the 
most difficult question humanity has always been dealing with. What is the meaning 
of our existence here? 
But, taking the discussion a few notches closer to earth, yet another example high-
lighting the complexity of this theme is in order. With the climate change well on 
its way, increasing attention has been given to the importance of economic growth: 
should we really be pursuing profit when the future of the whole globe is at stake? Put 
this way, the answer is quite blindingly obvious, however there is more to the notion 
of economic growth than the mere monetary outcomes accumulating on the bank 
accounts of the shareholders. 
As previously discussed, the economic growth represents the human faith in the 
future: it is beneficial to toil today in order for the tomorrow to be better. In the 
churning of the economic wheel of faith in the future, humans have had a two-fold 
role: on the one hand they have as employees participated in the productivity side 
of the equation, and on the other hand they have as customers participated in the 
financing of the process. Being unemployed, aside from being an individual level 
source of anxiety, has meant not participating in this wheel of progress in either side. 
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As the productivity increase driven by the industrial revolution required human 
labor, the societies addressed this issue by education resulting in the rise of the middle 
classes honed to perform well on both sides the equation. On the individual level this 
was grounded on the appeal of the spirit of enlightenment (underpinned by the par-
adigm shift of renaissance bringing the goals of human endeavors from the afterlife 
to the present life), which promised better life for an individual and an increasingly 
better life for their offspring through the continuing individual level improvement 
and increasing effort: study and work hard and you and your children will benefit. 
This doxa constituted the meaning making mechanisms and subsequent standards of 
desirability that shaped the economy for the most part of the past century.
While working is often accompanied by complaints about the work, it has howev-
er been an invaluable meaning making mechanism, a source of identity and a sense of 
belonging – all aspects essential for the mental well-being of the individual (Ahonen, 
2001, Park, 2010). Additionally, the collective doxa of our contemporary western so-
cieties is grounded on the meaning making mechanism in which the productivity 
of the individual is firmly coupled with the collective good of the society. We take it 
for granted that unless one is too young, old or ill, it is the meaning of the human to 
contribute to the upholding of the collective society as an economic entity, which in 
turn provides the structures within which that human can execute that upholding. 
Within such doxa, work has existed as a coupling of both the role of an individual 
in the society as the bipolar component of the wheel of the economy, and a meaning 
making mechanism.
However, we are now in the western societies witnessing an era where the new 
generations will never reach the level of the income of their elders, never mind the 
possibility of outpacing the rate of increase in the material wealth (Siltala, 2016). In 
addition, the advance of digitalization will render most humans unnecessary as em-
ployees (Arthur, 2017). So, in the twin engine of productivity and financing spinning 
the wheel of economic growth, humans are, on the side of productivity being replaced 
by machines to a notable extent (Frey and Osborne, 2017, McKinsey Global Institute, 
2017, World Economic Forum, 2016). However, on the other side, as the consumers 
ultimately financing the relentless turning of the wheel, humans are still needed – but 
with dwindling incomes99, becoming increasingly inefficient in even that. Addition-
99 The more the material wealth is concentrated in the hands of the few, the less of it is fed back to 
the system to continue spinning the wheel. The concentration of wealth has always happened 
in human societies (Piketty, 2015), and our era is no exception – actually quite the contrary, 
according to several scholars (Chomsky, 2017, Elliott and Pilkington, 2015), as the increasing-
ly developed technology creates even more inequality in between its owners and users. This 
means that the few employed bear an increasing burden in financing the spinning of the wheel.
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ally, humans as data sources serve both the process of distilling each last drop of the 
consumer utility from the individual (contributing to the side of financing), and the 
process of reaching full digital convergence, creating an encompassing digital repre-
sentation of the physical reality (contributing to the side of productivity). 
So, considering that this is the path the wheel of economy ploughs, how do we 
solve the paradox of human redundancy on the side of productivity, and human ne-
cessity (and growing inefficiency) on the side of financing the future? And maybe 
more importantly, how do we deal with the decoupling of work-as-a-component-of-
economy from work-as-meaning-making-mechanism? On the level of the individu-
al, this of course translates first to the mundane worry of shelter and sustenance: as 
the linkage of work between the two poles is being severed, how will the unemployed 
find food? However, the more pertinent question is, how do the individual unem-
ployed find meaning for their lives in a society allotting them only the roles of data 
sources and consumers?
Therefore the questions of the future of work in the digitalized future and the 
importance of economic growth are actually questions that pertain to the very grand 
narratives that shape widely our collective doxa. What are the meaning making 
mechanisms with which we argue the meaningfulness of our actions as societies and 
individuals in hundred years?
The technological developments of today promise to deliver us answers to many 
of the practical questions we can think of asking, to transport us to wherever it is 
we want to go. However the questions even the most advanced artificial intelligence 
will never know to answer, or even ask, relate to our choices of our destinations, and 
the reasons of why do we want to go there in the first place? To me the most critical 
implication of all of these three theses relates to the fundamental need to reassess the 
meanings of an individual and the society. If we cannot come up with a new grand 
narrative to carry us through the next century, the least we should aim at would 
be to on an individual level penetrate our individual doxa to ask these questions as 
they relate to our personal lives. This goes beyond the morality of defining right and 
wrong, into the core of ethics questioning why would the what is right be right and 
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“everything is connected.”
(Douglas Adams: Dirk Gently’s holistic detective agency)
The research question this dissertation has been answering is “How does digitali-
zation impact strategizing?” The premises from which the inquiry begun were that 
a) strategizing consists of individual actions and decisions, fused together in social 
action, aggregated onto collective level outcomes, b) strategizing is in big part dealing 
with uncertainty, either within the realm of the reflective or in the realm of the doxa, 
and c) digitalization as changes in the technological systems, in its usage and users, 
and in the perceptions has an impact on the nature of the uncertainty. 
These premises underlie the secondary research questions: How does digitaliza-
tion change the constitution of uncertainty, how are those changes reflected in strat-
egizing, and what are the theoretical and practical implications emerging from the 
changes in the uncertainty and subsequently in strategizing?
In order to answer the research questions, the first discussion in the thesis per-
tained to the diverse ontological perspectives from which extant knowledge has been 
created. This discussion grounded the approach of trying to integrate diverse streams 
of knowledge, underpinned by different philosophical positions, into more compre-
hensive entities, in order to explore the relationships of those entities. 
The second discussion focused on outlining the concept of strategizing as un-
derstood in this dissertation, by integrating select insights from the rich research 
streams in decision-making, strategy and strategizing. Subsequently, the third dis-
cussion of uncertainty presented a new conceptualization of uncertainty, built on 
the extant insights of uncertainty from several philosophical positions. The fourth 
discussion sketched the contours of digitalization understood as the amalgam of 
digitized technological systems, humans as objects and subjects of change, and per-
ceptions. 
These integrated insights were then further processed, first in observing how dig-
italization influences uncertainty, and secondly by outlining the three theses of this 
dissertation, including their theoretical and practical implications. The following 
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subchapters outline the outcomes, identify the contributions and limitations of this 
thesis, and ultimately delineate some potential avenues of future research. 
8.1 Outcomes: how does digitalization impact strategizing?
The fundamental drivers of digitalization are the idea of datafication, transforming 
the entities from all three Popperian realms into the ontological form of data, digitiz-
ing, rendering all types of data uniform, into binary digits, and connectivity, bring-
ing all of that uniform data together. While the representations of digitalization are 
manifold, captured in myriad concepts, ultimately the unfolding of digitalization is 
not dependent on the developments and diffusions of any specific technologies, ap-
plications or even infrastructural standards. Digitalization entails a paradigm shift 
where the previously ontologically distinct entities gain an ontologically same repre-
sentation as uniform data in the digital reality. 
The elemental technological advances that drive digitalization consist of a) devel-
opments in sensor technology that enable the datafication of physical realm entities, 
b) the developments of internet and telecommunications technologies that enable 
not only connectivity but also the datafication of subjective and intersubjective realm 
entities (in the form of human online action), c) the advances in the storage capa-
bilities of data, and d) the advances in the algorithmic processing of that data, the 
artificial intelligence. While the individual technological advancements drive the de-
velopments to an extent within any given area, the overall trajectories of these drivers 
of digitalization is not dependent on any individual solutions or applications. 
Data is malleable. This means that through the two-directional connections be-
tween the entities in their other ontological forms, and their digital form, the malle-
ability of the entities also in the other ontological realms increases. This malleability 
is hindered by the lack of full convergence, meaning that while the data is in theory 
uniform, the technologies with which it can be dealt with, are not (yet?) so. This 
has two main outcomes: firstly, as the realization of the possibilities of the increased 
malleability depend on the scope of convergence, the actors in digital economy pur-
sue creating pockets of convergence in increasing scope. Secondly, the possibilities 
emerging due to the malleability of the entities within the convergent area require 
identifying and seizing. If the reality-as-data can be fashioned, how should it be fash-
ioned?
Strategizing, as individual level actions and decisions, fused together in social ac-
tion to aggregate into collective level outcomes, is primarily dealing with uncertainty. 
This uncertainty arises from not only the lack of knowledge of all the relevant ele-
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ments influencing the pursuit of a goal, but also from the choices between diverse 
standards of desirability along which we can position those goals, and the funda-
mentally ephemeral nature of the meaning making mechanisms responsible for con-
structing those standards of the desirability in the first place. In strategizing, we deal 
with these uncertainties to an extent through reflection, but to a large extent through 
relying on our doxa, our understanding of what is normal, can be taken for granted 
and doesn’t need to be reflected.
As I have in this dissertation adopted a microfoundational perspective in the sense 
that there are no collective level causalities, also the impact of digitalization on both 
the act of strategizing and its collective level outcomes are perceived to be realized on 
the individual level. The following figure, as an adaptation of a previous Coleman’s 
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Figure 15: Digitalization in the Coleman's tub of strategizing
The mechanisms of digitalization constitute the three theses of this dissertation. 
First of all, within a zone of convergence where any relevant entities have been data-
fied, and adequate data sourcing, storage and processing resources and capabilities 
exist, one type of uncertainty becomes irrelevant. This type of uncertainty consists 
of lack of knowledge of a finite number of options and outcomes, in literature often 
defined as risk. The substantive part of this uncertainty is diminished through the 
encompassing datafication, and the procedural part through the excellence in algo-
rithmic processing. 
Secondly, as the dataform entities are no longer by their representations in the 
other ontological realms bound through the boundaries ontologically extant in those 
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other realms (time, geography, flesh, thought, machine), the old boundaries are erod-
ed and the boundaries of the dataform entities formed anew. This means that the 
distinctions such as cyber-physical, local-global, firm-market, national-international 
become increasingly blurred, with implications to both the practitioners and the the-
orists. 
Thirdly, as the digital representation of other ontological realms isn’t limited to 
only the physical realm entities, but encompasses also entities of subjective and in-
tersubjective nature, the ensuing digital representation of reality consists also of such 
building blocks as emotions, assumptions, standards of desirability, meaning making 
mechanisms – values and doxa. On one hand this means that the ensuing digital re-
ality reflects our doxa and values as datafiable through sensors or through our digital 
activities. On the other hand this means that our doxa and values become exceed-
ingly malleable through the increasing fusion of digital reality in terms of continually 
more ubiquitous and invisible technology and our mundane activities. 
These mechanisms play out on the individual level, however their implications 
reach beyond that, influencing the whole collective shape of our society. Currently 
lacking any of such grand narratives the majority of humanity could agree as mean-
ing making mechanisms, enabling such standards of desirability that would allow 
aligning our collective activities, digitalization is a force of fragmentation. However, 
with the increasing pursuit of convergence this may change. 
Currently, the lack of convergence due to the technological imperfections and in-
compatibilities means that the near future will be riddled with power plays between 
such agents that endeavor to create, master and expand pockets of convergence. If 
full convergence is ever reached, it may, in theory, lead to full global democracy or 
full global autocracy. Either way, however, it is still too early to predict whether full 
convergence can be realized, but in the meanwhile, its pursuit will impact us all, as 
individuals, citizens and economic actors. Equally, in the meanwhile, it is our actions 
and assumptions, our explicitly expressed values and implicitly impactful doxa that 
create the digital representation of reality that even before technological convergence 
shapes our realities also in the realms of the physical, subjective and intersubjective. 
8.2 Theoretical contributions
This dissertation is not built on the theoretical approach Alvesson and Sandberg 
(2011) name as “gap spotting”, i.e. the approach relying on identifying a void in be-
tween known entities then through research filled. Nor is it based on what the same 
authors call “problematizing”, which means questioning the underlying assumptions 
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of a theory and recreating the theory on new foundations. Instead, this research can 
be understood as phenomenon-based (Doh, 2017, Von Krogh, Rossi-Lamastra and 
Haefliger, 2012), in the sense that the object of enquiry is an existing phenomenon, 
understood in piecemeal from diverse perspectives, but so far lacking in integrative 
understandings. As such, the theoretical contribution aims of this dissertation fall 
into the category of conceptual contributions that MacInnis (2011) identifies as in-
tegration, with the aim to “see previously distinct pieces… in terms of a unified whole 
whose meaning is different from its constitutive parts” (MacInnis 2011, p. 138). In pur-
suing this aim, I have, hopefully adequately, employed what Gardner (2008) calls a 
“synthesizing mind”, made sense of distinct pieces of extant valuable knowledge as 
they relate to one-another, and crafted new entities that hopefully enable seeing some 
issues from new and more holistic perspectives. In short, I have engaged in building 
edifices, not bricks (Forscher, 1963), with the hope that my choices of bricks and my 
architectural design are sound enough in constructing a solid, self-standing struc-
ture.
The main theoretical contributions are the three theses, in addition to some small-
er contributions mainly resulting from the integrative efforts of this dissertation. The 
theses recently explicated in the previous chapter, the smaller contributions merit 
listing before embarking on the reflection of the respective values of the attempted 
contributions. 
Addressing the smaller contributions in the order of appearance, the first is the 
identification of the six ontological questions underpinning the epistemological and 
methodological choices in social sciences, depicted in the table 1. The second contri-
bution is the integration of diverse aspects of decision-making, strategy and strate-
gizing literatures into the diagrams of strategizing, captured in the figure 9. The third 
contribution is the novel conceptualization of uncertainty, the three dimensions of 
uncertainty residing in different ontological realities. While the building blocks of 
the conceptualization of digitalization are in themselves not new, potentially the in-
tegrative discussion and the explication of the fundamental enablers of datafication 
and digitizing count as a fourth contribution. 
Each of the following subchapters focuses on one contribution, and assesses it 
through reflecting the definitions of theoretical contributions as outlined by Whetten 
(1989). According to Whetten, the pertinent questions to ask in evaluating a theoreti-
cal contribution are 1) What’s new? (Is there a significant, value-added contribution to 
current thinking?), 2) So what? (Will the contributions change anything in the thinking 
of the scholars of practitioners?), 3) Why so? (Is the logic sound?), 4) Well done? (Are 
the grounding discussions thorough and well-rounded?), 5) Done well? (Is the writing 
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smooth?), 6) Why now? (Is the topic timely and relevant?), 7) Who cares? (Would the 
academic or lay readers be interested?) (Whetten 1989, p. 494-495). 
Of these questions, I will leave the Well done and Done well -questions for the 
reader to answer, as in assessing them from the perspective of having tried to do well 
the well done, my reflections are by nature too biased. While the ultimate evaluation 
of the merits of this dissertation are naturally up to the readers, I will however next 
try to argue for my insights through the questions proposed by Whetten (1989).
8.2.1 Theoretical contributions of the thesis one, eradication of risk
What’s new? While risk (Knight, 1921) and Ellsbergian ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961) 
constitute what Packard et al (2017) name weak uncertainty, the volume, complexity 
and volatility of the entities forming the closed sets of options and outcomes has 
however been such that even considering the finiteness of those options and out-
comes, both the substantive knowledge about all entities involved, and the proce-
dural knowledge (Dosi and Egidi, 1991) required in processing it has been lacking 
to the extent of it being impossible to dismiss even this type of uncertainty in deci-
sion-making. With datafication, digitizing, connectivity and enough technological 
convergence, it is now possible to obliterate this type of weak uncertainty, the quanti-
fiable, probabilistic risk. As uncertainty as a whole is not eradicated with the increase 
of knowledge, this obliteration of one specific type of knowledge has not been dis-
cussed – most likely because in the uncertainty literature, this type of uncertainty is 
conflated with other types of uncertainty (Packard et al., 2017). 
So what? In order to address such obstinate types of uncertainty not removed with 
digitalization, delineating the type of uncertainty rendered irrelevant would be ben-
eficial. In addition, through the advances in datafication and algorithmic processing, 
some of the entities previously by nature unknowable (other people’s thoughts) and 
therefore by nature always before forming open sets, are now moving into closed set, 
through becoming data. On the other hand, the ability to shape the entities within the 
closed sets further muddles the water as what may seem new (an entity from the open 
side) is actually a combination of entities within the closed set. In short, some things 
of previously unknown qualities become known, widening the closed sets of options 
and outcomes – and blurring the distinction of what can be considered a closed, what 
an open set. This has notable implications in decision-making.
Why so? With the increase in computing power to enable storage of massive data, 
the developments in sensor technology in datafying physical realm entities, the ubiq-
uity of personal digital devices connected through the internet and the subsequent 
sourcing of the worlds two and three entities evidenced in human digital interaction, 
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the advances in the processing capabilities of algorithms, and the trajectories of con-
vergence grounded on the uniform nature of the data, there is both substantive and 
procedural knowledge that enables closing sets of options and outcomes, and pro-
cessing the entities within to an extent when the uncertainty is removed. 
Why now? We are at early stages of this development: first of all, technologies 
are imperfect and incompatible, grounded on even less perfect legacy technologies, 
secondly they rely on limited natural resources and energy, and thirdly utilizing the 
possibilities requires such changes in mindsets that creates disparity between those 
who do and don’t exploit the potential. Additionally, the power unleashed through 
these technological advances is still looking for a home – currently the digital sphere 
is dominated by some players, but due to the early stages, the battle of dominance will 
continue. This means that if we want to change this trajectory, now we still can – and 
if we don’t now is the moment to focus on the implications of what happens if this 
theoretically possible future comes to be.
Who cares? In the scholarly realm of information systems, there is call for in-
creased research on the digital infrastructures and convergence (Herzhoff, 2009, Til-
son et al., 2010a, 2010b), in addition to call for understanding more deeply the expe-
riential computing (Lyytinen and Yoo, 2002, Yoo, 2010). In the research streams of 
strategic management, entrepreneurship and organization theory, the understanding 
of uncertainty is fragmented and overlapping. The introduction of open and closed 
sets of options and outcomes by Packard et al (2017) is in my view a notable opening 
in organizing the knowledge about such uncertainty that arises from lack of knowl-
edge, and the discussions in this dissertation contribute to further developing that 
line of thinking. 
In the realm of the practitioners, the firms should care, as many of their opera-
tional issues currently pertain to dealing with risk and weak uncertainty, and their 
capabilities are accordingly oriented. Understanding what may no longer be the most 
acute problem and what will be the new problems has implications for the orienta-
tion of firm capabilities: question what issues need exploitative and what explorative 
capabilities becomes increasingly relevant. Additionally, the firms might want to un-
derstand the ensuing power battles in and in between industries. 
In the realm of the individual, it will do no harm to understand that what has 
traditionally been considered personal, can to an extent be datafied and processed. 
8.2.2 Theoretical contributions of the thesis two, blurring of boundaries
What’s new? In theorizing, we need clearly defined and delineated units of analysis, 
and much research has been done on for example on the boundaries of the firm: how 
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can it be delineated in ways that enable researching it as a unit of analysis? The re-
search on networks (Möller and Halinen, 2017) has paved the way for understanding 
the nuanced relationships between the firm and the market, but with the decouplings 
(of ownership and utilization of resources, of control and hierarchy, of assets and 
control over them, of available capabilities and contractual employment) following 
from digitalization, this dissertation suggests the need to dig even deeper into the 
question of what is a firm – and what will happen to the markets if it is fathomable 
that there are omniscient entities that dominate certain areas through their presence 
in the digital realm? 
Additionally, in the research stream of international business, ample emphasis has 
been given to the internationalization of the firms (Buckley and Casson, 1976, Buck-
ley, 2016, Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 2009, Oviatt and McDougall, 2005). While the 
few decades old models have been criticized (Axinn and Matthyssens, 2002) through 
for example the research on the phenomenon of born globals (Knight, 1996), less 
attention has been given to the question of what does internationalization mean, if 
the nations as geographically bound clusters of socio-political tendencies and power 
lose their entityness (Kobrin, 2009, 2015, 2017b)? The novelty in this thesis furthers 
these discussions through highlighting the decouplings created by digitalization, and 
the couplings of such entities previously separate.  
So what? While we are currently still living in a world of firms, nations, cultures, 
industries and markets, what we have traditionally understood as being referred to 
with these conceptual labels, is changing. This means that as scholars, we can no 
longer take for granted that the connections between the phenomena being signified, 
and the concepts used as signifiers are similar to what they were just few decades ago. 
Subsequently, when we engage in building new knowledge on top of old knowledge, 
the newness of these constellations need to be highlighted. When the firm is used as 
a unit of analysis, defining the concept must be done with care, as what was a firm a 
mere while ago no longer applies to all entities we can now conceive as constituting 
a firm. 
Why so? Digitalization creates a data form representation of worlds one, two and 
three entities. As data is malleable, and the interfaces between the digital representa-
tion of reality and the three other realities are bidirectional, the entities of worlds one, 
two and three become more malleable, as the boundaries previously formed along 
space, time, or ontological differences (flesh, thought, machine, story) do not apply in 
the dataform digital reality. This means that the social groups form in different ways 
than bound through geography, control over humans or assets is realized through 
different mechanisms, and the power coalesces differently – to name a few examples.
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Why now? We are only beginning to see the malleability of everything, and as 
such can still have an impact on the new entities being shaped. However, in order 
to do that we urgently need to understand the impacts of that malleability resulting 
from the digital representation of the entities from not only the physical realm, but 
also from the realms of the subjective and the intersubjective. 
Who cares? In the scholarly realm of international business, the changing land-
scape of international economy has been acknowledged and calls have been made 
to focus on the relevance of the IB research in the changing world (Buckley, 2002, 
Buckley and Lessard, 2005, Buckley, Doh and Benischke, 2017, Peng, 2004). The call 
for redefining some of the central units of analysis in the field of IB done in this 
dissertation contributes to that discussion, as addressing the new phenomena with 
concepts shaped to define older phenomena risks ignoring the new features through 
conceptualization based on the old features (using irrelevant variables), explaining 
such issues that are no longer the most relevant. 
8.2.3 Theoretical contributions of the thesis three, importance of doxa
What’s new? The impact of what I have here referred to as doxa in decision-making 
has been known for a long time (Benartzi and Thaler, 2007, Cyert and March, 1963, 
Drumwright et al., 2015, Eagleton and Bourdieu, 1992, Haidt, 2001, Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979, Kahneman, 2011, Lindblom, 1959, 1979, Myles, 2004, Simon, 1947, 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). With doxa I mean the notion of normal, the zone of 
taken for granted assumptions that unwittingly shape our decisions before we engage 
in reflection, born out of both vital individual level psychological mechanisms (Sok-
ka et al., 2016), and equally vital social mechanisms (Joas, 1997, Mead, 1934, Maitlis 
and Christianson, 2014, Weick, 1979, Wood, 2000, Wu et al., 2016) that enable first 
of all pursuing any reflective action undisturbed by irrelevant signals and second-
ly any collectively aligned action. The novelty in this theses consists of suggesting 
that not only does the digitalization create new mechanisms that shape this doxa 
(personalized worldview, social objects), but that our doxa, our unwitting actions, 
preferences, decisions shape the digital representation of reality under construction. 
Subsequently, when that digital reality is used in programming such algorithms that 
make decisions on behalf of humans, our doxic values and meaning making mech-
anisms become ossified – whether they represent such values and meaning making 
mechanisms we would reflectively prefer or not. 
So what? The ability to shape our doxa has immense power, as exemplified in the 
recent case of US presidential elections (Apuzzo and LaFraniere, 2018, Cadwallar 
and Graham-Harrison, 2018, Cadwallar, 2016, 2018, McNamee, 2018). Currently, 
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this power is explicitly wielded still by relatively few agents, however as the technolo-
gy exists, there is no reason to doubt that it will be increasingly used both overtly (as 
in the China Social Credit Rating System) and covertly (as it was in the Cambridge 
Analytica case). This means that the geopolitical power and the socio-political sys-
tems backing it are changing dramatically, and as scholars, these power battles should 
be a focal focus of analysis.
In addition, the constitution of the digital representation of reality grounded on 
our doxic elements requires scrutiny: what are the values we are currently construct-
ing this mechanism of dominance on? What are the unfolding tradeoffs (Newell and 
Marabelli, 2015) that we are willing to live with, and what can be done to enable 
deliberate choosing between those emerging tradeoffs? These are some of the focus 
areas in urgent need of increased scholarly attention.
Why so? Digital technology is increasingly ubiquitous and invisible: we are creat-
ing digital traces of not only our physical actions, but also our subjective and inter-
subjective preferences and values with both our deliberate digital actions and interac-
tions and through the developing sensor technology. This dataform representation of 
reality is accessed and used in further increasing our engagement with digital reality 
(by tailoring personalized worldviews and enabling social grouping based on social 
objects), and in programming such data processing algorithms that can utilize their 
pattern identification capabilities in realizing such commands as are by their wielders 
given. The more traces we leave, the more the algorithms “learn” about us, and the 
more efficient they become in executing the tasks given to them. 
Not only is this a problem in (by some definition) malicious desires of the con-
trollers of the algorithms, but also an inherent uncertainty in benevolent program-
ming. Lacking the human slowness in execution, the extant knowledge, values and 
preferences of the moment of programming the algorithm, are carried swiftly to the 
ensuing outcomes. This means that the changes in knowledge, preferences of values 
cannot be embedded in the processes during the process, subsequently meaning that 
if the a priori understanding of the desired outcomes proves out to be faulty, it will 
still be reached effectively. This means that not being aware of such doxa at the mo-
ment of programming that will at the moment of outcomes turn out having negative 
consequences, will have dire effects.
Why now? The advances in artificial intelligence are exceedingly rapid – as are the 
developments in sensor technology. This means that it is time to deeply ponder the 
underlying meaning making mechanisms and standards of desirability constituting 
our doxa and shaping our reflective actions. There is immense power potential in this 
mechanism, and reflecting who, why and what for that power is used is highly essential.
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Who cares? In the scholarly realm of information systems, for example Newell 
and Marabelli (2015) have initiated the discussion of the ensuing tradeoffs that digi-
talization has for the individual in terms of privacy-security, freedom-control and in-
dependence-dependence – in short the emergence of the Big Other as conceptualized 
by Zuboff (2015). The discussions of this thesis continue and contribute to that line 
of thinking. In addition, the political debates around the tradeoffs of technological 
prowess vs individual rights (Macaes, 2018), for example in relation to the EU Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation (Goodman and Flaxman, 2016, Weinberger, 2018b), 
might be enriched by some of the presented insights of this thesis. Furthermore, the 
discussions in this thesis are related to the themes in the field of ethics of artificial 
intelligence (Bostrom and Yudkowsky, 2014, Dignum, 2018, Sandler, 2016, Taylor, 
Schroeder and Cowls, 2014, Yampolskiy, 2013), with the contribution of highlighting 
the impact of doxa: it is not enough to reflectively fashion ethical guidelines, as also 
our doxa travels to the digital reality. 
Fundamentally, in my view, everyone should care. We are all contributing to the 
creation of digital representation of reality, and we are all impacted by how this cre-
ation subsequently shapes our lives. 
8.2.4 Theoretical contributions of the six ontological choices
What’s new? Philosophy of science is a vast area, and new contributions in that field 
are far beyond the scope of this research. However, the identification and integration 
of the six relevant ontological questions in social sciences have some novelty value in 
the limited sphere of business and management studies, as the previous discussions 
have mainly been focused on the more epistemological and methodological plural-
ities, and on the arguments of choosing one -ism over another. The novelty stems 
from illustrating that the divide between the objective and subjective isn’t absolute, 
but instead, depending on the understanding of reality, it is not illogical to pursue 
research from the vantage of moderate realism and moderate constructionism. Ulti-
mately the contribution is that of integration (MacInnis, 2011).
So what? In at least the research fields of international business (Welch et al., 2011, 
Welch and Piekkari, 2017), accounting (Hines, 1988b, Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2008, 
Lukka and Modell, 2010), information systems (Volkoff and Strong, 2013), and in-
ternational relations (Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009), there is a similar problem in 
terms of the philosophical underpinnings of research: offsprings of on the one hand 
positivist economics and on the other hand constructivist sociology (to render both 
simplified strawmen), there is a growing concern of  both the positivist approaches 
ability to capture the nuanced social phenomena, and the constructivist approaches 
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denying the underlying reality of the outcomes of those constructive processes. Fol-
lowing the objective-subjective divide of Burrell and Morgan (1979) or Morgan and 
Smircich (1980), offers unappealing tradeoffs, as the merits of idiographic methods 
even about entities considered objectively real seem valuable. The solutions for this 
shared problem differ in name, but not in nature: in the fields of international busi-
ness and information systems, the introduction of critical realism seems to provide 
a way to combine the best of both worlds, and the same promise is accepted from 
pragmatism in the fields of accounting and international relations. 
My integrative framework of ontological questions highlights that it is possible to 
detach the philosophical underpinnings from the straightjacket of the subjective-ob-
jective divide, as the nature of reality is nuanced enough to provide foundations for 
several types of epistemological or methodological choices. On the other hand, my 
integrative framework can also be used in deducing the illogical combination of un-
derlying ontological choices and the epistemological and methodological choices. 
For example, it is possible to utilize idiographic methods even with realistic ontology, 
however in that case the understanding of reality needs to be different than the naïve 
realism that doesn’t logically accept such methods. 
Why so? These six ontological questions capture the essence of the higher level 
debates of epistemology and methodology. Without being a philosopher, and thus 
having perused the whole of western philosophy, these questions are addressed in 
different ways in all business and management literature, and in the subsequent argu-
ments between diverse choices of -isms. The logical argumentation I can here provide 
is merely inductive, and even as such, limited to my limited exposure to philosophy: 
this means that even one ontological question beyond these that I have distilled, ren-
ders the construct incomplete. However, even in that case, this may be a start of a 
comprehensive list of ontological choices that can be used in trying to align the per-
sonal ontological worldview with the methods best suited to addressing the research 
topic at hand.  
Why now? There is growing interest in the fields several business and manage-
ment studies to identify such methodologies that enable capturing the complex so-
cial phenomena impossible to render into quantifiable variables, exemplified in the 
founding of a research method group in the Academy of International Business, the 
main international association of the field. This is underpinned by the increasing calls 
for relevance, and phenomenon based research (Doh, 2017), in order to not only try 
to create such knowledge the predictively explains through generalizations, but also 
aims at understanding the contextually relevant issues in the increasingly fragmented 
and complex economic environment. 
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Additionally, this integration of ontological perspectives was necessary for this re-
search, approaching the objects of enquiry through literatures viewing those objects 
from different philosophical vantages. In highlighting the diversity of choices I could 
hopefully draw logically from diverse streams of research, without succumbing to the 
threat of mistaking some of the fruits of wisdom as offsprings of such trees they did 
not grow in, thus ending up treating apples as oranges. Instead by doing this, I hoped 
to illustrate that in understanding fruits, seeing both apples and oranges is necessary.
Who cares? Depending on the area of socialization, some of these ontological 
questions are taken as more for granted than others, including what the “right” an-
swers to such questions are. It is my hope that through showing the available choices 
for founding one’s research, some of the unfruitful tensions emerging from the de-
bates between diverse -isms can be dissolved and the energy focused on more per-
tinent questions. In the field of international business, Welch and colleagues (2011, 
2017) have initiated a rich discussion of the widening sphere of different method-
ological possibilities that enable understanding more of the complex environment 
within the field scrutinized. This integrative framework is a contribution from the 
sidelines to that discussion. 
8.2.5 Theoretical contributions of the integrative framework of 
strategizing
What’s new? None of the components of the framework are new, however the 
framework in itself weaves a comprehensive picture of the diverse streams of de-
cision-making, strategic management (including industry, institution and resource 
based views, and the microfoundational approach of the last) and strategy-as-prac-
tice (strategizing), again proposing an integrative contribution, as discussed by Mac-
Innis (2011), sketched in the previous subchapter. Through Coleman’s tub, I showed 
how the different discussions each illustrate some parts of what I have here called 
strategizing, the individual level actions and decisions, fused together in social ac-
tion, shaped by the collective forces, aggregating into collective level outcomes. 
So what? Pursuing knowledge of the same phenomena from several philosophi-
cal, disciplinary and historical perspectives at the same time creates a huge overarch-
ing accumulation of detailed knowledge, and makes seeing, relating and understand-
ing that knowledge difficult. What from one perspective may be new, has already 
been known elsewhere: there is a risk of keeping constructing similar bricks without 
at any given time giving thought and effort to the edifice being built (Forscher, 1963).
Why so? Decision-making and strategic management have long been at the very 
core of business and management studies, because they pertain to the very elemental 
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activity of business operations: what to do next? This means that knowledge in these 
fields has been pursued from nigh all available philosophical perspectives. Therefore 
there are rich treasures of knowledge within each paradigm, making it less tempting 
to venture out from one’s own paradigm, as the pursuit of knowledge within each 
school of thought is already extensive. 
However, looking at the vast fields from outside, in order to see such shapes that 
could provide understanding as part of an entity, not as an entity of exploration per 
se, highlights that brutally ignoring some of the paradigmatic tensions allows seeing 
such shapes and patterns. For example, the importance of doxa, the unwitting, the 
subconscious is identifiable within each stream. The logic by which this integrative 
edifice was built was based on this type of pattern recognition: what are the smallest 
common denominators that enable trying to see this mass of knowledge as a struc-
turable entity?
Why now? In an era of transformation, like ours, thinking about future possibil-
ities is grounded on what we know about how the past possibilities were envisioned, 
realized and seized. Therefore synthesizing an integrative framework of strategizing 
can be helpful, as it may create understanding of which of the past ways of dealing 
the with inherent uncertainty of future were context and circumstance dependent, 
and which of what has been learned can be transferred into the new and changing 
contexts and circumstances. 
Who cares? In information systems research there is call for integrating the digi-
tal strategy with the overall business strategy (Bharadwaj et al., 2013), encompassing 
also the understanding of strategy-as-practice (Peppard et al., 2014). In international 
business research there is call for increased understanding of the role of institutions 
in strategy and the underpinning capabilities, elemental in the resource based view 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2010, Peng et al., 2008). In addition, there is a crescendoing 
call for microfoundational research (Felin and Foss, 2005, Felin et al., 2012, Felin et 
al., 2015), resonating yet clashing with the widening diffusion of strategy-as-practice 
and the narrative turn to strategic thinking (Milojević and Inayatullah, 2015, Vaara 
and Whittington, 2012). The integrative framework of strategizing might contribute 
to the scholarly understanding of these various perspectives by illustrating the inter-
faces, overlaps and commonalities of diverse discussions. 
8.2.6 Theoretical contributions of the new conceptualization of 
uncertainty
What’s new? The new contribution in the threefold conceptualization of uncertain-
ty is the integration of such types of uncertainty that reside in different ontological 
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realities, into one framework. Previously, the literatures of uncertainty, grounded in 
the paradigms of decision-making and strategy fields have discussed primarily the 
types of uncertainty here defined as the lack of knowledge (consisting of the open 
and closed sets of options and outcomes), and sometimes also touching the type of 
uncertainty arising from the choices of the standards of the desirability. However, the 
third type of uncertainty, the unfathomability of the meaning making mechanisms 
has not been explicitly understood as a type of uncertainty, but discussed separately 
in primarily post-modernism influenced literature. 
So what? With the creation of the digital representation of other realm realities, 
the impact of this third type of uncertainty becomes pronounced. Especially as the 
most familiar type of uncertainty, risk (and Ellsbergian ambiguity), will lose its rel-
evance, this third type of uncertainty needs to be addressed also beyond the discus-
sions of ethics. Tastes, values and preferences can no longer be taken as the points 
of origin (Bowles, 1998), but the mechanisms through which they emerge require 
deeper delving.
Why so? In this dissertation uncertainty is defined as not only lack of knowl-
edge, but as all of the elements responsible for making the dealing with the future 
difficult. This includes the diverse types of lack of knowledge (of both prospective 
and retrospective nature, eg. probabilities and equivocality), but also the difficulty of 
choosing between the standards of desirability that are ultimately non-objective, of a 
fundamentally constructed nature (making the choice of a goal always ultimately not 
objectively arguable), and the impossibility of tracing all possible meaning making 
mechanisms that result in the constructed standards of desirability. 
Why now? Digitalization makes reaching goals faster and more efficient. There-
fore, scrutinizing those goals, and the reasons for their goal-ness, needs attention. 
The increase in data and its processing capabilities does not remove all types of un-
certainty, but makes the sticky ones even trickier. Information in itself is not enough 
to evaporate the haze of uncertainty enveloping every future moment. 
Who cares? On a theoretical level, the scholars of uncertainty have been focused 
on the first types of uncertainties, but neglected the last type. This is most likely due 
to the different ontological nature of the third type of uncertainty, but should be 
remedied. The discussions pertaining to the dimension of lack of knowledge build on 
and further develop the typology of uncertainty created by Packard et al (2017). The 
discussions of the standards of desirability continue the argument of Bowles (1998) 
in assessing the non-given nature of the endogenous values and preferences, in addi-
tion to touching the themes of ethical decision-making (As-Saber and Cairns, 2015, 
Drumwright et al., 2015, Kolk, 2016, Treviño et al., 2006) and morality (Graham et 
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al., 2013). In short, understanding that the ethical and moral discussions do not only 
constitute a specific sphere, but are through their impact on the meaning making 
mechanisms linked firmly to the uncertainty we deal with whenever engaging in fu-
ture-oriented action, could contribute to not only the literatures of uncertainty and 
decision-making but also to the ethical debates tied to the technological advances, 
geopolitical turbulence and environmental condition. 
8.2.7 Theoretical contributions of the enablers of digitalization
What’s new? The discussions of the advances of digital technology and for example 
fourth industrial revolution are primarily focused on the explicit appearances and 
outcomes of technological change, but the fundamental drivers of datafication, uni-
formization of that data through digitizing, and connecting of that uniform data have 
been paid less attention. Sociotechnical and sociomaterial research have made valu-
able contributions to understanding the amalgam of technology and humans within 
the organizational context, however the discussions pertaining to this amalgam in 
wider societal context are scant. This research addressed both of these facets in trying 
to integrate existing knowledge about both the social aspects and the technological 
advances into a bigger picture.
So what? The various discussions of the specific individual technological advanc-
es (Linturi et al., 2014, 2016) cloud the fact that the emergence of digitalization is 
not dependent on any single technology, standard, solution or application. While 
individual technologies and standards have an impact on the speed and scope of the 
theoretically possible full convergence, the trajectory leading towards it is no longer 
dependent on any single agent or structure. Therefore in addition to observing the 
developments within each layer of technological solutions, attention should also be 
paid to the emerging wider picture: how do the three worlds of Popper look like when 
coupled with the digital representations of them?
Why so? Analyzing two previous “revolutions” in human history reveals that 
when an enabling technological idea is born, the subsequent changes in the level of 
the worldview, social causes and litany follow in its wake – slower or faster. The tech-
nological ideas of datafication and digitizing, and the unification of that data, can be 
such enablers that, independent of any single solutions have the power to drive such 
paradigmatic change. 
Why now? The previous industrial revolutions were identified ex post, whereas 
the revolutionary nature of the current technological changes is still speculative, as 
ultimately it is not possible to predict the future. However, should the identified en-
ablers drive changes of paradigmatic, revolutionary scale and scope, understanding 
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and continuously assessing their developments, and the subsequent impacts on the 
humanity is a valuable undertaking. 
Who cares? The literatures of K-waves (Wilenius and Casti, 2015), Industry 4.0 
(Hermann et al., 2015), future of work (Arthur, 2017), digital infrastructures (Tilson 
et al., 2010a, 2010b), individual level tradeoffs (Newell and Marabelli, 2015) and the 
emergence of Big Other (Zuboff, 2015) each deal with the implicated outcomes of the 
technological trajectory driven by these enablers. While most of the insights written 
here are familiar in one or few of these literatures, it is again the integration of these 
knowledges that contains the possibility of contribution to these diverse streams. 
8.3 Practical contributions: Twelve Tips for the Managers
This chapter is deliberately written in managementese, not as a scholarly piece of 
writing. 
1. Digitalization consists of creating technological capabilities and of figuring out 
how to utilize them in making profit. Because the creation of the capabilities is 
important and complicated, it is easy to get lost in the practical difficulties in-
volved in realizing them. However, do not lose sight of what it is that you actu-
ally wish to do with those new capabilities. This is extra difficult, because there 
are some technologies you need to install just to stay in the game, even before 
you quite know what to do with them, but also technologies that you will have 
no use for. So, tip number one: try to begin by figuring out the potential use 
and business model of the new technological capabilities before committing to 
creating them.
2. Are your offerings products, services or data? Doesn’t matter, as you will any-
way need to be able to create hybrids of them: if you are selling products, you 
might want to think if instead of selling them as physical stuff, you might sell 
what the stuff does? Instead of selling a car, sell the possibility of transportation 
(the costs of which you naturally calculate based on digital data) – or, depend-
ing on your brand, sell the experience of driving a particular car. In addition, 
your customers will have learned to expect that because you already have data 
about them, you will use that data in providing them with such offerings you 
know they like. The want you to save them the effort of going through the 
whole list of possibilities: think Netflix. While this applies also to products, it 
is essential in services.
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3. You need a data strategy. First of all, figure out whether your business needs 
big data or little data: would your business benefit from being able to see pat-
terns in different data sets (like a furniture firm who found out that there was 
a peak in incoming customers always a day after it had rained: deduced from 
comparing their customer data with other data sets and finding a correlation 
between weather and how rapidly their front door opened), or from being able 
to anticipate the behavior of an individual (like the insurance company that 
installs a tracking device on the cars of its customers and gives them discount 
if they drive carefully). When you know this, figure out whether you can get 
all the data from your own customers and operations or whether you would 
need to get data from other sources – and whether you have the capabilities 
to analyze the data in-house or whether you might want to have someone else 
analyze it for you. And finally, think about the data that you routinely harness 
and generate: how much of it can you utilize in your own business? Could 
someone else benefit from that data? If so, you might have a new business area.
4. You may have noticed that your industry is changing, and even fear that new 
entrants from other industries may steal your customers. One of the ways that 
this can be tackled is by offering the customers a turnkey solution, through one 
door: this drives what you know as ecosystems. By joining forces with other 
firms with partially collaborative and partially competitive aims, it is possible 
to combine different types of offerings in a way that strengthens the customer’s 
relationship to your ecosystem. Can you identify ecosystems or potential fu-
ture ecosystems in your field of business?
5. It may well be that when digitalization continues, these ecosystems actually 
hold the power and provide the competitive advantage – the best you can do 
as the decision-maker of an individual firm is to try to create or latch on to 
an ecosystem. But there are different roles you can play, depending on how 
much you want to commit to an ecosystem and to what extent you want your 
business offerings be based on the potential of the one ecosystem. If you want 
to be at the core of an ecosystem, you will be highly committed to it and bear 
the risk of its downfall – but at the same time the ecosystem provides you with 
rich business benefits (think Apple ecosystem or Samsung in the Android eco-
system). On the other hand, if you have the right kind of business (like a game 
development firm), you can exploit the benefits of several ecosystems (offering 
your games in both Google Play and AppStore), without suffering too much if 
one of the ecosystems fails.
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6. With the digital technologies it is possible to reach many operational goals 
much more rapidly than before. This is of course a good thing – provided 
that you could fashion such goals that you consider desirable also at the time 
of reaching them. Also, reaching the “wrong” goals will most likely have far 
more wide spread implications than before: nothing stays hidden in the digital 
realm, which means that once you have reached a goal that enough people 
consider bad (think case Cambridge Analytica), the damage to your business 
can be lethal. 
7. The problem of wrong goals is not limited to reputational damage, however. 
You may be aware that the human induced climate change is well on its way, 
and with it the whole future of our globe is threatened. This means that you 
have a chance of being remembered by your posterity as one of the people who 
speeded up the destruction of the only planet on which the humans can (so 
far) live, or one of the people who helped saving it. Ignoring this choice won’t 
make it go away.
8. With digital technology, you can control and monitor your employees in un-
precedented ways. You can for example have them wear identification badges 
that track their movements, record their conversations and analyze the level of 
enthusiasm they expressed in those conversations. However, before ordering 
a set of these, you might want to think about how do you perceive humans: 
do you believe that we are ultimately untrustworthy and will only do what is 
necessary when coerced, or do you believe that we can be trusted, and come 
up with our best ideas, do our best work when given free reign? If your choice 
is the first one, and you see people as untrustworthy, the tradeoff is that in that 
case your organization will not excel in anything that requires creativity, as 
that managerial perception (and its accompanying enforcements) have been 
proven to destroy creativity and innovation. But if you genuinely just need 
efficiency and your firm can live without new ideas, go ahead and call Hitachi 
for the monitoring badges. 
9. Now that we are discussing employees, you might have a think about what do 
you need them for in the future? It is old news that any routine manual labor 
can be automatized, and increasingly also cognitive routine work. This means 
that your accountants and lawyers will become as redundant as your factory 
line workers. Indeed, the only areas where humans will be needed are jobs that 
require human interaction (as we people just need other humans to show care) 
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and human creativity (as even the most advanced algorithms can only work on 
what has been given to them). This might even shake your chair as a CEO, if 
your daily routines consist of such profit analysis that, honestly, an algorithm 
can do better. However, if you are a constant source of new business ideas and 
models, or an invigorating presence in the work lives of your employees, you 
are invaluable (and might reconsider ordering the Hitachi monitor badges).
10. Of course, with the possibilities offered by microwork or crowdsourcing, you 
might be able to externalize also the ideating, and need to employ only such 
individuals who can sort out the ideas, and show good judgement in assessing 
which ideas are worth pursuing. Then the human skills your firm needs are, in 
addition to good judgement, good organizational skills, and the ability to ex-
ploit the external resources accessible through digitalization – maybe in terms 
of creating a digital platform (think AirBnB or Amazon), which you control 
and exploit in leveraging the resources and assets of the other participants in 
that platform.
11. No matter where you are physically located, your competition is no longer 
regional, because whatever you are offering, someone else is offering also – on-
line. You have essentially two choices: either to create such local offerings that 
appeal to the need of physical human interaction of people and their specific 
desires (for example a deli of local field-to-fork food), or to get involved in the 
power play of ecosystems, platforms, networks and global value chains in one 
role or another. 
12. If you end up at the top power position, please remember the words of the 
children’s book character Peppi Pitkätossu (Pippi Longstocking by Astrid 
Lindgren): “With great power comes great responsibility”. In shaping your 
goals and pursuing them from that position, remember that all actions have 
at least four types of consequences100: 1) the intended consequences driven by 
benevolent intentions, 2) the unintended consequences driven by benevolent 
intentions, 3) the intended consequences driven by malevolent intentions, and 
4) the unintended consequences driven by malevolent intentions. Take care 
in the goals you shape and the actions that you take from that position – be a 
force for the good.
100 As already before mentioned, I cannot take the credit for this fourfould insight of consequenc-
es as I stumbled upon it somewhere online quite some while ago. Unfortunately I have been 
unable to retrace the source, but my sincerest thanks go to the anonymous thinker responsible 
for this brilliant nutshell.
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8.4 Limitations of the research
The main limitation of this research follows from its integrative aims: as it has been 
my primary goal to combine extant knowledge from several areas in order to draw a 
bigger picture of the impacts of digitalization, the individual areas of knowledge have 
mandatorily remained more or less superficial. As such, the contributions of this dis-
sertation rest on the potential benefits of integration, instead of creating completely 
novel deep insights in regards to the individual themes here discussed. 
This limitation is evident in the method of data gathering: instead of carrying out 
extensive and comprehensive literature reviews of the vast literatures each of the focal 
themes here are grounded in, the data was collected based on a pre-existing under-
standing of some key areas and literatures, which were then expanded through snow-
ball sampling – ie. from the diverse articles, the relevant seeming references were 
selected and perused, which led the investigation further. As such, while I naturally 
hope that the data used in this dissertation provides sufficient groundings for my 
argumentation, none of the central chapters (strategizing, uncertainty, digitalization) 
should be read as attempts at full scholarly literature reviews covering all potential 
aspects and “state of the art” within the sectors.
In addition, as there exists relatively little scholarly material pertaining to some 
technology related themes and phenomena, the sources in such cases were online 
articles or blogs, documenting the phenomenon not from a scholarly perspective but 
from the personal view of the authors. However, care was taken in trying to utilize 
this material in a way where this type of material was considered as case examples, 
documenting a phenomenon of interest, instead of using the opinions expressed in 
the material as grounds for argumentation.
Furthermore, as the phenomena of this dissertation is currently unfolding, there 
simply is not data about such developments or events that have as of now not yet hap-
pened. Therefore, the argumentation is grounded on the so far recognizable trajecto-
ries, which, as we know from future research, may or may not be reliably extrapolated 
to illustrate the future developments. However, while this pertains to the focal theme 
of digitalization and its impacts, the themes of strategizing and uncertainty are not 
time sensitive in this sense. Even if digital technology vanished overnight, we might 
still benefit from paying more attention to our doxa. 
Yet another limitation pertains to the limits of this dissertation: as widely as it 
arches, there are still several relevant themes that would merit addressing and dis-
cussing in this context. In addition, many of the arising themes were discussed pri-
marily as thought triggers and conversation starters, without deeper scholarly delv-
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ing. For example the future of work was merely cursorily noted while it may well be 
one of the most impactful changes arising from digitalization. 
The ultimate big limitation of this dissertation is its lack of clear positioning. 
While some individual themes contribute to some individual scholarly discussions, 
as a whole, this dissertation falls in between diverse fields, disciplines and categories. 
It is up to the reader to decide the severity of this limitation.  
8.5 Future research avenues
At this point, writing this dissertation has awoken more questions than it has an-
swered them. First of all, the nature of uncertainty is all but clear, and would mer-
it deep scholarly engagement: my threefold conceptualization requires additional 
scholarly attention, and understanding the boundaries of the closed sets would have 
already now practical relevance. Secondly, what has here been synthetized and re-
ferred to as doxa, would warrant intense scrutiny both from the vantages of extant 
knowledge about its constitution and more importantly, from the perspective of its 
impacts in creating the digital representation of reality – or from its role in creating 
such social problems currently discussed as issues of cultural clashes, as the concept 
of culture is too coarse to capture the more nuanced differences better explained 
through doxa. Additionally, many of the integrative frameworks here drafted would 
benefit from deeper scrutiny and empirically driven reflections.
However, in this final chapter, instead of zooming into theoretical avenues, I will 
point out some of the big questions this research has awoken in at least me. The 
unfolding of digitalization is underway, and as a phenomenon offers ample research 
avenues – either through the macro level perspective or within diverse micro level 
phenomena, aggregating into the (potentially) paradigmatic level change. I will finish 
this dissertation by pointing out a few areas I personally find interesting and relevant 
from a very macro perspective – however acknowledging that they are but a drop in 
the ocean of research opportunities and needs emerging from the ongoing, datafica-
tion, digitizing and connectivity driven transformation.
Distribution of the benefits of economic activity. This is a theme that should be 
(and luckily, increasingly is) at the core of global political discussions right now. Ad-
vances in digitalization will severe the linkage of work from between the activities of 
individual humans and their ability to care about their sustenance. In short, we will, 
in the following decades, most likely enter an era of such structural unemployment 
that will make it impossible for most humans to transform their effort into material 
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benefits through work. As a ripple effect, the meaning of work as an individual level 
meaning making mechanism will necessarily undergo changes.
This requires serious discussions of the inherent value of human life, the roles of 
humans and society, and the roles of humans and firms. Does the society exist for 
the individual human, or do the humans exist for the society at large? Do the firms 
engage in economic activity in order to create better daily lives for the humans, or do 
humans exist in order to contribute to the bottom line of the firms, ie. the economic 
growth, either through consuming or through employment?
How do we view material and power inequality – do we accept is an eternal part 
of human civilizations, or something to be eradicated? If we wish to eradicate it, what 
are the new material wealth distribution mechanisms – and should they be globally 
overarching or regionally bound? If we accept it, how do we judge the value and 
entitlement of the individuals in the different ladders of that pyramid? What are the 
post-work mechanisms through which individuals can climb that ladder?
What will be the new meaning making mechanisms of an individual – from which 
building blocks will the individuals create their identity and meaningfulness? If the 
economic growth is a macro level representation of the human faith in progress, how 
can that faith in progress be realized on the individual level without work? Or should 
it be realized – how important is it for an individual to have a feeling of going for-
ward, towards something else than the (currently) inevitable death?
Narratives enabling collective existence on a limited globe. Recent times are 
characterized by the shattering of any shared narratives, faiths in Gods, Enlighten-
ment or Market. Instead, through the increasing connectivity, and its restrictions, we 
witness the emergence of a cornucopia of miniature institutions driving, enabling 
and restricting human action in smaller spheres. Even a diet can be a source of nigh 
religious behavior. 
At the same time the limitations of what our globe can tolerate are daily becoming 
more evident. How can we construct such shared meaning structures that would 
enable creating such standards of desirability that would support such collective ac-
tions as would be necessary to ensure the continuity of our shared co-existence on 
this planet?
What would the new stories be and where would they emerge from? If we accept 
that the time of grand narratives is gone, and mininarratives reign, can those smaller 
stories create enough shared understandings to enable harmonious co-existence and 
globally non-destructive actions?
Looking anew the roles and impacts of geographically, economically and so-
cially bound entities – exploring the new coalescences of power. Geographically 
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bound entities include nations, regions and sub-regions, economically bound enti-
ties consist of firms, value chains, production networks and ecosystems, and socially 
bound entities are formed around the diverse nodes of social objects, including po-
litical opinions, diets, individuals, hobbies, animal rights, vocations, skill-sets… the 
list goes on. 
In looking at the global socio-political sphere, which entities wield the most pow-
er? What are the power dynamics between the diverse collectives? What should we 
be paying attention to and how? Who will hold the power in the future: will it be 
coupled with financial wealth or official position (as a head of a geographically bound 
entity for example); with the access, ownership and processing capabilities of data, or 
maybe with a messiah-type presence that becomes an iconic social object that draws 
enough masses together?
For example, can we envision a future where the global socio-political power will 
be held by entities of different nature: China, Alphabet, EU, Putin, Facebook (if it 
survives the Cambridge Analytica scandal) to pick a few? At what arenas will the 
global negotiations be then undertaken? How will the economic, social and political 
structures then look like: for example, what will happen to markets and nations?
These types of changes, if they emerge, will emerge in an unforeseeably distant 
future. However, in identifying some of the trajectories leading to one or another 
alternative, we can either stay informed about how the future will shape out to be, or 
even try to change those trajectories with the capability of surprises engrained in us 
humans.
Seeing the big picture. I have a personal compulsion of trying to connect the dots 
whenever I see them. This compulsion was in part realized in writing this book, but 
beyond my personal disposition, I do believe that with all the knowledge we now 
have, we should understand more. We should be wiser. 
If we scholars don’t at times look up and release our rigorous grip on seeking more 
and more detailed knowledge, I fear that we may never become wise. And wisdom is 
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